Redefining Violence: Some Thoughts about Justice, Power, Peace, Respect, and the Fabric of Our Social Experience by Harzenski, Sharon S.
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 3
2001
Redefining Violence: Some Thoughts about Justice,
Power, Peace, Respect, and the Fabric of Our Social
Experience
Sharon S. Harzenski
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harzenski, Sharon S. "Redefining Violence: Some Thoughts about Justice, Power, Peace, Respect, and the Fabric of Our Social
Experience." American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 9, no. 2 (2001): 305-393.
HARZENSKI.FINAL.ASC02 9/19/01 5:34 PM
305
REDEFINING VIOLENCE:
SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT JUSTICE,
POWER, PEACE, RESPECT, AND THE
FABRIC OF OUR SOCIAL EXPERIENCE
SHARON S. HARZENSKI∗
Reasoning which proceeds without regard for the dignity of all
people is corrupted in its inception.1  Pure good cannot come of it
                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law. Temple University.  BS, Kean College, 1965.
JD, Temple University School of Law, 1974; LLM, Yale University, 1975.  To write I am obliged
to dedicate.  To dedicate I am obliged to acknowledge.  To acknowledge requires more than
what is usual.  The brief poem which follows is, as are other attempts at poetic expression in this
document, my own creation.  This footnote, this poem, speaks of my gratitude for those, from
Tibet, who have come here as teachers.
Books broken open
Welcome is spoken
Word seeds come to flower
The new home has a door and is entered.
The author of this Article would like to thank the James E. Beasley School of Law at Temple
University for its ongoing support.  In addition, I am especially grateful to Nancy Knauer who
suggested the appropriateness of publishing this work in this form.  I, of course, am responsible
for its failures.
1. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE, UNDERSTANDING
AND SHAPING THE LAW 113 (1987) (quoting Thoreau who said “action from the principal, the
perception and performance of a right, changes things and relations . . . it divides the
individual, separating the diabolical from the divine.”); see also id. at 119 (quoting Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., who said that “any law that uplifts human personality is just.  Any law that
degrades human personality is unjust.”); id. at 84 (quoting Socrates who said that
for I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by
reason, whatever reason may be which upon reflection appears to be to be the
best; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own
words: the principles which I have hitherto honored and reversed I still honor,
and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am certain to
agree with you.);
Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 214
(1943) (noting that “in a democratic society a policy maker must determine which adjustments
of human relationships are in fact compatible with the realization of democratic ideals.”);
Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362,
374-94 (1971) [hereinafter Lasswell & McDougal, Theory About Law] (stating that human dignity
is a guiding principle); GREGORY BATESON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 159-65 (1972)
(arguing that treating people as tools and things leads to destructive habits of thought).
Bateson suggests directional, not goal oriented, operations are respectful of the moral authority
of the human spirit.  See id.
1
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because it is inappropriately oriented or grounded.2
What is not pure is tainted.  What is tainted carries seeds of injury.
Injury is harm.  Harm is pain.  Pain disrupts peace, violates good
order.  Pain calls attention to itself, demanding relief, release.3 It
announces a need for remediation.
When an injury is severe enough, when the harm is great enough,
pain does not seep from wounds.  It screams.  A serious enough
injury can command an entire organism.  It can become the voice,
the brain, the very heart of awareness.4
Through the infliction of injury, pain invades consciousness.5
Whether I am injured by a deadly weapon, brought to extreme pain
by feet and fists, whether the pain comes first from the rape which
invades my body, and only later from the rape that invades my
integrity, or first from the fear of exposure to violence, and only later
from brutal physical trauma, whether the pain comes from verbal
abuse or mental torment, whether it flows from intentional cruelty,
careless degradation or ignorant disregard for the another’s integrity,
pain when it comes strips me of peace.6
Simple discomfort stimulates corrective strategies.  Severe
discomfort evokes more dramatic machinations.  Discomfort, which
rises to pain, produces stronger responses.  Pain demands.
When pain demands attention and is denied, at least sometimes
when that happens, all hell breaks loose.7  When all hell breaks loose
                                                          
2. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 469-75 (reporting that the Treaty of Versailles was an
instigation to World War II).
3. See THE FREUD READER 595 (Peter Gay ed., 1989) [hereinafter FREUD READER]
(identifying that “unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and
pleasure to a diminution.”) (emphasis omitted); see also id. (suggesting that “the mental
apparatus endeavours [sic] to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible.”);
id. (commenting that because pleasure corresponds to decreased mental excitations and
unpleasure corresponds to increasing mental excitations, the release of excitation the release of
unpleasure, is the release of tension); id. at 602 (referring to the release, at least after buildup,
as “discharge”); id. at 606-07 (noting that Freud describes a “protective shield” preventing
consciousness of each and every episode of excitational buildup and discharge).
4. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 607 (characterizing the breakthrough of excitation
as an “invasion”); see also id. at 608 (describing how the flood of cathectic has a series of effects
such as paralyzing processes, impoverishing, slowing down or halting other systems, and when
severe enough it can give rise to a “very violent phenomena of discharge”).
5. See id. (describing the effects of physical pain).
6. See SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 93-94 (1965)
[hereinafter FREUD, PSYCHO-ANALYSIS] (commenting that the same build up, break through
and cathetic flooding experience associated with an invasion of extreme excitation described
for pain similarly describes anxiety reactions).
7. I suppose the break out of neurotic symptoms is not necessarily demonstrative of the
truth of the statement that “all hell breaks loose.”  However, I believe it is demonstrative of the
claim that these processes run their course and that the courses run by these processes are
known to us, and recognized by us, as potentially debilitating if not downright horrific.  See
FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 88 (explaining that the nervous system is the inheritor of the
2
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no one would question the presence of violence.8
What I bring to this discussion are some pieces of a puzzle.  I have
been working on the puzzle for a long time.  I do not think you need
to know the origins and I do not think you need to know much more
about the puzzle to appreciate the pieces I have selected to share with
you.  Most of the pieces included here come from a book, still in
draft form, on power and justice.  What we thought, when we thought
of the benefits of offering these pieces in the context of Redefining
Violence, is that exploring impressionistically some aspects of the
relationship between power and justice might bring into focus
aspects, attributes, elements, and considerations of violence that
might otherwise remain obscure.
Anyone hoping to elicit clarity from muddledness is ambitious.9
Ambition connotes power.10  Power is spiked with violence.11
You are lawyers.  Among my peers I am duty bound to “prove” the
truth of statements.  We might as well start here with this cautionary
word.  I am willing, and I hope, able to reveal my reasoning on or
about a topic.  I did not write the material you are about to read
imagining or wishing to prove anything to anyone.  If you maintain
an “on guard” position, anticipating or hoping for proofs, which will
require contention or acquiescence, you will be disappointed.  What I
am inviting you to do is to join with me as we think about power,
justice and the pernicious influence of violence.
The material is divided into six sections.  Each section is
introduced by a series of short statements.  The material within each
section is subdivided into segments that vary in length from one
                                                          
general irritability of all protoplasm, and that the the nervous system functions to discharge); id.
at 96 (indicating that hysteria can be linked to the same discharge process).
8. See NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 205 (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter COVER] (stating that “prolonged pain does not simply
resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about . . . a state anterior to language, to the
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.”) (quoting ELAINE SCARRY,
THE BODY IN PAIN 4 (1985)).
9. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 3-8 (finding that muddleness is something that cannot
easily be put into order).
10. See RALPH GUN HOY SIU, THE CRAFT OF POWER 35 (1979) (observing that “anyone with
a . . . drive to accomplish anything wants to and does exercise power of one kind or another.”).
11. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 7-8 (David Wootton ed., 1995) (noting that the
prince has no trouble equating power, force and violence).  “A prince . . . must make himself
the chief protector of smaller neighboring powers . . . endeavor to weaken the most powerful,
and take care [against] stranger[s] equally powerful with himself.”  Id.  See also id. at 63 (stating
that “[a] prince . . . who is not master of the art of war . . . cannot be respected”); COVER, supra
note 8, at 143 (positing that “a judicial interpretation is authoritative in the sense that it
legitimates the use of force.”).  The author points out that “judges are people of violence,” id. at
155, and argues that “the violence which judges deploy as instruments of a modern nation-state
necessarily engages anyone who interprets the law in a course of conduct that entails either the
perpetration or suffering of this violence.”  Id. at 203.
3
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paragraph to several pages.  These segments have been lifted, and
subjected to substantial editing, from the book on power and justice
which is the source for this work.12  Sections I, IV, and V are taken
from the chapters in the book concerning power.  Sections II and III
are taken from the justice-focused material.  Section VI mixes both
power and justice sources.
I
Power is spiked with violence.
It goes to your head.
About inebriates, Buddha warned,
they lessened the capacity for self-recollection, for moral,
ethical, principled, behavior.
What is at stake here is your integrity and the integrity of
everyone you come in contact with.
Assuming you care at all, that is no small thing.13
a
What is the difference between power and an adrenaline rush?  If
you do not know you are in for some difficult times.
The confusion seems to be prevalent.  People easily mistake the
high of victory, the kick of getting over on others, the sweet feeling of
one upmanship with a meaningful exercise of power.14  Of course,
winning can be thrilling.  The sources or causes of confusion can be
hard to pin down.  Getting a judge or jury to accept your version of a
case is an undeniable exercise of power.  Successfully carrying out a
stunning play on the basketball court is an exercise of power.  It is the
kick some people get from these exercises that is neither power nor
necessarily indicative of power.  The kick, the rush, may make a
                                                          
12. The book from which these essays have been lifted is a work-in-progress on file at the
Temple Law School Library (unpublished manuscript on file with Temple University Law
School Library).
13. I wrote these introductory poetic sections when I collected and reorganized the excised
sections from the book.  The book has its own poetical introductory sections.  The introductory
poetics for this Article were originally written between February and March of 1999.  I rewrite
them about as frequently as I edit the work.  The current edition dates from February 2000.
14. See SIU, supra note 10, at 57 (“[M]ost persons of power eventually overreach
themselves.  They are flushed with gigantic egos and extraordinary self-confidence.  This is only
a short step to the magical transformation of what they are into what they are reaching for.”).
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person feel powerful.  Feeling powerful is not the equivalent of
exercising power.  That is all there is to it.
When the two are confused, when an individual feels powerful,
relies on this feeling as evidence of power, uses this feeling as positive
feedback about himself as a powerful person, he is deluded.15
In my experience people suffering from this delusion are unable to
appreciate their actual condition.16  They expect to be powerful.
They expect to be treated as powerful.  They are frequently
frustrated.  They treat non-compliant others as the cause of their
frustration.  They get angry with those who don’t bow to their wishes.
It’s an awful condition.  It’s very common.
What is the difference between power and an adrenaline rush?
Even when you do know you can be in for some difficult times.
One source of these difficulties has already been alluded to.  A
second calls for attention.  The fact that you know the difference
between the exercise of power and the excitement of victory won’t
protect you from those who do not.  In fact, knowing the difference
might make you impervious to the influence of their exuberance.
Your ability to discern might make you less susceptible to their
influence than someone who confuses the aura of success with skillful
practice.17  In effect, since you are able to resist, you become
identified as an independent source of frustration.  You will be
attacked for non-compliance.18
                                                          
15. See id. (demonstrating how delusion about oneself occurs).
16. See id. at 76 (recounting a story where a corporate executive’s desire for revenge had
been so intense that when he was struck down as director of the company, the violent swings
from “triumph to despair” and the ultimate humiliation he suffered may have contributed to
his death).
17. I assume that everyone has had an ‘emperor’s new clothes’ experience.  I am referring
to one of those times when the much-applauded idol of one or another cultural set appears to
you as the mediocre pretender she ‘really’ is.  The raved about history teacher is a pedantic
fool.  The acclaimed writer has nothing to say.  The up-and-coming associate is unable to
handle a reasonable client inquiry.  The newest car, computer, movie-of-note is a bust as far as
you can tell.  For instance, I recall, when attending a well-known law school, being enrolled in a
class taught by someone who had a sterling reputation as a leading scholar in his field.  Class
after class would go by with nothing but ordinariness.  Once, asking a question by which I
hoped to throw all this vacuity into sharp relief, I was thrown a comment suggesting that my
previous training incapacitated me for this more sophisticated level of analysis.  Admitting now
to the possibility of personal arrogance and, on that basis, error, I offer the episode as a candid
example of what can happen when the aura of success does not stun perception.
18. I once worked with a powerful organized crime figure.  He was, at the time I came to
know him, serving a twenty-year sentence in a federal prison.  For a variety of reasons he was not
doing time on another charge.  Not least among those reasons was the fact that he had been
acquitted.  He was convinced the acquittal was the result of his pro se management of this other
trial.  And, because he was convinced that he played a central role in gaining this acquittal for
himself, he had come to consider himself a bit of a legal pundit.  Now what he wanted was to
get the court to grant him a new trial for the charges that had landed him in prison.  I was
researching habeas law for him.  I was putting in long hours, working hard to present him with
5
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Certainly if you do not know that the world is populated by people
who confuse the two, you might find it hard to understand why so
many inept individuals expect to be treated with respect.  On the
other hand, if you know that power is not the equivalent of an
adrenaline rush you might also know that power is not the equivalent
of position or status.
The association between status and power is at least as clear as the
association between victory and power, maybe clearer.  When I was a
young student I was often told that we obeyed the principal or the
president or the police officer because he was the principal,
president, or police officer.  This is the kind of training that links
power and position.  This is hierarchical mythology at work.  You tell
an individual early and often that status operates in this way.  You
indoctrinate the person into a normative scheme of enforced
positional respect.  Societies with inherited royalty and nobility must
find ways of producing widespread acceptance of unreasonable
disparities.19  While the process of indoctrination is rarely called
brainwashing, I do not comprehend a difference between my early
childhood lessons and the process of indoctrination called
brainwashing.20
                                                          
the best information available.  The information did not favor his release.  His response was
nasty.  Because I didn’t tell him what he wanted to hear, he berated the legal system, my
judgment, my intelligence, and my willingness to serve his best interests.
19. See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 25 (quoting Plato’s REPUBLIC that “our
rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their
subjects.”).  According to Reisman and Schreiber, the maintenance of a belief system, essential
as it is to the established order, is a dynamic process with a coercive element.  Id. at 27.
Reisman also concludes that so important is the unifying mythology of a system that these
beliefs are transmitted, through acculturation processes, to the core organization of the
individual personality, so that, what threatens to disestablish the myth, threatens anomie and
personal disintegration as well.  Id. at 28; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE,
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 222-23 (1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT,
POWER/KNOWLEDGE] (discussing the means of establishing an hereditary hierarchical belief
scheme within the context of racism); GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 210-
13 (3d ed. 1961) (commenting on the development of hereditary hierarchy in Medieval
Kingship).  The author also discusses the Thomistic hierarchy, the material on post-feudalistic
developments leading to the development of absolute monarchies, and the material on the
divine right of kings.  Id. at 248-50, 331-35, 391-95.
20. See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 23 (stating that “[m]embership in the group
involves . . . acculturation, a profound shaping of the personality, in processes that impart [a]
preferred picture and make it part of the identity and cognitive structure of the individual.
That picture includes the official code of the group and much of its distinctive ritual.”).  The
authors elaborate on the indoctrination concept by noting that:
The apparatus for imposing ‘evils’ or deprivations for deviations from orthodox belief
may not be obvious.  For example, the potential characterization of eccentricity
may . . . deter the more timid . . . from verbalizing their perceptions . . . .  More serious
violators may be . . . declared insane. Such characterizations neutralize the deviants
and at the same time reinforce the accepted version of reality for the rest of the group.
Id. at 27.  For Reisman and Schreiber, “[b]elief in the myth system is a critical part of group
organization, the basis for mobilizing . . . collective activities.  Because it has been transmitted,
6
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Like the individuals who were unable to distinguish feelings of
victory from power accomplishments, people who inherit or inhabit
positions associated with control often expect control to flow from
them personally.  They confuse the exercise of positional power with
the exercise of personal power.
I have often heard this said as criticism of judges.  I think many
teachers suffer from some form of this delusion.21  Doctors, lawyers,
high level executives, military officers must all be prone to this
confusion.  I know of at least one family where aging parents insist
their position as parents entitles them to exercise ultimate authority
in the lives of adult children.  Does all this sound familiar to you?
Individuals who confuse their positional or status-based authority
with personal authority are bound to the same frustration as those
who confuse feeling powerful with being powerful.  And, people who
are not confused about these issues, those who know the judge is just
another ordinary citizen when her office doesn’t enthrone her, are
liable to elicit the pent-up fury of this frustration.
Is that enough information to alert you to what is not simple about
some simple forms of confusion concerning who is or who is not
powerful?  Further distortions lie beyond these simple forms.  For
now it is enough to notice that the expectation of power when
frustrated often finds expression in anger and violence.  While the
examples above generally involved low level violence, the fact is,
frustration is tension.  Tension is painful.  Pain seeks release.  People
who get resistance when they expect, and feel correct in expecting,
no resistance, may act out angrily toward those who disappoint their
expectations.
                                                          
through acculturation, to the core organization of the individual personality, a waning belief in
it, without a replacement, may lead to anomie and personal disintegration.”  Id. at 28.
21. I recall a difficult episode from fairly early in my law teaching career involving my
father.  I was teaching Contracts.  We were discussing a contract that held personal interest for
him.  He desired a particular outcome.  I resisted, assured of the technical correctness of my
interpretation.  He said, she said, he said, she said with increasing tension. Eventually we
reached a state of hostility that made substantive discussion impossible.  We broke off
communication.  I retreated into myself, a not infrequent response to confrontations with my
father.  I no longer recall what he did.  The anecdote fits here in this way: I was a law professor
who expected her authority, her knowledge of the law, to be respected.  He was my father who
expected his parental authority to be respected. I was busy acting out my status as law professor
while talking to my father.  He was busy acting out his status as father while speaking to a legal
authority.  Each of us was busy acting out behind our status masks. At the time we could not
conduct ourselves through that dynamic with these status roles disabled.  Now, over twenty years
later, we could do better.
7
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b
A friend of mine has a sixteen-year old son.22  After a troubled early
adolescence the son settled into a hard working active life.  He had a
full time summer job.  He stayed up late working on his computer.
He had a dirt bike that he continually rebuilt and raced.  My friend
believed her son was not getting enough sleep or nourishment.
Overall, though, until recently, she was delighted with his
development.
The story begins as dinner is put out for the family.  My friend calls
her son in from the backyard where he is working on his bike. “Oh,
do I have to come in now?” he whines.  “I’m in the middle of
something.  I’m not hungry.  I’ll eat later,” he adds.
“No!” my friend, his mother, retorts.  “You must come and eat
dinner now.  Now is when the family is having dinner.  Now is when
you are having dinner.”
“I don’t want dinner now,” he bellows, stomping into the kitchen,
revealing in every heavy footfall the annoyance of interrupted
concentration.  “I’ll eat when I want.”This evokes his mother’s
comment, “You can’t set meal times to suit yourself.  Either sit down
to eat with the family or go to your room.”
The son does neither.  He storms out.  Or, more accurately, he
moves in the direction of storming out of the house.  Mom jumps up
also, rushing after him.  She grabs his T-shirt, spins him around.
“You can’t ignore me like that,” she screams in his face. “I am your
mother.”
“F—-you,” he spits back, tearing himself away, to succeed in
escaping the house onto the front lawn.
“Don’t you ever speak to me like that,” Mom shouts running after
him.
                                                          
22. I did not make these stories up out of whole cloth.  But, had I, what meaningful
difference would that make?  Under no circumstances will I provide enough information to
allow anyone to identify the people I write about.  Their privacy, so shockingly invaded by my
use of them as subjects, entitles them to as much confidentiality as possible under the
circumstances.  Nevertheless, I appreciate that people who read the sections describing the lives
of my family and friends might want to know more.  So, for me, the question is, what more
could I tell you? What are you entitled to know beyond my assertion, my personal assurance,
that these are not fictional creations?  I know there is an entire literature devoted, or semi-
devoted, to the issue of facticity in these matters.  Patricia Williams was once the subject, if not
the author, of some of this literature.  Jacques Derrida, also, addresses the question.  Surely,
though, entertaining that tangent would simply distract us from the already dizzying complexity
of ideas presented.  The facts underlying this section occurred over four years ago.  They were
reported to me over a time which stretched to several months.
8
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“I’ll speak to you the way you deserve, you B——” he turns on her
with hatred burning his leering mouth.
The mother realized something had gone terribly, terribly wrong
here.  She and her son are in the middle of their lawn, cursing each
other out in a trap of fury neither seems able to stop.  She knows in
this moment that she should not have followed him out of the house.
She knows she should have given him a chance to cool down before
she disciplined him, before she attempted to discipline him, for his
refusal to abide by the rules of the house.  She knows, but she cannot
stop herself.  She feels absolutely justified, indeed, she feels obliged
by parental responsibility to continue down the path of
confrontation.
Have you been there as a child? As a parent? Or as a witness?  If
you’ve been there you know, the situation can deteriorate.  It can.  It
did.
Out on the lawn the son continues to call his Mother names.  She
continues to demand corrective action.  She slaps him.  He pushes
her.  He calls her more names, worse names.  She grabs hold of his
neck and repeatedly hits him.
When words aren’t enough, we may escalate to action.  Unable to
express intensity in language, we move to physical injury.
I am going to tell you something else about my friend.  I am going
to tell you that two years ago, after a lifetime of on again-off again
brutality, her father beat her mother to death.23
So there on their front lawn, my friend is hitting her son.  Her son
is hitting back.  Fortunately, at sixteen, he is still unable to bring
himself to use too much force against his Mother.  She is hitting and
hitting until he breaks free and runs to his room where he locks the
door behind him.
Remember when my friend knew earlier in the confrontation that
she was going down the wrong road.  She knew but kept going out
of . . . out of whatever it is that drives us to misconduct in the face of
conscience.  Of course, she is sorry.  Of course, she cried.  But, along
with her sorrow she continues to harbor a desire, almost a need, for
                                                          
23. My friend’s father was an alcoholic.  He reached a stage, early in my friend’s life, which
combined alcohol and physical brutality.  When he drank, he was violent. When he was violent,
he beat his wife.  This is not an uncommon pattern. Many people have experienced it.  After
many years of broken promises, separations, reconciliations, the couple, my friend’s parents,
reached stability.  Her father ceased drinking, her mother felt safe.  Years of sobriety assured
the family of a fundamental change in reality. Then, to everyone’s dismay, my friend’s father,
who was suffering from some age-associated deterioration, ceased taking needed medication,
got drunk and beat his wife, an event which caused her death.  Needless to say, the batterer was
mortified, mortified to the point of suicide.  He was institutionalized, released to jail, and
eventually committed as mentally ill.
9
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her son to apologize first.
Do you remember “You started it!” from your childhood?  I do.  I
think, in a small part, my friend is caught up there.
My friend’s troubles, though, are complicated and disturbing.
Conflict evokes stress that is released as violence.  My friend was
raised to it, trained in it, indoctrinated you might say, brainwashed,
modeled, taught.  It isn’t idiosyncratic.  My friend is one of many.
For people like this, from the acknowledgment that conflict is an
ordinary fact of life it pretty much follows that violence, intense
violence, is an ordinary fact of life.24  Violence is attached to conflict
as the coping mechanism of choice for the stresses of our social
condition.25  Violence relieves the stresses of inevitable conflict.
It’s frightening, frightening but true.  There must be a better way.
Whatever that better way consists of, power that masks violence in
smooth language or polished institutions is not the whole answer.
Masked violence is violence plus deception.  That is not to say that
there aren’t ways of ameliorating violence, watering it down, diluting
its concentration.26  The language and institutions in such a system
could not claim purity.  Violent flavors, violent elements, would be
present threatening to corrupt the trend toward reliance on more
developed coping skills.  But, the difficulty of eliminating violence
does not necessarily implicate us in deception if we are aware of the
additive condition.  As we make a transition from one mode to
another we could gradually phase out violence reliance, phase in
alternatives.27
                                                          
24. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 749.  Freud stated:
men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved . . . [but] creatures among whose
instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness that
waits for some provocation or puts itself at the service of some other purpose, whose
goal might also have been reached by milder measures.
Id.  Freud further believed that “[i]t is . . . not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of this
inclination to aggression.  They do not feel comfortable without it.”  Id. at 751.
25. See id. at 88 (opining that “discharge represents the primary function of the nervous
system.”).
26. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN, ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 155, 157 (1995) [hereinafter CORNELL, IMAGINARY DOMAIN] (noting that
Angela Carter and Catherine MacKinnon view pornography as a form of anti-woman violence);
see also COVER, supra note 8, at 255, 261 (comprehending the tragic necessity of law’s violence as
justified by the law’s disciplined reliance on collective decision rules).  “[I]nside the law, and
against the possibilities of undisciplined force and aggression, legal interpretaion and the law’s
social organization are looked to as the domain to achieve . . . ‘the domestication of violence.’”
Id. at 264.
27. See COVER, supra note 8, at 236-38 (recognizing that violence fuels legal decisions,
yielding recognition of shared responsibility for that violence).  The process of aggregating
voices and the creation of a continuum of degrees of commonality do not fully answer the
problem.  Id.
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Those of us who know alternatives need to share with those of us
who do not know them how to confront, how to enter and participate
in conflict, without constant resort and reliance on settlement by
violence.
If you think it is possible, get started.28
c
The emphasis in our legal system on process values29 rather
than outcomes,30 when it is not a deceit, is a step in the right
direction.  When winning takes a back seat to conduct there is some
hope that conflicts can be resolved without a minimum of violence.
There are people working on the subject, people studying the
quantum of violence that taints, infects, irreparably corrupts or
                                                          
28. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 287-306 (offering three models of learning as a means of
developing mental facilities capable of handling knowledge, operating with understanding, and
resolving profoundly disturbing contraries in a modern world); see also FREUD, PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 147-48 (expressing hopefulness in the potential of psycho-analysis to
assist children to make thorough and lasting adjustments in their lives); BERTRAND RUSSELL,
UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 106 (1950) (suggesting that “[u]ntil you have admitted your own fears to
yourself, and have guarded yourself . . . against their myth-making power, you cannot hope to
think truly . . . . Fear is the main source of superstition, and one of the main sources of cruelty.
To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom.”).  Russell suggests “sheer courage” as the
preferred technique.  Id.  See also HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 14-15 (1968)
[hereinafter ARENDT, PAST] (believing that a deep and searching investigation into the origins
of traditional concepts is a means of distilling their original and hope-giving spirit).
29. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87-88
(1980) (noting that it is not so much who ends up with what that is of constitutional
importance, rather what matters more is how the process operated to reach distributional
results); see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 2 (1959) (stating a neutral principle alternative to Ely’s representational reinforcement
model).  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
264-65 (1990).
Legal reasoning, which is rooted in a concern for legitimate process rather than
preferred results, is an instrument designed to restrict judges to their proper role in a
constitutional democracy.  That style of analysis marks off the line between judicial
and legislative power, which is to say that it preserves the constitutional separation of
powers, which is to say that it preserves both democratic freedom and individual
freedom.  Yet legal reasoning must begin with a body of rules or principles or major
premises that are independent of the judge’s preferences.
Id.  Bork continued his analysis by stating that “[it is] impossible under any philosophy of
judging other than the view that the original understanding of the Constitution is the exclusive
source for those exterior principles.”  Id.
30. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 156 n.4 (quoting Margaret Mead that
by working toward defined ends we commit ourselves to the manipulation of persons,
and therefore to the negation of democracy.  Only by working in terms of values
which are limited to defining direction is it possible for us to use scientific methods in
the control of the process without the negation of the moral autonomy of the human
spirit.)
(emphasis in original).
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disturbs a developing situation.31  As far as I know we simply do not
know how much violence and hostility can be introduced into a
child’s life without twisting that child toward the conflict-stress-relief
formula of brutality.
We know even less about the effects of societal abuse.  In the daily
lives of ordinary people, how much undue intensity, restraint or
constraint, coercion, duress, compulsion or force is tolerated before
the distorted pattern is internalized and replicated, like a virus,
spreading itself through individuals across the population?32
These are questions people who work with power must ask.  Our
work is in the raw material of destruction.33  There is no point in
                                                          
31. D. GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR
AND SOCIETY 44 (Little Brown, 1995) (citing R.L. Swank & W.E. Marhcand, Combat Neuroses:
Development of Combat Exhaustion, in ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 55, 236-47
(1899)). See also HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 13 (1963) [hereinafter ARENDT,
REVOLUTION] (noting that revolution has often served to justify war and its violence on the
grounds of an original evil inherent in human affairs and manifest in the criminal beginning of
human history).  Anecdotally, I recall with respect a class I took with Harold Lasswell at Temple
University in the fall of 1973.  At that time he was working out of the John Jay School of
Criminal Justice studying the South Bronx.  Periodically during the course of our semester,
Professor Lasswell would provide us with brief updates on the progress of this investigation.
The information he provided us was never hopeful.  According to his study, the South Bronx
was being systematically raped (my word not Lasswell’s) by and through the spread of a criminal
drug culture.  The energy, wealth and integrity of this community were deteriorating.  Professor
Lasswell was convinced that the process of depletion had already progressed beyond ordinary
means of redemption.  I wish I could, but I cannot, recall with detail the specifics of Professor
Lasswell’s observations.  I know he studied the normal established institutions, schools, police,
churches, jobs; he also studied corner stores, small businesses, family structures, clubs, traffic
patterns.  Unfortunately, because of the flawed memory I cannot reconstruct the useful
information concerning how it was that Professor Lasswell combined information bits into his
hypothesis about conditions in the South Bronx.  I do know that I was alerted by Professor
Lasswell in this 1973 class to the devastating effects drugs were having on what he told us had
once been a struggling but not unsuccessful community.  The plague drugs have become for
many in the present was forecasted by Harold Lasswell’s report.  So, for myself, I know that this
work of prediction is, given the talent and willingness, doable.
32. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 492 (explaining that “[t]here is an ecology of bad ideas,
just as there is an ecology of weeds, and it is characteristic of the system that basic error
propagates itself.  It branches out like a rooted parasite through the tissues of life.”).  Bateson
further notes that “there is no area in which false premises regarding the nature of self and its
relation to others can be so surely productive of destruction and ugliness as this area of ideas
about control.”  Id. at 267.
Under the influence of great fear, almost everybody becomes superstitious.
Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity towards those
who are not regarded as members of the herd . . . . Fear generates impulses of cruelty .
. . . Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think
sanely under the influence of a great fear.
Id.  See also RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 108-09.
33. See ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 86-87 (explaining that in an age guided by
Heisenbergian realization, “everything is possible not only in the realm of ideas but in the field
of reality itself.”); see also id. (noting that totalitarian systems unite hypothesis with “consistently
guided action[s]” which are then observable as objectively true); id. at 141 (finding that living
in a political realm without the restraint of authority or an awareness of a source of leaves
humans without the protections of traditional, self-evident standards of conduct to help resolve
12
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pretending that our work is solely creative or that its creative
capacities obviously outweigh destructive tendencies.  Contradictory
evidence surrounds us.  We are obliged to investigate.
Meanwhile, the duty to investigate does nothing to change the
primal drift.  Since we are going to rely on technologies of power to
accomplish our personal, professional or communal objectives, since
we are not going to shy away from any and all conflict, we need to
consider ameliorating possibilities.  In addition to the emphasis on
conduct, we need to identify and practice antidotal skills.
What are some of these alternatives?  Starting with our initiating
paradigm, coping with the stresses of conflict without resorting to
violence as a release mechanism, we can identify several alternatives:
(1) “Love your enemy” comes to mind along with “equanimity.”34
Both focus on softening the affects of enmity.  Empathy is a
technique.  When empathy, or a heartfelt attachment to the well-
being of your opponent dominates your attitude, it is hard to turn to
hostility as a means of resolving disagreements.  People have told me
that love eliminates antagonism.35 In love is there generally less
conflict?  In love is the stress of conflict weakened?  Is the inclination
to relieve oneself through brutality lessened?  Perhaps all three occur.
Genuine love, friendship, and empathy can shift attention away from
                                                          
the inevitable problems of living together).
They say that power corrupts; but this, I suspect, is nonsense.  What is true is that the
idea of power corrupts.  Power corrupts most rapidly those who believe in it, and it is
they who will want it most . . . .  But the myth of power . . . is very powerful . . . most
people believe in it . . . .  [I]f everybody believes in it, [it] becomes . . . self validating.
But it is still epistemological lunacy and leads inevitably to various sorts of disaster.
BATESON, supra note 1, at 486-87 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 445-46 (explaining as “the
power ratio between purposive technology and environment” change, man, as the “changer of
his environment,” has become “fully able to wreck” the environment and himself); id. at 434
(noting further that “conscious purpose is now empowered to upset the balances of the body, of
society, and of the body around us.  A pathology - a loss of balance - is threatened.”).
34. Luke 6: 27-31 (New Oxford):
But I say to you . . . .  Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those
who curse you, pray for those who abuse you.  To him who strikes you on the cheek,
offer the other also; and, from him who takes away your coat do not withhold even
your shirt.  Give to everyone who begs from you; and of him who takes away your
goods do not ask them again.  And as you wish that men would do to you, do so to
them.
35. See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 165-66 (Indiana Univ. Press
1996) [hereinafter LEVINAS, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS].
Ask . . . if peace, instead of being the result of an absorption or disappearance of
alterity, would not on the contrary be the fraternal mode of proximity to the other,
which would not simply be the failure to coincide with the other but would signify
precisely the surplus of sociality over every solitude - the surplus of sociality and of love.
Hence, peace as love.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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primitive modes of stress or conflict management.
(2) Another alternative to violence is offered by the practice of
calmness.36  A person able to manage stress, especially the stress of
conflict, without accumulating disturbing levels of built-up emotional
pressure, has less need to relieve him/herself by blowing off the
steam associated with temper and explosive violence.37  Many
individuals learn to meditate or undertake similar disciplines for this
purpose.
(3) One of the teachers who instructed me emphasized the utility
of awareness as a third alternative to violence.  For him, awareness of
the overall futility of animosity, the general unsuitability of hostility,
and the high cost to one’s self of antagonistic attitudes and behaviors
will, over time, generate a desire to develop the ways of generosity
and kindness.38
(4) A highly developed, well-integrated map of the totality of
circumstances might help keep things in a workable perspective.  I
have always thought that if saner minds contemplated the goals and
the human cost of World War I, an awful and seemingly endless war
could have been avoided.  Similarly, I remember reminding myself as
my first marriage dissolved that the comparatively small amount of
money involved in our property disputes would not justify arguments
upsetting to our college-age son.  
(5) Conflict avoidance can be accomplished by setting up clear
demarcations and procedures beforehand.39  Many people know how
to set boundaries.  People know how to walk away from trouble.
The idea here is not to disable anyone as a powerful professional.
The idea is to add to the library of strategic options and technologies
                                                          
36. MASTER SANTIDEVA, A GUIDE TO THE BODHISATTVA WAY OF LIFE 47 (1997).  “Untamed,
mad elephants do not inflict as much harm in this world as does the unleashed elephant of the
mind . . . .”  Id. at 61.  “The mind does not find peace, nor does it enjoy pleasure and joy, nor
does it find sleep or fortitude when the thorn of hatred dwells in the heart.”  Id. at 89.  “[O]ne
should stabilize the mind in meditative concentration, since a person whose mind is distracted
lives between the fangs of mental affliction . . . .  [Q]uiescence eradicates mental afflictions . . . .
Quiescence is due to detachment toward the world and due to joy.”  Id.
37. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 88 (stating that “discharge represents the primary
function of the nervous system.”); see also id. (explaining Freud’s work as authority for the
observation that discharges of energy were often violent); BATESON, supra note 1, at 68-72
(explaining that schismogenesis or progressive differentiation is a process characterized by
escalating patterns of differentiation which, if not restrained or restricted, can lead to a systemic
breakdown.  When the term is applied to human relations, the escalation can lead to extreme
rivalry and hostility prior to breakdown).
38. See SANTIDEVA, supra note 36, at 89 (reminding that lack of awareness allows the
unleashed elephant mind to romp freely).
39. RICHARD WILHELM, THE I CHING (BOOK OF CHANGES) 29 (Cary Baynes trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1950) (“If rights and duties are exactly defined . . . the
cause of conflict is removed in advance.”).
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of power, comfortably available to those who shun force and violence.
II
The idea of whipping people into a just condition lies.
“The wrath of God” “Hell fire and damnation”
herald horror along with the Prince of Peace.
The loud, brutal nature of
injustice more familiar,
more common,
then justice’s whispered voice
whose delicate quality
needs peace to survive.40
a
Have you seen the bumper sticker “No Jesus, No Peace/Know
Jesus, Know Peace?” I think of that bumper sticker as a way of
communicating.  I think of it as a quippy, clever way of
communicating.  It is connected, albeit through some extreme
stretching, with the difficulties of talking to someone about what they
can or cannot, should or should not, do to get peace in their lives.  If
these people are like my friend in the earlier story and cannot follow
the given instructions, perhaps because they have too little peace in
their lives to use that peace as a meditative starting point for attaining
more, what are our options?
Think about it.  What can you do?  You cannot yell at people as a
way of directing them toward peace.41  You cannot set them up in
highly structured environments pervaded with peacefulness as a
                                                          
40. Sharon S. Harzenski, unnamed work (Feb. 2000) (manuscript on file with author).
41. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 208 (explaining a breakdown in understanding that
occurs in double bind situations).  Double bind situations are described as: (1) involving
intense, vitally important relationships, in which the capacity to respond appropriately is
desired such that discriminating accurately about the nature of the message arises as a priority;
(2) concerning the communication of two orders of messages wherein one order denies the
other, for instance, one message asserts the importance of peace while the other message
assaults the nervous system as a means of facilitation; 3) denying the recipient an opportunity to
comment on the disparity, thereby denying the recipient an opportunity to determine an
appropriate response.  Id.  Regarding the last situation, if the recipient was told by a screaming
individual accompanied by angry facial expressions and threatening body language to control
his hostile reactions to events by responding in a peaceful manner, he can hardly know whether
he is being directed to respond to the lesson about peace or the lesson about aggression.  A
cowed “Yes, Ma’am” is about all one can do, which is not about peace as much as it is about
appeasement.
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means of introducing peace into their lives.  You cannot lock them
up.  You cannot provide them with a foolproof, available to anyone,
set of instructions for producing peace. 42
So, really, what can you do?  You can lead by example.  You can
show peacefulness in the way you treat them, in the way you treat
others and in the way you live your life.  You can point them in the
direction of what you identify as the source, fountain or foundation
of your peace.  Like the bumper sticker, you can share your truth.43
b
When people live reasonably, inflaming their passions demeans
them.  Emotional impulsiveness is not maturity.  If you foment
emotionality among immature people you may not actually demean
them.  Neither do you educate, elevate, or inform them.  Instead you
act as an opportunist by taking advantage of the weaknesses in your
audience.44
You may think or wish to think that justice was the issue.  You may
believe that passionate commitment and the expression of that
passion justifies emotional instigation.  But the manipulation of
passion is degrading work.  Justice has nothing to do with conduct
that debases the relevant actors.45
                                                          
42. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY, REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 184 (1980)
(discussing the theme that polycentric tasks are best managed, and in fact are both ‘ideally’ and
practically manageable, only within a system of mutual adjustments); see also id. (noting that
because of this belief, Polanyi speaks critically throughout this volume of and about attempts to
manage complex human endeavors through state or religious means); RUSSELL, supra note 28,
at 123 (“[I]t is important . . . to realize the limitations of what can be done by organization.
Every system should allow for loopholes and exceptions, for if it does not it will in the end crush
all that is best.”).
43. See POLANYI, supra note 42, at 6 (speaking about the love of knowledge, the spirit of
pure scholarship and the communal experience of independent effort within a community of
shared values).  Polanyi continues in this vein by stating that “the world needs science today
above all as an example of the good life.  Spread over the planet scientists form . . . the body of
a great and good society.”  Id.; see also ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 14 (promising to share
“how to think” examples because “thought . . . arises out of incidents of living experience and
must remain bound to them as . . . guideposts.”); RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 118 (speaking
about a teacher who conveys what is in his heart to his students).
44. See RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 121 (warning that for democracy to survive, “a teacher
should endeavor to produce in his pupils . . . the kind of tolerance that springs from an
endeavor to understand those . . . different from ourselves.”).  This is a necessary educational
undertaking because
It is perhaps a natural human impulse to view with horror and disgust all manners and
customs different from those to which we are used.  Ants and savages put strangers to
death.  And those who have never traveled physically or mentally find it difficult to
tolerate . . . queer ways and outlandish beliefs . . . .
Id.
45. See id. (warning against instilling collective hysteria, which is “the most mad and cruel
16
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Efforts to educate, train and discipline individuals so that the
maturation of reason takes place cannot depend upon degrading
techniques.46  People who are disciplined through degradation are, of
course, degraded.47 What this means is that if you take advantage of
authority to enforce your will at the expense of respecting another’s
dignity, you introduce vice into the equation.48  You are choosing to
act in derogation of the standards to which a respectful person in
your position would adhere.  You are corrupting rather than
constructing.
You may have been taught and may wish to believe that harsh
methods are required to bring about the establishment of disciplined
conduct.49  But, the use of undue harshness weakens, rather than
                                                          
of all human emotions”); see also id. at 119 (propagandizing rather than educating students
“[d]estroys in them all generous vigor, replacing it by envy, destructiveness, and cruelty . . . .
There is no need for men to be cruel; on the contrary . . . .  Cruelty results from thwarting in
early years, above all from thwarting what is good.”).
46. See ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 181 (explaining that “emancipated from the
authority of adults the child has not been freed but been subjected to a much more terrifying
and truly tyrannical authority, the tyranny of the majority.”); see also id. at 183 (noting “the very
thing that should prepare the child for the world of adults, the gradually acquired habit of work
and not-playing, is done away with . . .”).  See generally id. at 173-96 (regarding “The Crisis in
Education”); RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 112-23 (relating to a discussion of “The Functions of a
Teacher”); FREUD, PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 181-87 (discussing elicitation of hysteria in
a fourteen-year-old girl as the result of sexual relations with an older man).
47. See WILHELM, supra note 39, at 22 (discussing the effects of degradation on the human
spirit).
Law is the beginning of education.  Youth in its inexperience is inclined at first to take
everything carelessly and playfully.  It must be shown the seriousness of life . . . .  He
who plays with life never amounts to anything.  However, discipline should not
degenerate into drill.  Continuous drill has a humiliating effect and cripples man’s
powers.
Id. at 22; see also id. at 23 (noting further that “often the teacher, when confronted with such
entangled folly [speaking of the folly of clinging to unrealistic fantasies] has no other course
but to leave the fool to himself . . . not sparing him the humiliation that results.  This is
frequently the only means of rescue.”); id. at 234 (“If one is too severe in setting up restrictions,
people will not endure them.  The more consistent such severity, the worse it is, for in the long
run a reaction is unavoidable.”).
48. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 163-64 (discussing the tragic process which occurs when
anyone decides that the “end justifies the means”).
[T]hat the ‘end justifies the means’ in their efforts to achieve either a Christian or a
blueprinted heaven-on-earth . . . they ignore the fact that in social manipulation, the
tools are not hammers and screwdrivers . . . .  [I]n social manipulation our tools are
people, and people learn, and they acquire habits which are more subtle and pervasive
than the tricks which the blueprinter [Bateson’s term for the person attempting to get
students to generate specific behaviors toward the end; i.e. goal, of creating some
specific social reality] teaches them . . . .  [B]ecause the children are people they will
do more than learn this simple trick [referring to a ‘report on your parents’ directive]
they will build this experience into their whole philosophy of life . . . .  [The parent
spying directive] will color . . . [the children’s] attitudes toward authority.
Id. at 163-64.
49. But see RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 148 (emphasizing “how much brutality has been
justified by the rhyme ‘A dog, a wife, and a walnut tree, The more you beat them the better they
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strengthens, an individual’s ability to acquire self-control.50
Justice cannot be developed under conditions that weaken
participants.  To cultivate justice, self-development and respect are
the keys to success.51
c
Responsible adults remain alert to injustice within their families
and communities.52 Responsible adults want to know what is going
wrong so that they can work with others to make the necessary
corrections.53  Injustice can corrupt quickly.  People who love justice
are ill at ease in situations heavily laden with injustice.  Injustice twists
people out of equality and mutuality into positions of defensiveness,
competition, judgment and hostility.
We are not at peace when injustice tarnishes our interactions with
others.  Laws that establish and maintain unjust systems are violent
expressions of oppressive power.
                                                          
be . . . .’  The reformative effect of punishment is a belief that dies hard, chiefly I think, because
it is so satisfying to our sadistic impulse.”).
50. YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, HAGAKURE 39-40 (William Scott Wilson trans., 1979).
There is a way of bringing up the child.  From . . . infancy one should encourage
bravery and avoid trivially frightening or teasing the child.  If a person is affected by
cowardice as a child, it remains a lifetime scar.  It is a mistake for parents to
thoughtlessly make their children dread lightening, or have them not go into dark
places, or tell them frightening things in order to stop them from crying . . . .
Furthermore, a child will become timid if he is scolded severely.
Id.
51. See CORNELL, IMAGINARY DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 5 (stating that “the freedom to
struggle to become a person is a chance . . . which depends on a . . . set of conditions that I
refer to as minimum conditions for individuation . . . .  [E]ach one . . . must have the chance to
take on this struggle in his or her own unique way.”).
52. See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY 245 (Duquesne Univ. Press 1969)
[hereinafter LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY] (stating that “[b]ehind the straight line of the
law of the land of goodness extends infinite and unexplored, necessitating all the resources of a
single presence.  I am therefore necessary for justice, as responsible beyond every limit fixed by
an objective law.”); see also id. at 247 (noting further that “[g]oodness consists in taking up a
position in being such that the Other counts more than myself.”); LEVINAS, PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS, supra note 36, at 143 (explaining “the proximity of a neighbor is my responsibility for
him . . . .  Responsibility does not come from fraternity, but fraternity denotes responsibility . . .
antecedent to my freedom.”); ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 189 (expressing the opinion that
people must take responsibility for the world).
Anyone who refuses to assume joint responsibility for the world should not have
children and must not be allowed to take part in educating them . . . .  The teacher’s
qualification consists in knowing the world and being able to instruct others about it,
but his authority rests on his assumption of responsibility for that world.
Id. at 189.
53. See LEVINAS, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 143 (“The proximity of a
neighbor is my responsibility for him . . . .  Responsibility does not come from fraternity, but
fraternity denotes responsibility . . . antecedent to my freedom.”).
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The practice of justice must involve the practice of peace.
d
I saw a movie several years ago; Qui Ju was its name.54  The movie
takes place in modern era, circa 1980s, in rural mainland China.  In
the movie, the young, sympathetic protagonist seeks to redress an
injury the chief of her agricultural community did to her husband.
The chief had struck her husband and had disrupted the good order
of her household, and her sense of a well-ordered world.  She is
disturbed because she wants peace, real peace.  She wants to
experience peace when she is moved to recall the events that now
upset her.  She wants the settlement of the dispute in deed and in
thought.  She wants the resolution of tension, the dissolution of
antagonistic attitudes, an admission of error, and a reconstruction of
social conditions.
In the Chinese system, as depicted in the film, each party is
directed to engage in self-criticism in order to bring about the peace
which is justice.  As the story presents the situation, justice refers to a
state of “everything in its place,” or as a friend of mine says, to
equilibrium.  And this state of affairs, this balance, appropriateness,
cannot be achieved simply by authoritative statement or fiat.
Winning in a court of law is unlikely to achieve the desired goal.55  An
arrest is not going to achieve the desired goal.56 Neither a fine nor
                                                          
54. See generally THE STORY OF QUI JU (Sony Picture Classics 1993).
55. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 690 (2d ed. 1998).
[I]t is unlikely that courts will make a defining move that captures the myriad
historical, social, ethnic, religious, economic, familial, and maturational aspects of the
desires and behaviors that properly fall under the umbrella of ‘sexuality.’  Nuance
here is crucial, yet almost impossible to achieve.  The available legal compartments are
simply too crude . . . .  Legal categories . . . tend to repress or problematize nuances.
Id. (quoting Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47, 54-56, 92, 95-
96 (1996)).
[L]egal interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others:
A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his
freedom, his property, his children, even his life . . . .  When interpreters have finished
their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by
these organized, social practices of violence.
COVER, supra note 8, at 203; see also id. at 221 (“On one level judges may appear to be, and may
in fact be, offering their understanding of the normative world to their intended audience.  But
on another level they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a substantial part of
their audience loses its capacity to think and act autonomously.”).
56. See THE STORY OF QUI JU, supra note 54 (featuring an awful and disturbing arrest that
results from the protagonist’s efforts).  As the story plays out, she moves through higher levels
of state apparatus seeking an authority to rebuke the chief of her village.  During her ceaseless
19
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imprisonment will achieve the objective.57  The state of mind or
quality that is experienced as justice arises in participants when
disequilibrium is settled within them and between them.
Justice, understood from this perspective, is a quality, perhaps even
a delicate quality, belonging to both a personal and a social
condition.
e
“You have to stand for something or you’ll fall for anything.”58  My
Mother, who was the source of many homilies in my life, taught me to
call statements like that “homilies.”  This subsection is about how
each of us does need to stand for something in the way suggested by
the homily or risk becoming foils for those who dissemble, feint,
weave, spin and manage discussions about justice toward
considerations consistent with their private interests.
The Bible story about Solomon as the judge, two mothers and one
baby teaches this lesson by carefully considering private interests.59
The fact is, I prefer to orient the material by focusing on Solomon
                                                          
pursuit of justice he, on his own, saves her life and the life of her child.  Qui Ju, profoundly
grateful for his assistance, witnesses the fruit of her pursuit of justice as the man who saved her
family from tragedy is arrested for his insult to her husband.  Id.
57. Interview by Sharon S. Harzenski, with anonymous (Mar. 15, 2000).  Domestic violence
stories often reflect this difficulty.  Just this week, I was privy to the following: a woman was
living with a man in a carefully structured relationship following an outburst in which he held
her in a stranglehold while threatening to kill her.  Of course, he soon thereafter apologized.
She was determined to remain in the relationship as long as violence was off limits.  As often
happens, her partner could not restrain himself.  After a month or so of relative calm, he began
a series of emotional explosions until, again, he held her down and threatened her life.  This
time she left their shared living space as soon as she could and reported his conduct to the
police, who came and arrested him.  As the story was reported to me, and as the woman seemed
to understand the situation, the charges filed against the man carry lengthy prison sentence
possibilities because he is a hunter and has hunting weapons, specifically guns, in the house.
The possible prison sentence was far in excess of anything the woman could accept as
appropriate.  She desired to have him removed from the environment, restrained from reentry,
and warned through arrest about the seriousness of his conduct as well as his need for
professional treatment.  A few nights in jail, a few weeks in jail; these were what the woman
thought appropriate.  The fact that this man might spend more than a year in jail astounded
and upset her.  Instead of the peace of mind she sought, she is now tormented by the legal
consequences of her actions.  As for me, I hope she is able to confront and recognize the
mutuality of this construction.
58. See WILHELM, supra note 39, at 238 (“[When] the source of a man’s strength lies not in
himself but in his relation to other people . . . no matter how close to them he may be, if his
center of gravity depends upon them, he is inevitably tossed to and fro [between joy and
sorrow.]”); see also MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 111 (Signet, 1964) (“The old
order ends, no matter what Bastilles remain, when the enslaved, within themselves, bury the
psychology of servitude.”); cf. at 128 (“Is not freedom the negation of servitude? Does not one
have to end totally for the other to begin?”).
59. 1 Kings 3:16-28 (Oxford).
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rather than on the Federalist founding fathers60 and their discussions
about republican civic virtues.61  It is not that I do not value the
political wisdom of developing civic virtue.  Instead, I prefer the
Solomon example because I feel it in my heart, or in my gut.  I better
understand its representational value.  I am drawn into the basic
human needs and desires of the competing mothers more
thoroughly than I am drawn into the humanity of successful
politicians in the post Revolutionary War period of United States
history.
From the Solomon story, I learn that private interests deny us
heartfelt identification.62  As I understand it, the mother who awakens
                                                          
60. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 190-270
(1992) (presenting, in a historical and political context, the debate between the Federalists and
the Anti-Federalists on what was and was not desirable and/or feasible with regard to the
calculation, weighing and discounting of private interests among public-oriented citizens).
61. See id. at 195 (beginning the discourse on virtue by alluding to the enlightenment age’s
man made criteria of gentility).  The criteria includes:
[P]oliteness, grace, taste, learning and character . . . .  It implied being reasonable,
tolerant, honest, virtuous and candid . . . .  It signified being cosmopolitan, standing
on elevated ground in order to have a large view of human affairs, and being free of
the prejudices, parochialism . . . [what] we sum up today in the idea of a liberal arts
education.
Id.; see also id. (explaining the revolutionaries were creating a new kind of aristocracy “based on
principles that could be learned and were superior to those of birth and family.”); id. at 197
(explaining that the leaders of the Revolution were unusually “self conscious about the moral
and social values necessary for public leadership.”); id. at 219 (explaining that “man . . . is
formed for social life.”).  But see id. at 229-30 (noting that we should not confuse idealistic
ideation with accomplishment.  The fact is that “the American people seemed incapable of the
degree of virtue needed for republicanism.”); id. at 231 (explaining that “[w]ell before 1810
many of the founding fathers and others, including most of the older leaders of the Federalist
party, were wringing their hands over what the Revolution had created.”); id. at 239-41 (noting
further that equalitarian pressures pushed the faith in Lockean sensationalism to its breaking
point); id. at 246-67 (explaining that a full-scale ideological defense of self-interest was alarming
to ‘the gentry’ who had interests, private interests, of their own); id. at 253 (noting, however,
that whatever the tensions, “most of the revolutionary leaders . . . continued to hold onto the
possibility of virtuous politics . . . [believing a few political leaders] had sufficient virtue to
become disinterested umpires and promote an exclusively public sphere of . . . government.”).
62. 1 Kings 3:16-28 (Oxford).
Then two [women] came to the king and stood before him.  The one women said . . .
“[T]his woman and I dwell in the same house; and I gave birth to a child while she was
in the house.  Then . . . this woman also gave birth . . . .  And this woman’s son died in
the night, because she lay on it.  And she . . . took my son from beside me, while your
maidservant slept, and laid it at her bosom, and laid her dead son in my bosom . . . .
[W]hen I looked at it closely in the morning, behold, it was not the child that I had
borne.”  But the other woman said, “No, the living child is mine, and the dead child is
yours”. . . .  Then the king said, “The one says, ‘This is my son that is alive, and your
son is dead’; and the other says, “No; but your son is dead, and my son is the living
one”. . . .  Bring me a sword . . . .  Divide the living child in two, and give half to the
one, and half to the other.” Then the woman whose son was alive said to the king,
because her heart yearned for her son, “Oh, my lord, give her the living child, and by
no means slay it.” But the other said, “It shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it.”
Then the king answered and said “Give the living child to the first woman, and by no
means slay it; she is its mother”. . . .  And all Israel heard of the judgment . . . and they
21
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to find her baby dead is alone in her suffering.  She is alienated,
isolated, in her pain, and by her pain.  She cannot imagine, or trust
in, the capacity for comfort except for the comfort she anticipates by
stealing from another what she has lost.  She is willing to stop her
suffering by inflicting it on another.  She becomes so consumed by
her own pain, she loses sight of the fact that this pain must be born
by someone.  In the end, having chosen the other mother as a
substitute sufferer, the mother of the dead child becomes willing to
sacrifice life itself (the surviving child) in an attempt to share the
pain.  Subtracting Solomon’s wisdom and the nature of maternal
love, I understand the story to be about the alienation of selfishness.
That the alienation of selfishness is not a ground upon which
justice rests or can be safely built is a theme woven through
republican theories of civic virtue.63  However, the republicans did
not provide me with a clear enough picture of the human suffering
which feeds the absence of virtue, or, if you will, the vice of self-
interest.  Able to identify with the sad, sickened mother in the
Solomon story, I know in my heart the failing of her heart.
Justice requires a strong heart.  Likewise, I know in my heart the
                                                          
stood in awe of the king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to
render justice.
Id.
63. See WOOD, supra note 60, at 174-75 (explaining historical notions regarding American
ideology).
Americans steeped in the radical whig and republican ideology . . . regarded . . .
monarchical techniques of personal influence and patronage as “corruption,” as
attempts by great men and their power-hungry minions to promote their private
interests at the expense of the public good and to destroy . . . [the colonists’] popular
liberty.
Id.; see also id. at 190 (relying on quotes from Samuel Stanhope Smith in reporting what the
revolutionaries believed).
[T]he revolutionaries believed . . . that new habitual principles, “the constant
authoritative guardians of virtue,” could be created and nurtured by republican laws,
and that these principles, together with the power of the mind, could give man’s
“ideas and motives a new direction.”  By the repeated exertion of reason, by “recalling
the lost images of virtue: contemplating them, and using them as motives of actions,
till they overcame those of vice again and again . . . it seemed possible for man to . . .
form a society of ‘habitual virtue.’”
Id.; see also id. at 197 (living as a gentleman in this social environment meant avoiding the
appearance of meanness and dedication of oneself to the public good); id. at 207-08
(explaining that Washington had an excellent reputation in keeping motives like personal
interest, consanguinity, friendship or hatred from interfering with his public judgments).  In
the winter of 1784-85, the Virginia Assembly, in recognition of his service, presented
Washington with valuable shares in canal companies.  Id.  He believed in these ventures, had
worked hard to foster their development and needed the money.  Id.  Nevertheless, rather than
accept the shares, Washington sought the counsel of respected peers.  Id.  Jefferson
recommended declining the offer as the best means to enhance Washington’s reputation for
disinterestedness.  Id.  Instead of taking the shares for his personal benefit, Washington gave
them to the college that eventually became Washington and Lee.  Id.
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heartfelt willingness of the actual mother to undergo extreme pain to
save her baby’s life.  Any emotional pain is endurable when
compared to the emotional pain of standing speechless while
allowing your child to be sacrificed unnecessarily.64  I know that.
However awful a fact it might be, it is a simple fact to me.
At this point in the story, the “You have to stand for something. . .”
homily ties in.  The actual mother in the story knew what she was
about.  She knew who she was and what she stood for in the context
of the baby trial.65  She was, first and foremost, the baby’s mother.
She knew what she stood for, she knew what her principles were and
what her priorities were.66  She was the child’s mother.  For me, that is
where the heart of the matter lies in this story.
Of course, the mourning mother thought she knew what she was
about.  She thought she was “standing for” something.  She wanted to
provide herself with a substitute for her dead baby.  But, her situation
is more confusing, more complex, than that.  She wants a substitute,
but finding a substitute is not really what she is about.  If she were
entirely focused on replacing her deceased child with a living child to
mother, she might have been able to think up a better plan than
stealing the child of her house mate.67 And, had she been dedicated
to finding a substitute for her dead child, she would not have agreed
to the slaughter of her selected replacement.68  So, while it looks like
this suffering mother is about finding a substitute, the situation is
more complicated.  Similarly, it might appear as if she is willing to
stand on her principle or claim of motherhood, but here again, the
situation is not that simple.  She is unable to stand up as the child’s
mother because she is unwilling to sacrifice her needs for the needs
of the child.  The heart of her matter lies in her self-centered retreat
from the pain of her loss.  The substitute child is a means of escaping
her own suffering.  That is the baby’s meaning to her.  That is what
she is “standing up” for.
Please do not understand this as some sexist theory about
motherhood.  I would expect my son’s father to spare the life of our
child because, like me, I would expect him to prefer any emotional
suffering to the pain of watching his son’s life end to prove a point of
                                                          
64. 1 Kings 3:16-28 (Oxford).
65. Id. (“Then the woman whose son was alive said to the king, because her heart yearned
for her son, ‘Oh, my lord, give her the living child, and by no means slay it.’”).
66. Id.
67. Id. (“And this woman’s son died in the night, because she lay on it.  And she . . . took
my son from beside me, while your handmaiden slept, and laid it at her bosom, and laid her
dead son in my bosom.”).
68. Id. (“But the other said, ‘It shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it.’”).
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law.  Instead of sexist propositions, why not think of political
applications?
Think in terms of applying the principles of this story to the
practice of justice.  For instance, I taught myself to identify with
Solomon in order to ponder what it was he knew about the human
condition that enabled him to judge so accurately what each of the
women was likely to do.69  As a result of all that wondering, I moved
on to wondering about the women.  As a result of maturing events in
my own life, I was able to reach into my own heart as I tried to
understand the hearts of the two mothers.  Finally, as a result of these
combined efforts I was able to conclude that decisions without
heartfelt grounding would inevitably fail to satisfy the heartfelt need
we have for justice.
Justice goes to the heart of the matter because justice lies in the
deep core of our hearts.70
                                                          
69. Id. (“And all Israel heard of the judgment . . . and they stood in awe of the king,
because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to render justice.”).  Solomon is
speaking to God:
[T]hy servant is in the midst of thy people . . . .  Give thy servant . . . an understanding
mind to govern thy people, that I may discern between good and evil; for who is able
to govern this great people? It pleased the Lord that Solomon had asked this.  And
God said to him, ‘Because you have not asked for yourself long life or riches . . . but
have asked . . . to discern what is right . . . .  Behold, I give you a wise and discerning
mind.
1 Kings 3:8-12.
70. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 134 (discussing “le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît
point,” which means that “the heart has its reasons which the reason does not at all perceive”).
At a facial level, the quote calls for an acknowledgment that ordinary consciousness is an
insufficient guide if profound understanding is sought.  See id. at 134-44 (articulating Bateson’s
theory of understanding in which consciousness represents only the ‘visible’ arcs of circles or
cycles of mental processes.  Full or complete arcs, the whole of the mental process, including
those processes Freud referred to as “primary,” (i.e. including relational material, metaphoric
material, etc.) are necessarily incorporated in fulfilling or sound intelligence functions.).  See
WILHELM, supra note 39, at 186.
[T]he well is the symbol of that social structure which, evolved by mankind in meeting
its most primitive needs, is independent of all political forms . . . .[T]here are two
prerequisites for a satisfactory political or social organization of mankind.  We must go
down to the very foundation of life.  For any superficial ordering of life that leaves its
deepest needs unsatisfied is as ineffectual as if no attempt at order has ever been
made.  Carelessness – by which the jug is broken – is also disasterous.
Id.; see also LEVINAS, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 3.
Henceforth the comprehension of being does not presuppose a merely theoretical
attitude but the whole of human comportment.  The whole human being is ontology.
Scientific work, the affective life, the satisfaction of needs and labor, social life and
death – all these moments spell out the comprehension of being, or truth . . . .  It is
not because of the human being that there is truth.  It is because being in general is
inseparable from its openness, because there is truth, or, if one likes, because being is
intelligible, that there is humanity.
Id.; see also id. at 5 (“We exist as a circuit of understanding with reality.  Understanding is the
very event that existence articulates.  All incomprehension is only a deficient mode of
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III
The knowledge of injustice bothers people.
Feeling at ease with heaven and hellish myths,
they turn aside, pretending.
What cost justice when
expectations and disadvantages clash?
Is peace at any price an answer?
Not trusting the judgment of those with power,
what violence
when taking justice into your own hands?71
a
When I began law school, I thought of justice as the correct
regulation of the socio-political world.  I studied theories of justice in
an attempt to discover which orderings of human societies were right
and which were wrong.  I saw practicing justice as moving society
toward right forms and away from erroneous forms.
I thought a person would have to have a lot of power to make any
meaningful progress at all toward these objectives.
Not all that much has changed.  I realize now, however, that justice
rarely, if ever, lies in constructing the correct rules for others to
follow.72  There may occasionally be sages who are capable of this
level of insight and influence.73  For most of us, though, propagating
                                                          
comprehension.”).  “[K]nowledge of the other requires, outside of all curiosity, also sympathy
and love . . . because in our relation with the other, he does not affect us in terms of a concept.
He is being and counts as such.”  Id. at 6.  “The essence of discourse is prayer.”  Id. at 7.  “[I]t is
as a neighbor that a human being is accessible . . . .”  Id. at 8.  “The human only lends itself to a
relation that is not a power.”  Id. at 10.
71. Sharon S. Harzenski, unpublished poem (Feb. 2000) (on file with author).
72. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 3 (alluding to the futility and the silliness of making laws
as if people were predictable).
73. See id. at 146 (“[M]ere purposive rationality unaided by . . . art, religion, dream, and
the like, is necessarily pathogenic and destructive . . . .  [L]ife depends upon interlocking
circuits of contingency . . . .”); see also POLANYI, supra note 42, at 28 (“[T]he freedom of science
cannot be defended . . . on the basis of a positivist conception of science, which involves a
positivist programme for the ordering of society.  The . . . fulfillment of such a programme is
the destruction of . . . free society and the establishment of totalitarianism.”).  Polanyi also
believed that the exercise of human will is “fully determined . . . by the responsibility inherent
in action; hence any attempt to direct these actions from outside must inevitably distort or
25
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a set of right rules for society will never be within our practice.  We
will practice justice on a more limited scale.  This is a good thing.
For some of us it is helpful to look to others, to the shared wisdom
of sages, to provide a solid foundation for our practice.  Those of us
who find our wisdom in the Bible,74 the Koran,75 Lao Tsu,76
Confucius,77 Thomas Aquinas,78 Buddha,79 Aristotle80 and Mother
                                                          
destroy their proper meaning.”  Id. at 58; see also RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 162 (“Most of the
greatest evils that man has inflicted upon man has come through people feeling quite certain
about something which, in fact, was false.  To know the truth is more difficult than most men
suppose, and to act with ruthless determination in the belief that truth is the [one’s]
monopoly . . . is to invite disaster.”).
74. Oxford Bible, at xvi (stating in the preface that
[t]he Bible is more than a historical document to be preserved.  And it is more than
a classic of English literature to be cherished and admired.  It is a record of God’s
dealing with men, of God’s revelation of Himself and His will . . . .  The Bible carries
its full message, not to those who regard it simply as a heritage of the past or praise
its literary style, but to those who read it that they may discern and understand God’s
Word to men);
see also 2 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 168 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining the Bible as “[t]he scriptures [sacred writings] of the Old and New Testaments”).
75. 8 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 531(2d ed. 1989)
(defining the Koran (from the Arabic word meaning recitation) as “[t]he sacred book of the
[Muslims], consisting of revelations orally delivered at intervals by Muhammad, and collected in
writing after his death”).
76. LAO TZU, TAO TE CHING 1 (1972) (enunciating the principles of this mystical religion
which acted as a counterpoint for the official Confucianism of the Chinese state).
77. See WILHELM, supra note 39, at 165 (describing the teachings of Confucius).  Confucius
was a Chinese sage or philosopher.  His influence, and the influence of his followers, pervaded
Chinese culture for at least a thousand years.  Confucius, like Lao Tzu, is believed to be the
source of much wisdom incorporated into the I Ching.  As an example of Confucius’ wisdom,
Wilhelm includes the following quote from Confucius:
The superior man sets his person at rest before he moves; he composes his mind
before he speaks; he makes his relations firm before he asks for something.  But if a
man is brusque in his movements, others will not cooperate.  If he is agitated in his
words, they will awaken no echo in others.  If he asks for something without first
having established relations, it will not be given to him.  If no one is with him, those
who would harm him draw nearer.
Id. at 165.
78. See SABINE, supra note 19, at 248 (noting that Thomas Aquinas was a thirteenth century
Dominican monk, who, along with his teacher-mentor Albert the Great, transformed the ideas
of Aristotle into a “permanent system of Christianized philosophy.”).  In this system of
philosophy, “God and nature are large enough and opulent enough to afford a niche for all the
endless diversity that makes up finite existence.”  Id. at 248.  This mantra emphasizes the aspects
of harmony and the fact that all human knowledge is of a single piece.  Id.  Sabine also recounts
how it is especially important in this system to view the universe as forming “a hierarchy
reaching from God at its summit down to the lowest being” so that social and political
arrangements, the like the arrangements of nature, have design and purpose within an
encompassing whole in which the lower serves the higher while the higher guides and directs
the lower.  Id. at 248-49.
79. See 2 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 618 (2d ed. 1989)
(noting that Buddha is “the title given by the adherents of one of the great Asiatic religions,
thence called Buddhism, to the founder of their faith, Sakyamuni Guatama, or Siddhartha, who
flourished in Northern India in the Fifth century.”); see also NANCY WISON ROSS, THREE WAYS OF
ASIAN WISDOM 89-94 (Clarion Book, Simon & Schuster 1966) (defining the term Buddha to
26
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/3
HARZENSKI.FINAL.ASC02 9/19/01  5:34 PM
2001] REDEFINING VIOLENCE 331
Teresa81 have much to be grateful for because these sources yield
directions we can follow.  Many are not so fortunate.  We suffer from
mixed messages when our sources supply mixed advice.  The solid
foundations we need come to us in fractured and paradoxical forms
that we attempt to piece together in sensible ways.82  Even those of us
with single sources of authority or multiple, but consistent,
authorities may be misled if these authorities are qualitatively
inadequate.  Doctrinal loyalties to inadequate practices ask us to
construct our practice of justice around counterproductive
propositions.  The source of these loyalties may be as appealing as
charismatic political personalities, as evocative as popular ideologies,
religious doctrines or philosophical paradigms, or as hard to deny as
famiy obligations.  However, when pursuing justice, it is not the
                                                          
mean “Enlightened or Awakened Being,” which should not be confused with the eighteenth
century philosophical movement in Europe).  The Enlightenment of eastern experience refers
to the attainment of a consciousness higher and truer than provided by or through limited
personal ego, id. at 89 & 94, and the attainment of Enlightenment presupposes a freedom from
earthly or worldly ties describable as supreme detachment.  Id. at 90.  The author also describes
an eightfold path which was Buddha’s formula “for deliverance from the . . . crippling
invalidism that comes with having a ‘body-identified mind.’”  Id. at 91-92.  Ross sums up the
eight requirements as follows:
First, you must see clearly what is wrong.  (II) Next decide to be cured.  (III) You must
act and (IV) speak so as to aim at being cured.  (V) Your livelihood must not conflict
with your therapy.  (VI) That therapy must go forward at the ‘staying speed,’ the
critical velocity that can be sustained.  (VII) You must think about it incessantly, and
(VIII) learn how to contemplate with the deep mind.
Id. at 91-92.
80. See SABINE, supra note 19, at 88 (noting that Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is understood to
be “the greatest of Plato’s students [to have] joined the Academy”).  Aristotle was known for his
empirical investigations into, and general conclusion about, the structure and functioning of
states based upon observations and history.  Id. at 119.  Aristotle taught that what is complete
and perfected arises out of, or develops from, what is primitive and simple.  Id.  Seeds, he
believed, contained their own nature that is displayed as germination proceeds toward plaint
and eventual flowering.  Id.  Similarly, communities reveal their nature as they grow.  Id. at 120.
Once beyond subsistence, man’s social proclivities move him out of the simplicity of family into
the formation of more sophisticated organizations (can be thought of as “states”) where the
development of higher capacities and rational powers are fostered.  Id. at 120-22.
81. See MOTHER TERESA, A SIMPLE PATH xvii (1995) (describing Mother Teresa as “a living
saint,”an “exponent of world peace,” and “often appears on lists of the world’s ten most
admired women,” although she has never claimed to have accomplished anything
extraordinary).
82. See SABINE, supra note 19, at 253 (describing how Thomas Aquinas was able to build a
singular system by integrating Aristotle’s emphasis on reason with the importance the Church
placed on faith).  There are those who are unable to accept Aquinas’ concept of Christian
society, built on both faith and reason, as eternal, constructed secular state ideologies.  Id. at
256.  Aquinas’ model de-emphasized the nature of empire while facilitating the introduction of
the Church’s claim to supernatural origins and theocratic authority.  Id. at 261.  Others,
however, were less persuaded.  Id.  Even today, it appears difficult, if not impossible, to combine
the dual institutions of faith and reason with grace or ease.  Id. at 261-62.  But see WILHELM,
supra note 39, at xxvi (remarking that Lao Tzu and Confucius emerge in a shared culture
inspired, in part, by a common source); LAO TZU, supra 77, at cover page (claiming that
Confucianism concerns itself with “day-to-day rules of conduct” while “Taoism is concerned with
a more spiritual level of being.”).
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appeal of the source, but the efficacy of the practice, that ensures
wholesomeness.
The dysfunctional results of misplaced loyalties are seen by some as
pathological.83  Others see the process in terms of inevitable
enculturation.84  Still others, the non-apologists, believe in teaching
these loyatlies as part of their cultural heritage.
Some people see society’s contradiction in the administration of
justice as social pathology.85  Others see it as the inevitable results of
enculturation.86  Still, others believe in teaching these loyalties as part
of their cultural heritage.87  What remains unsettled is how we might,
appropriately, respectfully and wholesomely, characterize our
inheritance of dysfunction to avoid unduly replicating injustice.
Politicians may be honorable individuals in pursuit of creating a
more just society.88  However, I understand politicians as the
                                                          
83. See WILHELM, supra note 39, at 30.
84. Id.
85. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 162 (“[T]he conflict is now a life-or-death struggle . . . .
Are we to reserve the techniques and the right to manipulate people as the privilege of a few
planning, goal-oriented, and power hungry individuals . . . ?”).  “Conscious purpose is now
empowered to upset the balances of the body, of society, and of the biological world around us.
A pathology – a loss of balance – is threatened.”  Id. at 434.
86. See ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 192 (“[C]onservatism, in the sense of conservation,
is . . . the essence of . . . education activity . . . .”).  Arendt notes that “the function of school is to
teach children what the world is like and not to instruct them in the art of living.  Since the
world is old, always older then they themselves, learning inevitably turns toward the past . . . .”
Id. at 195.  The author goes on to state that the aim is not “to introduce the young person to the
world as a whole, but rather to a particular, limited segment of it.”  Id. at 196.
87. See id. at 193 (suggesting that education, at least primary education, rightfully, not only
inevitably, involves indoctrination into cultural heritage); see also TSUNETOMO, supra note 50, at
166 (discussing the proper ancient Japanese manner for raising children).
In bringing up a boy, one should . . . encourage . . . valor . . . .  [T]he child should
liken his parents to the master, and learn everyday politeness and etiquette, the
serving of other people, the ways of speech, forbearance . . . the correct way of walking
down the street.  The elders were taught in the same fashion . . . .  As for the girl, it is
most important to teach her chastity.  She should not be in the company of a man at a
distance of less than six feet, nor should she meet them eye to eye . . . .  Neither should
she go sight-seeing or take trips to temples.  A woman who has been brought up strictly
and has endured suffering at her home will suffer no ennui after she is married.
See id. at 166.
88. See ARENDT, PAST supra note 28, at 263 (presenting a deeply appealing image of
political life, and “the joy and gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers,
out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by
word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something
entirely new.”); see also SABINE, supra note 19, at 106 (describing Aristotle’s view of political life
that “the complete art of a statesman must take governments as they are and do the best it can
with the means it has.).  “The statesman of Aristotle’s art is . . . seated in the midst of affairs.  He
cannot model them to his will . . . but there is . . . the intelligent use of available means to bring
affairs to a worthy and desirable end.”  Id. at 116.  “[T]he state gives the opportunity for higher
development of . . . rational powers . . . .  These represent the perfection of human
development and . . . are attainable only in civil society.”  Id. at 199; see also WOOD, supra note
60, at 254 (describing the views reflected in and by the founding fathers who stated that “[t]he
28
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individuals most likely to suggest honoring unjust propositions as a
necessary element in the practice of justice.89 With the exception of
rare sages, people who exercise power by directing, cajoling or
compelling others to practice in accordance with the principles they
label as just or justice, are power players not justice practitioners.
Power players are politicians.
As it turns out, most of what I was taught in school about justice was
taught by people under the influence of other misinformed people.
My teachers were often politicians or the “victims” of politicians.90
The books I learned from taught good conduct as a duty.  I was
politically indoctrinated, but was I educated enough to find my own
way to justice?
I would like to tell what I call the Patrick Henry story.91  Do you
recall “Give me Liberty or give me Death”?92  I certainly do.  I was
stimulated by the courage of Patrick Henry’s convictions.  I learned
to identify with him as an example of how a responsible citizen
conducts herself.  She has principles.  She stands up for those
                                                          
new federal Constitution was designed to ensure that government leadership would be
entrusted . . . to . . . ‘men who,’ in Madison’s words, ‘possess most wisdom to discern and most
virtue to pursue the common good of society.’”).
89. See ARENDT, PAST, supra 28, at 257  (speaking about the leaders of the Russian
Revolution and the use of propaganda during the era of the Soviet Union as an example of how
politicians are likely to promote injustice in the name of justice).  Arendt states that
Their trouble is that they must consistently change the falsehoods they offer as a
substitute for the real story . . . .  And though this continuing instability gives no
indication of what the truth might be, it is itself an indication, and powerful one, of
the lying character of all public utterances . . . .[T]he surest long-term result of
brainwashing is a peculiar cynicism – an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of
anything . . . .  In other words, the result of a consistent . . . substitution of lies for
factual truth is not that the lies will now be accepted as truth . . . but that the sense by
which we take our bearings in the real world . . . is being destroyed.
Id.; cf. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES, BRIBERY CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 15-36 (1979)
[hereinafter REISMAN, FOLDED LIES].
Elites are operators and are certainly acquainted with the discrepancies from the myth
system; more important, they are aware of the utility (to themselves and, perhaps in
rationalized form, to ‘the system’) of the particular practices of the operational code.
When popular disquiet grows, they will respond in ways that reinforce belief in the
myth system . . . .  Some responses are uncomfortably obvious.  For example, after a . . .
revelation of campaign fund abuses, Congress heroically cleaned house . . . by
shortening the statute of limitations on the offenses involved from five to three years.
Id. at 29.
90. See RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 113 (discussing the modern status of education in that
“[t]he teacher has thus become . . . a civil servant obligated to carry out the behests of men . . .
whose only attitude toward education is that of the propagandist.”).
91. See ROBERT DOUTHAT MEADE, PATRICK HENRY: PATRIOT IN THE MAKING vii-x (1957)
(describing Patrick Henry as a true patriot and American hero based on his actions and
accomplishments before, during, and after the American Revolution).
92. See generally A. CRAIG BAIRD, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADDRESSES: 1740-1952, 30-32 (1956)
(quoting a Patrick Henry speech).
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principles.  She is willing to face the consequences of her values when
confronted with nasty, repressive, overbearing and power hungry
autocrats.  I tried to prepare myself.
What I hadn’t figured on is that the very people who were exposing
me to Patrick Henry as a hero where simultaneously exposing me to a
double bind that would keep me imprisoned for many years.  Even as
I learned to see myself as a modern day version of revolutionary
forefathers, I was under pressure to comport myself in accordance
with restrictive regulations.  “Liberty or Death” was taught to me in a
context where I was obliged to wait single file in cafeteria lines, sit
quietly at my desk, keep my books covered with the requisite plain
brown paper and stand up, sit down, talk, or remain silent as
commanded.
Of course, I was a school child, and children need structure, limits
and discipline.  But what, really, was I getting?  Were all these school
rules essential to my well-being?  Weren’t many of them designed and
implemented by people who thought their system of control and
order was the right one for everyone?  Was I being educated by
people who respected my dignity?  No.  You know and I know that
these people may have been doing the best they could do, but they
also had been victimized, the way I was being victimized and the way
Patrick Henry was victimized.93  We have all suffered to one degree or
another from the imposition of order that was good for some, but
bad for many.94  The question is: what can be done to resolve this
discrepancy? 
There appears to be no answer to this dilemma.  I do not have an
answer.  Or, my answer is humility.95 That is, I have no single,
                                                          
93. See RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 113-14 (warning against the dangers of dogmatic creeds);
see also id. at 162 (“Belief in a divine mission is one of the many forms of certainty that have
afflicted the human race.”); id. at 123 (“Every system should allow loopholes and exceptions, for
if it does not it will in the end crush all that is best in man.”).
94. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 21 (1993) (arguing that the current
doctrinal paradigm governing the analysis of free speech is good for many, but bad for women,
especially bad for women who oppose pornography).  But see ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN: A BOOK
ABOUT MEN 1-4 (1990) (explaining how today’s technological society may provide
opportunities for women to participate, but it is depriving men of connectedness to the wild
aspects of masculinity).
95. See POLANYI, supra note 42, at 199 (theorizing possible explanations for the status of
man’s current system of rules).
How should we consciously determine a future which is, by its very nature, beyond our
comprehension?  Such a presumption reveals only the narrowness of an outlook
uninformed by humility.  The super-planner who – like Engels . . . – announces that
men ‘with full consciousness will fashion their own history . . . reveals the
megalomania of a mind . . . .  When such men are eventually granted power to
control . . . their fellow men, they reduce them to mere fodder for their unbridled
enterprises.
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dominating, structured response that will enable us to go forward
into a utopian order good for everyone.  Instead, I have a warning.  If
the guidance of our history books can be trusted, almost all humans
are born, mature and die without experiencing much freedom from
the oppressive fictions of their culture.  When we practice justice, that
is something that needs to be remembered.
b
A misconception that troubles me is the nonsense many of us were
taught about the nature of justice.  I was taught to think of injustice
in the same way.  Ordinary people living ordinary lives could have
ideas about justice and injustice.  These ordinary people could
express their opinions and could, if qualified (and, if allowed), vote.
These ordinary people could participate at some level of the law, in
law enforcement and in the justice system itself.  But, serious
questions were left to those in positions of authority and control.
The way I was taught to understand the world was that ordinary
people, like my family and myself, were not supposed to spend too
much of our time concerned with serious social questions.  There
were better educated, better positioned people who did that.
Since, according to the way I was taught, justice and injustice were
out of the hands of the ordinary folk, the world we were taught about
disempowered us while empowering the people already in control.
Justice and injustice were something we could think about, but not
something we were ordinarily invited to take responsibility for.  They
were not something we were ordinarily entitled to experience.
Someone else was empowered to make these decisions and
distinctions.
It is shocking when laid out like this.  Nevertheless, that version is
pretty close to the way I experienced the lessons I was taught about
the distribution of influence and authority in the United States when
I was in grade school.  Only later in life did I take it upon myself to
challenge the orthodoxy that I was taught.  Only as an adult did I
become convinced that justice was an essential experience for all
people and that injustice was an experience we all shared.96
                                                          
Id.  See also LEVINAS, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 72 (“[T]o the voice that calls
from the Burning Bush, Moses answers, ‘Here I am,’ but does not dare to lift up his eyes.  The
glorious theophany which makes so much humility possible will be missed because of the
humility which lowers the eyes.  Later, on the rock of Horeb, the prophet ventures to know, but
glory is refused to the boldness that seeks it.”); see also id. at 56 (“[a]nd is not the will thus at
bottom humility rather than will to power?”).
96. See J. Hillis Miller, Laying Down the Law in Literature: The Example of Kleist, in
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c
I was taught in law school to rely on abstract constructions to
establish the perspectives and relationships that contained or
contextualized our professional service.  Get the ideas right, I
understood my teachers as saying, and effective behavior will follow.
At the root of this concept is the supposition that a commitment to
honorable abstract concepts will result in honest and commensurate
actions.97  Relying on ideas (ideals) to direct and validate our actions,
                                                          
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 305-29 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992)
(observing that the idea of the administration of justice and injustice in society is well described
by the story titled “Michael Kohlhaas”).  In the story, the protagonist is an upright, respectable
horse dealer who is detained for want of (apparently a spurious want of) a pass on his way
through a particular Junker’s territory.  Id. at 310-11.  Leaving as surety two horses and groom,
he is allowed to continue on his journey with the remaining animals.  Id. at 311.  Returning
several weeks later with proof that the demand for a pass was itself not legitimate – the first
injustice – Kohlhaas finds his groom beaten and destitute and his fine horses thin, dull and
overworked – the second injustice.  Id.  He demands as recompense the rehabilitation of his
groom and his horses.  Id.  He is denied what he seeks.  Id. at 312.  Instead he is told to take up
the horses, whatever their condition and depart – the third injustice.  Id. at 311-12.  Coming to
his aid by pressing his suit, his wife is mortally wounded – the fourth injustice.  Id. at 312.
Claiming himself free to stand outside the law which has so casually refused to correct the
growing litany of injustice, Kohlhaas issues a decree of independence following which he and
his followers attack and burn the castlehold, thereafter, taking to the forest as outlaws – taking
justice into his own hands?  Id.  His first acts of injustice?  Eventually, under a grant of amnesty,
the Elector of Saxony, an overlord, punishes the Junker and returns the fattened horses along
with other recompense to Kohlhaas – the redeeming justice?  Id.  However, the overlord’s
overlord, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, who considers himself unfettered by the
amnesty, orders Kohlhaas’s execution for “breach of the peace” – the ultimate justice or
injustice.  Id. at 312-13; see also FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 8-9 (“In the
case of popular justice you . . . have the masses and their enemies . . .  [T]he masses, when they
perceive somebody to be an enemy . . . do no rely on an abstract universal idea of justice, they
rely only on their own experience, that of the injuries they have suffered, that of the way in
which they have been wronged, in which they have been oppressed.”); LESLIE BENDER & DAAN
BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW – A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 66-67 (1995) [hereinafter
POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW] (“Oppression . . . is part of the basic fabric of a society, not a
function of a few people’s choice or policies.  You won’t eliminate this structural oppression by
getting rid of the rules or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically
reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions.”).  “The conscious actions of
many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people
are usually simply doing their jobs or living their lives, not understanding themselves as the
agents of oppression.”  Id. at 68; see also LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 52, at 72
(noting that “[t]ruth is . . . bound up with the social relation, which is justice”).  Levinas
appears to be stating that “God is accessible in justice . . . [and] the dimension of the divine
open forth from the human face.”  Id. at 78.  In addition, “metaphysics is enacted where social
relation is enacted – in our relations with men.  There can be no ‘knowledge’ of God separated
from the relationship with me.”  Id.
97. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 115 (1994).
Observing . . . similarities – this pattern in a series of instances of experience – we
abstract out of them common elements and develop a symbol to stand for the pattern
of instances . . . .  Characterizing signs of this kind, or abstractions, . . . stand[s] not for
32
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we establish a hierarchy where words speak louder than actions and
where the best ideas are valued more than good conduct. The
situation is troublesome.
Theories of justice often propose ideas that seem impossible to
practice.98 Our justice ideas or ideals are presented as abstract goals
or principles.  I was taught that aspiring to these ideals or values was
important.  However, I was also taught that a certain greatness was
required to identify and understand these ideals and that an even
finer greatness was required to abide by them.
Because of the way this scheme of ideas and values operated, I was
taught that acknowledging these ideals was imperative while acting in
accordance with these principles could not be expected from mere
humans.  Therefore, as long as I could recite the principles and
project the patterns of behavior implied by them, I was learning what
was necessary for me to learn.
When the primary value of an abstraction is to be admirable, the
utility of having well-thought out ideas about justice and law is
                                                          
any particular instances of experience but for an idea . . . .  Abstractions . . . are . . . the
essential instruments by which the law performs its directive function of providing,
authoritatively and in advance, what is to be done . . . .  The process by which general
or characterizing signs, or abstractions, are employed to arrive at the conclusion that
this particular instance of experience is an example of a previously formulated general
idea . . . is of the essence of the operation of law.  What happens, when the operation
runs smoothly, is that the user recalls the various characteristics which in combination
form the pattern represented by the abstraction.  He then examines the particular
instance and observes that it exhibits the same characteristics.  When the matching of
the abstracted characteristics and the concrete ones is perfect, he moves surely to his
conclusion.
Id.
98. See id. at 116-17 (acknowledging that the process they described does not always work
smoothly).  The “disorderly conduct of words” coupled with the incomplete and deviating
patters of human conduct, make out abstractions “inexact.”  Id. at 116.  We depend, in fact, on
shared (they call it “general”) understanding and judgment – a judgment that is likely to
require “conscious ratiocination,” which is conscious thought along a “chain of reasoning.”  Id.
When we begin the process of characterizing qualities or tendencies of human experience, “we
come to depend on ‘higher levels of abstraction’ . . . not involving in any way the perception of
tangible objects.”  Id. at 116-17.  It is at this point of the process that “accurate communication
requires that the speaker and the listener not only share the same understanding of the
components of the abstraction – say, ‘justice’ – but that they be able to follow parallel lines of
though in applying it in the particular instance in question.”  Id. at 117.  As if the difficulty of
achieving shared understanding, shared lines of reasoning and shared judgment regarding the
“justice” might call for in a particular case were not daunting enough, Hart & Sacks identify
additional requirements for sound legal reasoning.  Id. at 117.  In their paradigm, legal
decision-making is about “controlling . . . the future.”  Id. at 117.  Accordingly, the statement of
abstractions articulated in justification or explanation of a particular choice must indicate
general direction while leaving just the right room for future aligned reasoning and judgment.
Id.  “[T]he direction-giver has to strike a happy medium between definiteness and
indefiniteness.  His task is to control the future as far as he wisely can.  He must be
indeterminate only when an attempt at too tight a control is unwise.”  Id. at 117.  See also
CORNELL, IMAGINARY DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 16 (asserting the proposition that “[j]ustice is
not something to be achieved, it is something to be struggled for.”).
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converted into dysfunction.  The process of good conduct flowing
from well-constructed ideals is inverted.  When people are directed
away from practicing actions consistent with accepted principles and
toward the ability to imagine elegant social constructions as a “fantasy
only” endeavor, a perversion is takes place.99
Only if we do what we say we believe in, and when abstractions
become principles for conduct rather than something we think
about, can we move toward creating justice.
d
Lawyers function in highly regimented ways.  There are forms and
ceremonies, proper ways and required protocol that pretty much
dictate the work of lawyers in courtrooms, government agencies,
governing bodies.100  These formalizations are not all about
                                                          
99. See HART & SACKS, supra note 97, at lxii.
The rationalist tradition is deep and strong in Anglo-American law . . . .  By ‘rationalist’
we mean an insistence that legal commands be supported by reasons, that reasons be
subject to evaluation by universal criteria, and that the reasons justifying different legal
commands not be inconsistent with one another.  The common law formalism of
Langdell was rationalist.
Id.  See also id. at lxiii (quoting Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s organic theory of rationalism as
enunciated in his work, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)).  “The judge . . . is to
draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.”  Id.  “[These] principles emerge from the
process of testing, retesting, and reformulation inherent in common law.”  Id.  “Law . . . is
dynamic and not static.  It is . . . activity with purpose.”  Id. at n.141 (quoting Hart, Note on Some
Essentials of a Working Theory of Law, Hart papers, Box 17, Folder 1).  Law “is the channeling of
community activity . . . .”  Id. at xciii.  However, the resolving reliance on the design and
implementation of processes of decision-making, i.e., procedure, quash vitalitism for the sake of
stability.  The emphasis shifts from the initiating concern for dynamic to the modulating need
for well-constructed, well thought out procedural methodologies.  Ideation, this time ideation
about procedural elegance, emerges as the important activity.  “An unsound procedure invites
ill-formed and unwise [decisions].”  Id. at xciv.  Judge Cardozo continues on to explain that
“[p]rocess not only defines the roles and duties . . . but provides mechanisms for controlling
discretion and for self-correction . . . .  [T]his process is critical to law’s stability and legitimacy.”
Id. at xcv; see also THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 31-36, 44-45 (1935),
reprinted in REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 448 (finding that the law “is a way of writing
about human institutions in terms of ideals, rather than observable facts”).
100. See ARNOLD, supra note 99, at 448-49.
Law is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally important social symbols . . .  [I]t is
the greatest instrument of social stability . . . .  The abstract ideal which is not tied up
with a definite institution or memorialized by particular ceremonies, becomes
relegated to the limbo of metaphysics and has little social consequences.  The
institutions which throw about the law the atmosphere of reality and concreteness so
necessary for its acceptance are the court and the law school.  The one produces the
ceremonial ritualistic trial; the other produces a theoretical literature which defends
the ideal from attack by absorbing and weaving into its mystical pattern all the ideas of
all the critics.
Id.  See also FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 8 (expressing his judgment).
[L]ook . . . closely at . . . the spatial arrangement of the court, the arrangement of the
people who are part of or before the court.  The very least that can be said is that this
34
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efficiencies or ordered regularity or theories of evidence, or justice.
Some of these rituals are maintained to evoke respect or awe.  Those
British judges who wear black robes or red robes and white wigs come
to mind, so, also, does the Oyez Oyez  entrance that announces the “all
rise” greeting in Pennsylvania courts.
I hear some voices quibbling back with “What’s wrong with a little
tradition?” or “What’s wrong with a little respect?”  The point I want
to make is that there is nothing wrong with honoring tradition in the
right time and place.  There is nothing wrong with asking people to
show regard for the authority of a sincere, hardworking judge, either.
What is wrong is asking people to respect judging when judges
cannot follow either law or justice.101  When we ask people to respect
these individuals we are really asking people to respect the power,
that is, the might of the “Form” of the state.  When acting as a
practitioner of justice you want to be careful about asking people to
honor the power of reigning governors.  Justice may not demand the
disestablishment of all officials, it does demand the actualization
rather than ritualization of respect.  The fact that most of us were
educated to produce ritualizations when respect is called for should
suggest the depth of our struggle as we attempt to practice justice.
                                                          
implies an ideology . . . .  A table, and behind this table, which distances them from
the two litigants, the ‘third party’, that is, the judges.  Their position indicates . . . that
they are neutral . . . that their decision is not already arrived at . . . that it will be made
after an aural investigation . . . on the basis of a certain conception of truth and . . .
ideas concerning what is just and unjust . . . that they have the authority to enforce
their decision.  This is ultimately the meaning of this simple arrangement.
Id.  See also id. at 27 (suggesting that “[t]he court is the bureaucracy of the law.  If you
bureaucratise popular justice then you give it the form of a court.”); COVER, supra note 8, at
221-22 (speaking about the courtroom as “a setting of domination.”).
101. See ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 257 (observing that the use of propaganda in the
Soviet Union led to a peculiar type of cynicism, where the categories of “truth”: and “lies” no
longer held any meaning); see also ROBERT PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 27-55
(1962), quoted in REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 364 (“Hierarchy . . . is the result of the
separation of personal, charismatic authority from official authority . . . .  The deference
accorded organizational leaders is highly charged with charismatic implications.  Such
deference validates the individual’s need to impute superiority to those above him.”); id. at 362
(alleging that such a system anesthetizes “the sense of personal and systemic responsibility of
individuals.”); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281 (D. Kairys ed., 1982), reprinted in REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note
1, at 466 (speaking about hegemony which moves both the dominant and the dominated
classes to believe that the existing order represents pretty much the best anyone can do).
“[T]hese clusters of belief . . . convince people that all the many hierarchical relations in which
they live and work are natural and necessary.”  Id. at 466.  Respecting the source of power only
because it is the source of power, may be a practical requirement of living with others in the
world.  Id.  This does not eliminate or circumscribe the risks of its misuse.  Id. at 467.
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I live in a house that is built on sand.  Each year the building sinks
or shifts as the foundation settles into the slowly moving sand.  This is
old-fashioned construction.  No one would build a house this way
today.  No one would be allowed to.  The point here is not whether
my house fails to meet modern construction standards, the point is
that I am constantly confronting choices.  I can tear down my house
and construct another sounder building.  I can keep repairing the
accretionary damage like cracked walls, tilting floors, sagging
windows.  I can let it deteriorate.  It is my house.  The issue comes
down to my finances--what I can afford to do. What it makes sense for
me to do.  My house poses no danger to others.  The cost of
reconstruction, repair or neglect falls on me.  In that sense, it’s all the
same thing.
The cost of tolerating unsoundness in a society, however, falls on
all members of that society.  With society, the costs of reconstruction,
the costs of constant repairing, and the costs of living with
deteriorating conditions may not be the same, but each is higher
than citizens generally care to acknowledge.  Usually what happens is
that the cost of tolerating uncorrected conditions, remember we are
speaking about injustice, is denied recognition or laid at the feet of
those who suffer the condition.
At the time of the French Revolution, the crowds of poor
protesting citizens were considered “the problem” by powerful
aristocrats.102  In our society the unsupervised, “acting out” of latch-
key children and the violence of the children of addicts is often
identified as a problem of youth offenders.103  Uncooperative wives
                                                          
102. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 15 (noting that the penal system
operates as an anti-seditious system).
[T]his penal system was aimed . . . against the most mobile, the most excitable, the
‘violent’ elements among the common people: those who were most prepared to turn
to direct, armed action, including farmers who were forced by debts to leave their
land, peasants on the run from tax authorities, workers banished for theft, vagabonds
or beggars . . . those who live by plundering the fields, those who . . . attacked the tax
authorities and . . . agents of the State, and finally those who . . . carried weapons . . . .
It was these ‘dangerous’ people who had to be isolated (in prison, in the Hôpital
Général, in the galleys, in the colonies) so that they could not act as a spearhead for
popular resistance.  This fear was great in the eighteenth century.
Id.
103. See, e.g., Elizabeth Venant, “I Dream They are Going to Kill Me” Kidnappings.  Drugs.
Violence.  Death.  In L.A. Neighborhoods Dominated by Gangs, The Invisible Victims are Children, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1990, at E1 (reporting that latch-key children in inner-city Los Angeles are at
particular risk of falling prey to drug and gang related violence).
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are blamed for the brutality of their battering husbands.104  Women in
the workplace are blamed for an increase in sexual harassment.105
As long as we displace or deny the costs of injustice, justice will look
too costly.  When justice is the only item with a price tag, injustice
may look like a free lunch.  It never was like that.  It is not like that
now.  It will never be like that.  Until you know the cost of
maintaining injustice, you cannot judge the comparative cost of
justice.
If you are old enough, you may be able to pass the problems on to
the next generation.  They can cope with the sagging beach house.  If
you are younger than that, the house will eventually collapse.  You
could be in it.
IV
Knowledge is Power is Knowledge is Power.
Forever looped,
forever woven,
a tapestry, once created,
never undone.
Caught like a fly in a spider web trap,
never unhung.
Meaning from context, context from culture,
culture from grammar, law, structure and form.
Form creates substance, substance generates form. 
                                                          
104. See Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2118 (1996) (noting that the “Anglo-American common law originally provided that a
husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal punishment or
‘chastisement’ so long as he did not inflict permanent injury.”); see also People v. Berry, 556
P.2d 777, 782 (Cal. 1976) (reversing a murder conviction when the now deceased wife’s
admissions of infidelity, her taunts, teasing and infuriating conduct were understood to support
a finding that the defendant killed in wild desperation induced by this provocation); Victoria
Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and The Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331,
1343 (1997) (discussing ‘separation assault’ by reference to studies showing that forty-five to
fifty-six percent of males committing intimate homicides are occasioned by a female’s attempt
to leave or leaving the relationship).
105. See L. Camille Hébert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment for Women, 3 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 47-50 (1994), reprinted in BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 498
(finding that “[s]exual harassment in the workplace may even be motivated by the frustration
some men feel over the loss of economic power in the workplace . . . . Some men feel
threatened, both socially and economically, by the advancement of women; some of these men
react to these women with hostility.”).  Bartlett & Harris go on to suggest that some men are
acting out unconscious efforts to maintain male dominance by responding, with hostility and
aggression against women in workplace situations, to preserve and protect male power, status
and security.  Id. at 508.
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Enter a space defined action-by-action.
Is outside the lines
really “gone wrong”?
Rituals provide meaning, become meaningless.
“The groundlessness of our believing”, the mutuality of 
meaninglessness,
this hell we escape
only by sharing.106
a
Foucault teaches that power is related to knowledge by way of
mutual derivation and support.107  Power can come from knowledge,
can arise out of knowledge.  Knowledge can generate a nodule, a
clustering of ideas, concepts, ideations, which moves, influences,
directs and so gives rise to power.  On the other hand, established
power controls information, directs institutions, channels resources,
shapes knowledge.108  Along the same lines, morality enforced by law
is an instrument and expression of power.  Law, separated, isolated,
alienated from morality by power loses authority.109  The idea of
                                                          
106. Sharon S. Harzenski, unpublished poem (revised Mar. 2000) (on file with author).
107. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 51-52.  Foucault states:
exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and
accumulates new bodies of information.  One can understand nothing about
economic science if one does not know how power and economic power are exercised
in everyday life.  The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely,
knowledge constantly induces effects of power.).
[P]ower is strong . . . because . . . it produces effects at the level of desire—and also at
the level of knowledge.  Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it . . . .  It was
on the basis of power over the body that physiological, organic knowledge of it became
possible.
Id. at 59.
Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation,
displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge
functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an
administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via
knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of
domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory.
Id. at 69.  “Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of
constraint.  And it induces regular effects of power.  Each society has its régime of truth, its
‘general politics’ of truth . . . .”  Id. at 131.
108. See id. at 131-32 (arguing that truth “is produced and transmitted under the control,
dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (universities, army,
writing, media) . . . it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation . . . .”).
109. See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting REISMAN, FOLDED LIES, supra
note 89) (arguing that “[a]ll foci of loyalty have, by definition,. . . a normative code.”).
“‘Legality’ may be taken to refer to conclusions drawn by members of the community as to the
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justice without power is abstract, unrealizable, still born.  Power
without justice threatens to erupt into oppression and violence.110
b
Ceremony is a prescribed series of acts, a pattern of formalized
behavior.111  It is akin to ritual, to etiquette, to politeness.  It is also
related to the performance of religious rites.112  It carries a flavor of
                                                          
propriety of practices determined by some method of logical derivation from the myth system.”
Id. at 27; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 97, at cxii (presenting a supporting message from a
partially inverted view).  Hart brought copies of Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964)
(announcing the Supreme Court’s reliance on the Civil Rights Act to halt prosecutions of
desegregation sit-ins) to his Federal Courts class.  The class was prepared from past experience
for a serious and scathing analytical dissection of the case.  Instead, Hart paused, reflected,
remained silent for ‘thirty breathless seconds,’ looked up at the class and announced:
“Sometimes, sometimes, you just have to do the right thing.”  Id.; see also REISMAN & SCHREIBER,
supra note 1, at 118-19 (“[O]ne has not only a legal but moral responsibility to disobey unjust
laws . . . .  An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.”) (quoting Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.); SIU, supra note 10, at 64-65 (standing for the proposition that “[n]o
power of major proportions can effectively be exercised over a prolonged period of time
without an array of myths to sustain it . . . [therefore it] directly provide[s] [a] moral
justification for the extension of . . . power.”).
110. See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: “The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in
DECONSTRUCTION AND JUSTICE, supra note 96, at 10-11 (quoting, in both the French and
English versions, Pascal’s belief regarding justice).
La justice sans la force est impuissante, la force sans la justice est tyrannique.  La
justice sans force est contredite, parce qu’il y a toujours des méchants; la force sans la
justice est accusée.  Il faut donc mettre ensemble la justice et la force; et pour cela
faire que ce qui est juste soit fort, ou que ce qui est fort soit juste.
Id.  The passage as translated is reproduced as follows:
Justice without force is impotent, force without justice is tyrannical.  Justice without
force is contradictory, as there are always the wicked; force without justice is accused of
wrong.  And so it is necessary to put justice and force together; and for this, to make
sure that what is just be strong, or what is strong be just.
Id.
111. Ceremony is defined as
an outward rite or observance . . . the performance of some solemn act[s] according to
proscribed form, [can be used] disparagingly [to refer] to rites or observances
regarded merely . . . as empty form; 2.  A formal act or observance . . . established by
custom in social intercourse, a usage of courtesy; 3. Formal observances . . . in
reference to matters of religion or state.
2 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1048 (2d ed. 1989); see also SIU,
supra note 10, at 143 (contending that “[w]hat is meant by ceremony in the context or power
. . . is . . . strategy reinforcing . . . .  There has never been a person of great power who failed to
recognize the indissoluble relationship between ceremonial reinforcement and social
control.”).
112. See JOHN BOYER NOSS, MAN’S RELIGIONS 15 (1963) (“[P]raise, thanksgiving, and the
desire for communion with divine beings provide much of the content of religious ritual . . . .”).
Noss reports in the context of describing primitive religions:
[A]nthropologists claim that in most religious situations anxiety exists . . . .  First, there
is a primary anxiety arising from crises or strains in the life of the individual or the
community . . . this calls forth rituals whose purpose is to provide reassurance . . . a
secondary anxiety [arises] lest the rituals have not been . . . properly performed
39
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sanctification or worship.  Even watered down, reverence is often an
associated emotion.
I am not at all certain I know how ceremonies operate to create
awe or other proper emotional reactions.  I am certain that
ceremonies work at least some of the time for some of the people just
as I am certain that ceremonies do not work all of the time for all of
the people.113  Ceremonies are a useful place to take account of
personal experience.  One too many family weddings, too many
funerals or the last straw obligatory professional gathering, its hard to
                                                          
giv[ing] rise to further rituals of purification and expiation.  The rituals . . . not only
comfort and reassure but also bind . . . .
Id.; see also FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 712-13 (offering his own interpretation of religious
rituals).
We know that a human child cannot successfully complete its development to the
civilized stage without passing through a phase of neurosis . . . .  This is because so
many instinctual demands which will later be unserviceable cannot be suppressed by
the rational operation of the child’s intellect but have to be tamed by acts of
repression, behind which, as a rule, lies the motive of anxiety . . . .  In just the same
way, one might assume, humanity as a whole, in its development through the ages, fell
into states analogous to neuroses, and for the same reasons—namely because in the
times of its ignorance and intellectual weaknesses the instinctual renunciations
indispensable for man’s communal existence had only been achieved by it by means of
purely affective forces.  The precipitates of these processes resembling repression
which took place in prehistoric times still remain attached to civilization for long
periods.  Religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity . . . .
Id.
113. See SIU, supra note 10, at 153 (relating the following story on the war in Vietnam):
When the American president wanted to escalate the war in Vietnam during the early
1960s, he got the United States Senate to pass the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
The overwhelming passage with only two dissenting votes out of a hundred provided
the legal justification.  By the time the Senate woke up to what it had done and
repealed the resolution in 1969, the President had already committed half a million
troops in a full-scale war.  The succeeding President then claimed that his authority for
continuation of the war does not rest on that piece of paper but on others.  He would
not object at all to see it repealed.  In the meantime, it had served the intended
purpose of legitimacy well.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at 147 (recounting the story of a Chicago alderman in
1970).
He would often visit his favorite pawnshop, pay cash for a hundred-dollar watch, and
immediately pawn it for thirty dollars.  He would then redeem it within a short time.
After this cycle happened several times, the pawnbroker became curious and asked the
alderman as to the purpose of the routine.  The latter explained that his political
friends were continually pressuring him for contributions.  So he simply tells them that
he doesn’t have any money and whips out the pawn ticket to prove the point.
Id.  But see FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 689-90 (offering a different perspective on
civilization).
[E]very civilization rests on a compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct and
therefore inevitably provokes opposition from those affected by these demands . . . .
[T]hese privations [coercion and the renunciation of instinct] . . . form the kernel of
hostility to civilization.  The instinctual wishes that suffer under them are born afresh
with every child . . . .
Id.
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say, generally, exactly what occasion initiates a cynical chain-reaction.
For each person a time comes when the proscribed rituals lose their
magic and, stripped of their ability to inspire, become empty forms
filled with cynical fakery.
“The Emperor’s New Clothes”114 is too kind an epitaph for the
experience of degraded ceremonial conduct.  It compromises us
deeply.  We are demeaned, humiliated.  The very acts designed to
generate respect twist into conduct of form-only respectfulness.115
Fakery, trickery, fraudulent behavior is learned as an aspect of our
ceremonial training.  Once this point is reached anger and
resentment are sewn into the fabric of our ceremonial experiences.116
Almost no one escapes without debasement.
The why of this rejection syndrome seems obvious.  A set of
behaviors, a pattern of conduct, established to assist in the direction
or expression of shared emotion cannot work equally well for all
people at all times.  We are malleable, but not that malleable.  We are
herd animals, but not solely herd animals.  We are social creatures,
but not entirely social creatures.  We are cooperative, but not wholly
cooperative.117 We are neither the free-standing, atomistic
individualists of some philosophies118 nor the passive bovine mass of
                                                          
114. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, ANDERSEN’S FAIRY TALES 263-68 (1945).
115. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 691 (stating that “it is understandable that the
suppressed people should develop an intense hostility towards a culture . . . .  In such
conditions an internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed people is not
to be expected.”).
116. See id. at 691 (“[A] civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants
unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor deserves the prospect of lasting
existence.”).  The relevancy of the Freud cites depends on the willingness of the reader to
permit the analogy between ceremonialization and civilization.  Id.
117. See SABINE, supra note 19, at 524 (stating that communities rely on cooperation).  “The
main result of Hobbes’s analysis . . . had been to show that a community as such is a pure
fiction, that it has no existence except in the cooperation of its members . . . .”  Id.
118. See id. at 432-33 (concluding his discussion of seventeenth century political ideation).
The individual human being, with his interests, his enterprise, his desire for happiness
and advancement, above all his reason . . . appeared to be the foundation on which a
stable society must be built . . . .  Under other circumstances man as a member of an
organized community might have figured as the axiom, as in general it did for Plato
and Aristotle, and man as an individual as the derivative.
Id.  Drawing on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Sabine argues that “[s]ociety is made for
man, not man for society; it is humanity . . . that must always be treated as an end and not as a
means.  The individual is both logically and ethically prior.”  Id. at 526.  Sabine, citing John
Locke’s philosophical works, states that “[b]oth government and society exist to preserve the
individual’s rights.”  Id. at 525.  This ideation, according to Sabine, led to systematic
individualism according to which “[t]he value of any social group consists in the happiness or
self-satisfaction which it produces for its members . . . .”  Id. at 580.  Turning to Bentham and
his view that any corporate body, any state, community, society, is inevitably fictitious, Sabine
reports that “[t]he utility of the greatest happiness principle, therefore, consists in the fact that
it is the great solvent of fictions . . . .”  Id. at 679.  Referring to the Nineteenth century in a
chapter entitled “The Idealist Revision of Liberalism,” Sabine offers this description:
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counterbalancing alternative ideologies.119
Our willingness to cooperate “up to a point” requires respectful
                                                          
This ideal requires that the members of a society meet as moral equals, that they treat
each other with respect, that all are free to think and act for themselves . . . .  For this
reason coercion ought to be reduced to a minimum, and this is no truer of coercion
exerted by the state than of any other form of coercion which has the effect of making
persons less than free moral agents.
Id. at 731.  Offering his own conclusion, Sabine reminds us that “[th]e picture of a liberal
political community as a mass of unattached individuals . . . was never approximately a fact, but
only a figment of a few philosophers . . .”  Id. at 751.
119. See SABINE, supra note 19, at 751-52 (dismissing the idea that people would be free if
they had no organization or that human communities take a form simple enough to allow a
single, all encompassing organization, to serve all unification, cooperation functions).
“Certainly no modern society can ever approximate such a condition,” he says, “and both
fascism and . . . socialism demonstrate that experiments in this direction were both fictions and
disasters.”  Id. at 752.  Criticizing Lenin’s philosophy, Sabine argues that:
[I]n effect Lenin said that the working-class people are not naturally much inclined to
revolution, have learned little from their experience with capitalist industry, and in
general have very little capacity for thinking about their place in society or ways to
improve it.  All this was contrary the Marxian belief that it is precisely experience with
industry that creates a proletariat and makes it inherently revolutionary . . . .  Lenin’s
thought had a definitely anti-democratic undertone as if he did not really trust the
proletariat . . . .  For Lenin’s proletariat clearly needed to be managed and
maneuvered by leaders . . . who know what the proletariat ought to want . . . .
Id. at 814-15.  According to Sabine, Lenin believed that “a leader has nothing to learn about
ends from the people he leads.  He has a great deal to learn about how to urge them along as
fast and as far as possible, and without the undo use of force, which works best when used
moderately.”  Id. at 817.  Moderating or vacillating views have long been a part of our tradition.
Id. at 525.
Both the government and society exist to preserve the individual’s rights, and the
indefeasibility of such rights is a limitation on the authority of both.  In one part of
Locke’s theory, therefore, this individual and his rights figure as ultimate principles; in
another society itself plays this part.  There is nothing which adequately explains how
both can be absolute.
Id. at 625-36.  Paraphrasing Jaques Rousseau, Sabine states that “the natural egoist is a
fiction . . . some kind of community is inevitable . . . .  [A] unique fact about a community . . .
[is] that it has a collective good which is not the same thing as the private interests of its
members.”  Id. at 588.  Hegel is noted as having moved these ideas into a post-French
Revolutionary formulation, according to which:
Neither society nor the state can be said to depend merely on individual consent; they
are too deeply ingrained in the whole structure of needs and satisfactions that make
up personal self realization.  The highest of all human needs is the need for
participation, to be an organ of causes and purposes larger than private wants and
satisfactions.  The fundamental error or revolutionary philosophy . . . was its abstract
individualism.
Id. at 651; see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 465-66 (1973)
[hereinafter ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM] (arguing that total terror is a strategy attributable to
totalitarian states and that it “substitutes for the boundaries and channels of communication
between individual[s]. . . a band of iron which holds them so tightly together that it is as though
their plurality had disappeared into one Man of gigantic dimensions.”); FOUCAULT,
POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 98 (offering an alternative view that
[t]he individual . . . is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects.
The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to
which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation.  The individual which power
has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.).
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regard.  Ceremonial mandates rarely recognize the limitations of
willing participation.  More is demanded than can be produced.120
The rewards for producing extraordinary cooperation are rarely
sufficient to justify the expenditure of discipline.  Hence, we are
“forced” into producing a form of the requisite behavior.  That is, we
may go along with the ceremonial conduct but we go along with it
without heartfelt commitment.  To some degree or another coercion
fuels our sense of obligation or duty.
Having been moved by compulsion to act in accordance with
another’s demands we do not produce the desired emotional
response.  In actual fact an undesired emotional response is
produced instead.  Where reverence is wanted, the unwilling
participant produces resentment.121  Where family unity is wanted, the
compelled participant produces withdrawal and contempt.122  Where
community spirit is wanted, the bullied participant experiences
distancing, alienation.123  In this way ceremonies designed to generate
one set of responses degenerate into activities that produce a
different and undesired, unwanted, set of responses.
Just about every kid reports this experience to just about every
parent and teacher.  Just about every parent and teacher misinstructs
the concerned young person.  As a result, misinstructed, misguided,
we turn away or run away from events designed to bring us closer
together.
                                                          
120. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF HOPE 222 (1995).
[C]ontemporary man finds it hard to return to faith because he is afraid of the moral
demands that faith makes upon him.  And this, to a certain degree, is the truth.  The
Gospel is certainly demanding . . . .  Christ never permitted His disciples and those who
listened to Him to entertain any illusions about this.
Id. (emphasis in original).  The Pope goes on to say that God’s demands never exceed the
believer’s abilities.  Id. at 222.  If one accepts these demands with an attitude of faith, God will
give you the strength to meet them.  Id. at 222.  “To accept the Gospel’s demands means to affirm all
our humanity, to see in it the beauty desired by God, while at the same time recognizing, in light of
the power of God Himself, our weaknesses: ‘What is impossible for men is possible for God.’”
Id. at 223 (emphasis in original).
121. FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 690 (“[A] majority of people obey the cultural
prohibitions on these points only under pressure of external coercion—that is only where that
coercion can make itself effective and so long as it is to be feared.”).  Speaking of ancestors
who, like us, may have questioned the facticity or accuracy of the important traditional beliefs
and rituals which make a religious practice, Freud says “[m]any of them probably nourished the
same doubts as ours, but the pressure imposed on them was too strong for them to have dared
uttered them.”  Id. at 702.
122. See id. at 702 (arguing that with respect to religious beliefs and practices that “countless
people have been tormented by similar doubts, and have striven to suppress them, because they
thought it was their duty to believe.”).
123. See id. (claiming that “many brilliant intellects have broken down over this conflict
[about religious beliefs and practices], and many characters have been impaired by the
compromises with which they have tried to find a way out of it.”).
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What guidance was given?  Do you recall?  Was it phrased in
mandatory terms for you? Terms of obligation are commonly
employed.  The why of this is easy enough to comprehend.  I use the
Church (The Catholic Church) as a prime example.  Raised as I was
right at the breaking point of its authority, I recall the Church
described to me as a unitary organism established and maintained to
serve the souls, the eternal well being, of all humans.124  The
ceremonies of this Church, called sacraments, were one method of
service. These sacraments were sacred rites.125  Abiding by the
ritualistic performance of these rites positioned one safely as regards
eternal life.126  Deviation was soul threatening which, in effect,
implied the possibility of eternal damnation.  As far as I can
                                                          
124. See NOSS, supra note 112, at 631 (arguing that the “word ‘catholic’. . . became, in fact,
part of the name of the single organized institution that expressed the Christian religion after
the middle of the Second century.”) (emphasis in original); see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra
note 120, at 11 (emphasizing the universality of the church).  “In the Church—built on the
rock that is Christ—Peter, the apostles, and their successors are witnesses of God crucified and
risen in Christ.  They are witnesses of the life that is stronger than death.  They are witnesses of
God who gives life because He is Love.”  Id.  The Pope further professes his belief that
[w]e can affirm that . . . the position . . . is inspired by a truly universal concern.  The
Church is guided by the faith that God the Creator wants to save all humankind in Jesus
Christ, the only mediator between God and man, inasmuch as He is the Redeemer of
all humankind.  The Paschal Mystery is equally available to all, and, through it, the way
to eternal salvation is also open to all.
Id. at 81 (emphasis in original).  “Against the spirit of the world, the Church takes anew each
day a struggle that is none other than the struggle for the world’s soul.”  Id. at 112 (emphasis in
original).  “It is . . . a revealed truth that there is salvation only and exclusively in Christ.  The
Church, inasmuch as it is the Body of Christ, is simply an instrument of this salvation.”  Id. at
136 (emphasis in original).
125. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 120, at 182 (discussing religious sacraments).
“Already, on earth the Church is adorned with true, even if imperfect, holiness . . .  [T]he
pilgrim Church, with its sacraments and institutions . . . carries the mark of this fleeting world,
and lives among its creation, . . . yearning for the appearance of the children of God.”  Id. at
182.
What else are these sacraments (all of them!), if not the action of Christ in the Holy
Spirit?  When the Church baptizes, it is Christ who baptizes; when the Church
absolves, it is Christ who absolves; when the Church celebrates the Eucharist, it is
Christ who celebrates it: “This is my body” . . . .  All the sacraments are an action of
Christ, the action of God in Christ.
Id. at 130.
126. See id. at 74-75 (emphasizing that observance of the sacraments ensures one an eternal
life).
[T]hat Christianity is a religion of salvation is expressed in the sacramental life of the
Church.  Christ, who came “so that they might have life and have it more abundantly”
. . . discloses for us the source of this life.  He does so in a particular way though the
Paschal Mystery of His Death and Resurrection.  Linked to this Mystery are Baptism
and the Eucharist, sacraments which create in man the seed of eternal life.  In the
Paschal Mystery, Christ established the regenerative power of the Sacrament of
Reconciliation.  After the Resurrection He said to the apostles: “Receive the Holy
Spirit.  Whose sins you forgive are forgiven them.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
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determine, belief or faith was as obligatory as ceremonial
compliance.127  Where actual faith cannot be pretended, ceremonial
compliance can be faked.  “Fake it till you make it” might not have
been what was said to my childhood Catholic friends, but they were
without any doubt directed to go along with the rituals despite their
doubts about their efficacy or the efficacy of the underlying beliefs.
The price for exercising freedom of choice was understood in
“forever” terms.128  Few if any children in my circle were allowed to
make this choice for themselves.  The choice was made for them by
their parents who supervised, to the best of their ability, the adequacy
of my friends’ compliance.
What did we learn from this?  We learned that deviation from
ceremonial performance was forbidden.  This wasn’t a suggestion, a
guideline, an issue of cooperation or politeness.  It wasn’t even an
issue of tradition, custom, or culture.  It was a bigger than life issue of
obedience to a higher authority.  The trouble with this lesson was that
it left us without a structure for evaluation or judgment.  You know as
well as I what happened.  What happened was already described in
the earlier parts of this section.  You can only witness so many
sacramental marriages followed by broken vowed relationships before
you, an intelligent child, begin to question the commitment that
adults, your leaders, have toward the obligatory ceremonies.  One
cannot promise a God of true faith on Sunday morning only to find
oneself compromised by Monday evening.  The result was that the
children lost faith in the rituals.  Rituals, ceremonies, performed
without belief are empty forms, meaningless procedures undertaken
for show, theater.  The requirement of participation does not
engender faith, it engenders a lesson of obligatory submission to
meaningless authority.  It engenders a pattern of subjugation to
human institutions and demands, which is coupled with resentment
                                                          
127. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 120, at 192 (“The essential usefulness of faith consists in
the fact that, through faith, man achieves the good of his rational nature . . . .  [H]e achieves it by giving
his response to God, as is his duty—a duty not only to God, but to himself.”) (emphasis in
original).
128. See id. at 185-86 (speaking of eternal punishment and damnation for those choosing
not to believe).
[C]an man be damned, can he be rejected by God? The problem of hell has always
disturbed great thinkers in the Church . . . .  And yet, the words of Christ are
unequivocal.  In Matthew’s Gospel He speaks clearly of those who will go to eternal
punishment . . . .  Who will these be?  The Church has never made any
pronouncement in this regard.  This is a mystery, truly inscrutable, which embraces
the holiness of God and the conscience of man.”
Id.  “Eternal life can be given to man only by God; it can be only His gift.”  Id. at 57
(emphasis in original).
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and cynical behind-the-scenes rebelliousness.129
These are not attitudes designed to produce mature, responsible
adult citizens.  As I said, we were misguided.  This improper guidance
infected our attitudes toward power. The institutions which held our
parents captive and to which our parents sacrificed our sanity were
understood by them, and hence at least initially by us, to be
organizations of powerful people.  When the institutions were
churches or religious organizations the power of the people was often
understood derivatively as the power of a higher authority.  When the
institutions were political, the power of individuals was understood
derivatively as representational.  It was this power that kept us in our
places at our schools, our churches, our temples, our family
gatherings.  Various threats of punishment were used to direct our
behavior into requisite ceremonial form.130
When you learn about power in such an offensive environment,
you tend to despise it.  However, our actual situation is not this
simple.  It won’t hurt you to consider the ways in which you resent
ceremonies and the ways in which you love them, the ways in which
you rebel against ceremonies and the ways in which you manipulate
and take advantage of them, the ways in which you mock and decry
                                                          
129. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 715 (speaking of religion as engendering feelings of
intimidation and hostility towards civilization).
A believer is bound to the teachings of religion by certain ties of affection.  But . . .
countless others . . . are not . . . believers.  They obey the precepts of civilization
because they let themselves be intimidated by the threats of religion, and they are
afraid of religion so long as they have to consider it part of the reality which hems
them in . . . .  They cease to fear religion when they observe that others do not fear it.
Id.
How has it happened that so many people have come to take up this strange attitude
of hostility to civilization? I believe that the basis of it was a deep and long-standing
dissatisfaction with the . . . existing state of civilization and on that basis a
condemnation of it was built up . . . .
Id. at 735.
130. See id. at 740 (arguing that it is civilization through its regulation of social relationships
which exerts coercive force and subjugates the power of the individual to that of community).
[C]ivilization enters . . . with the first attempt to regulate . . . social relationships . . . .
The power of [the] community is then set up as “right” in opposition to the power of
the individual, which is condemned as “brute force”.  This replacement of the power
of the individual by the power of the community constitutes the decisive step of
civilization.
Id.
The existence of [the] inclination to aggression . . . is the factor which disturbs our
relations with our neighbor and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure
[of energy]. . . .  Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s
aggressive instincts and to hold manifestations of them in check by psychical reaction-
formations . . . .  It hopes to prevent the crudest excesses of brutal violence by itself
assuming the right to use violence . . . .
Id. at 750.
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ceremonies and the ways in which they evoke from you heartfelt
responsiveness.
Your mixed bag won’t be identical to my mixed bag.  Neither your
bag nor my bag will match our neighbors.  What we can say for sure is
that ceremonies exert powerful influences on us and that these
influences are deeply conflicted.
c
Ritual is ritual.  Established ritual creates order.  The order gives
rise to norms.  Norms give rise to judgments.  Judgments give rise to
interpretations, explanations, justifications.  The explanations give
rise to follow up actions.   Over and over again we experience this
process.  This process is the method of “enculturation”.131  In the
context of power be aware of the ways in which and the degree to
which power in one form or another, in one setting or another, was
employed, was an integral part of the process of enculturation.132
                                                          
131. See ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 213 (offering as a concept of culture a  “mode of
intercourse . . . with the things of the world.”).  “Culture, word and concept, is Roman in origin.
The word ‘culture’ derives from colere—to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend and
preserve . . . in the sense of cultivating and tending nature until it becomes fit for human
habitation.”  Id. at 211-12.  “While the Romans tended to regard even art as a kind of
agriculture, of cultivating nature, the Greeks tended to consider even agriculture as part and
parcel of fabrication, as belonging to the cunning, skillful, ‘technical’ devices with which man
. . . tames and rules nature.”  Id. at 212-13; see also 5 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 199 (2d ed. 1989) (identifying the prefix ‘en’ as substantially identical
with the Latin ‘in’ which was and is used to suggest putting something into the identified
condition or state, or investing something with the stated quality).  In this case, ‘enculturation’
is used to refer to the processes by which each of us is educated in life to know “what the world
is like” from the perspective of the ordering traditionally, or dominantly, associated with and by
those who raise and educate us.  See ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 221 (“Judging is one, if not
the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass.”).
Culture and politics, then, belong together because it is not knowledge or truth which
is at stake, but rather judgment and decision, the judicious exchange of opinion about
the sphere of public life and the common world, and the decision what manner of
action is to be taken in it, as well as how it is to look henceforth, what kinds of things
are to appear in it.
Id. at 223.
132. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 187-88 (arguing that a
government’s function derives from existing and independent relations of domination between
individuals).
Between every point of a social body, between a man and a woman, between the
members of a family, between a master and his pupil . . . .  There exists relations of
power which are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign’s great power
over the individual; they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the
sovereign’s power is grounded, the conditions which make it possible for it to
function.  The family . . . is not a simple reflection . . . of the power of the State; it does
not act as the representative of the State in relation to the children, just as the male
does not act as its representative with respect to the female.  For the State to function
the way that it does, there must be, between male and female or adult and child, quite
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Rather than think of these situations as “natural” or as “inevitable,”
rather than pass over them with a minimum of concern, slow down.
Pay attention.  Study them as constructs.  Study them as processes of
constraint, restraint.  Study them as personality programming, as
value indoctrination.  Concern yourself with identifying emblematic
underpinnings without forming allegiances or resentments.  Ask
about the relationship of this process to integrity, ask about its
relationship to invasiveness, ask about its violence.  In these studious
ways you may be able to exercise intelligence, sense, and flexibility.
You may find yourself freer.
d
Let’s consider one of the processes by which we understand
ourselves.  That is, let’s consider ways of meaning.133
                                                          
specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative
autonomy.
Id.
133. See S. I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 60 (1964) (arguing that “one
of the premises upon which modern linguistic thought is based . . . [is] that no word ever has
exactly the same meaning twice.”) (emphasis in original); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE OF LANGUAGE 99 (1972) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY] (arguing that “a statement always belongs to a series or a whole,
always plays a role among other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing
itself from them: it is always part of a network of statements, in which it has a role . . . to play.”);
Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (1984) (asserting the proposition that a
word’s meaning is shaped by its context).  “To be . . . ‘deeply inside’ a context is to be already
and always thinking (and perceiving) with and within the norms, standards, definitions,
routines, and understood goals that both define and are defined by that context.”  Id.; see also
Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations
of the New Legal Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND JUSTICE, supra note 97, at 171 (citing Stanley
Fish for the proposition that “plain meaning is ‘made’ - that is that it is fashioned or contrived -
through the force of rhetoric.”); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 9
(1966) (stating that “[language] is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a
collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit
individuals to exercise that faculty.”).
If we could embrace the sum of word-images stored in the minds of . . . individuals, we
could identify the social bond that constitutes language.  It is a storehouse filled by
members of a given community through their active use of speaking, a grammatical
system . . . ; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity . . . .  Language is not a function
of the speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual.
Id. at 13-14; see also COVER, supra note 8, at 223 (proposing that meaning is dependent on social
cooperation).  “[N]either effective action nor coherent meaning can be maintained, separately
or together, without an entire structure of social cooperation.”  Id.
Creation of legal meaning entails subjective commitment to an objectified
understanding of a demand.  It entails the disengagement of self from the ‘object’ of
law, and . . . requires engagement to that object as a faithful ‘other.’ The metaphor of
separation permits the allegory of dedication.  This objectification of the norms to
which one is committed frequently, perhaps always, entails a narrative—a story of how
the law, now object, came to be. And, more importantly, how it came to be one’s own.
Narrative is the literary genre for the objectification of value.
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How does it happen that people can say the same words and mean
different  things?  How does it happen that we know they mean
different things despite the sameness of their words?  What would you
identify as determining the differences?  Is it culture?  History?
Mental states like intent?  Faith?  Community pressure?  Support
groups? 
As part of my general education I was taught to look in the
dictionary for the meaning of words.  In dictionaries each word is
given one or several definitions along with an abbreviated etymology
identifying the word’s root or source.  The inspirations for its
meaning and the broad outlines of its range of meaning are
provided.  As part of legal education, students are trained to look to
context to help determine meaning.  “Necessary & Proper” are words
whose meanings are not solely determined by reference to
dictionaries.134  That lesson learned early and often sticks long and
hard.
Additional information about the meaning of words is gathered
from the specific context of their employment.  The nature of the
document, the nature of the subsection of the document in which
they appear, special “term of art” associations, if any, are brought in
as relevant aids in the determination of meaning.  In philosophy
classes I was taught that meaning comes from usage and that usage is
                                                          
Id. at 145.
134. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-15 (1819) (interpreting the word
“necessary” in the “necessary and proper clause” of the Constitution as requiring a construction
that considers the subject, context and intention of a person’s usage and ultimately holding
that the law passed by the Maryland Legislature was unconstitutional and void.).
Congress is not empowered by . . . [the Constitution] to make all laws, which may have
relation to the powers conferred . . . but such only as may be ‘necessary and proper’
for carrying them into execution.  The word ‘necessary’ is considered . . . as limiting
the right to pass laws . . . as are indispensable . . . [this understanding] excludes the
choice of means, and leaves to [C]ongress . . . that only which is most direct and
simple . . . .   Is it true, that this is the sense in which the word “necessary” is always
used? . . .  We think . . . not.  If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of
the world, or in approved authors, . . . it frequently imports no more than that one
thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another . . . .  It is essential to just
construction, that many words which import something excessive should be
understood in a more mitigated sense . . .  [The word “necessary”] admits of all
degrees of comparison . . . .  A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or
indispensably necessary . . . .  [This] comment on the word is well illustrated by the
passage cited . . . from the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution.  It is . . .
impossible to compare the sentence which prohibits a state from laying “imposts, or
duties . . . except what may be absolutely necessary . . . with that which authoriz[es]”
[C]ongress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper . . . without feeling a
conviction that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of
the word ‘necessary’ by prefixing the word “absolutely.” This word, then, like others, is
used in various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention
of the person using them, are all to be taken into view.
Id. at 413-15.
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determined in relevant discourse.135
All of this to inform us that even our simplest words are not free
standing in their concrete meaning.  Meaning, instead of emanating
from the words themselves, emanates from the way the words are
used in relation to one another and by the way the words are used by
the relevant peer group of people using them.
You are with me so far, right?
This discursive meaning base applies to more than just word
“definitions.” We might have been trained to refer to these
differences as subjectivities.  We might have been trained to contrast
these subjectivities with freestanding objectivities, which served as
standards or measures or norms against which subjectivities could be
measured for deviancy.  In such a system meaning emerges from the
space covered by standard deviations from normative centers.136
                                                          
135. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 10 (D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
Harpertorch Books 1969) (“A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it.  For it is what
we learn when the word is incorporated into our language.”).  “Our talk gets its meaning from
the rest of the proceedings.”  Id. at 30e; see also HAYAKAWA, supra note 133, at 314 (finding that
the “meanings of words are NOT in the words; they are in Us.”) (emphasis in original);
SAUSSURE, supra note 133, at 13 (“If we could embrace the sum of word-images stored in the
minds of . . . individuals, we could identify the social bond that constitutes language.  It is a
storehouse filled by members of a given community through their active use of speaking . . . .”).
Saussure warns that “starting from words in defining things is a bad procedure.”  Id. at 14.
Instead, he suggests starting from an understanding of the process of language acquisition.
Language, he teaches:
can be localized in the limited segment of the speaking-circuit where an auditory
image becomes associated with a concept.  It is the social side of speech, outside the
individual who can never create or modify it for himself; it exists only by virtue of a
sort of contract signed by members of a community.
Id.  “Language is checked . . . by the weight of the collectivity . . . .”  Id. at 74.  “[L]anguage
never exists apart from social fact . . . .  Its social nature is one of its inner characteristics.”
Id. at 77.
136. See SAUSSURE, supra note 133, at 15 (“Language is concrete . . . .  Linguistic signs,
though basically psychological, are not abstractions; associations which bear the stamp of
collective approval – and which added together constitute language – are realities that have
their seat in the brain.”).  “Of all social institutions, language is least amenable to initiative.  It
blends with the life of society, and the latter, inert nature, is a prime conservative force.”  Id. at
74.  Although Saussure notes that “language . . . always appears as a heritage of the preceding
period,” he is not to be understood as claiming that language does not change.  Id. at 71.
“[L]anguage changes, or rather it evolves, under the influence of all the forces which can affect
either sound or meaning.  The evolution is inevitable . . . .”  Id. at 76; see also FOUCAULT,
ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 133, at 217, 224.  The first story concerns the way mad people were
treated during the Middle Ages:
From the depths of the Middle Ages, a man was mad if his speech could not be said to
form part of the common discourse of men.  His words were considered null and void,
without truth or significance, worthless as evidence, inadmissible in the authentication
of acts or contracts . . . .  [T]he madman’s speech did not strictly exist.  It was through
his words that one recognized the madness of the madman; but they were certainly the
medium within which this division became active; they were neither heard nor
remembered.  No doctor before the end of the eighteenth century had ever thought
of listening to the content . . . yet it was these [words] which signaled the difference
between reason and madness.
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How is communication possible in a system like the one described?
Do we actually agree to abide by standard deviation measurements of
meaning?  Are we expected to bring our emotional responses in line
along with our intellectual understanding of the situation?  What
does the process of communication have to do with power?  I suspect
that those who understood that knowledge is power are not bothered
by this last question.  Obviously those who can influence the shape of
the normative curve will exercise power.  They will determine
meaning and deviancy for the community.  And, whether that
community is as large as the globe or as small as the home,
individuals with power have the capacity to set the forms and
standards of measurement and establish the objective.137
                                                          
Id. at 217.  The second story concerns Mendel, the nineteenth century geneticist:
People have often wondered how on earth nineteenth century botanists and biologists
managed not to see the truth in Mendel’s statements.  But it was precisely because
Mendel spoke of objects, employed methods and placed himself within a theoretical
perspective totally alien to the biology of his time . . . .  Naudin . . . suggested that
hereditary traits constituted a separate element before him; and yet, however novel . . .
the principle may have been, it was nevertheless reconcilable, if only as an enigma,
with biological discourse.  Mendel on the other hand, announced that hereditary traits
constituted an absolutely new biological object . . . he detached them species, from the
sex transmitting them, the field in which he observed being that infinitely open series
of generations in which hereditary traits appear and disappear with statistical
regularity.  Here was a new object calling from new conceptual tools, and for fresh
theoretical foundations.  Mendel spoke the truth, but he was not dans le vrai (within
the truth) of contemporary biological discourse . . . .  Mendel was a true monster, so
much so that science could not even properly speak of him.
Id. at 224.  But see Rosenfeld, supra note 133, at 160 (“Meaning . . . is neither subjective nor
objective, but intersubjective”).
All meaning – or at least all meaning relating to events and transactions in the social
and political sphere where the community of legal actors is located – is intersubjective
in that it requires some collective consensus or compromise . . . .  In other words, all
meaning – endowing interpretations in the context of the social and political sphere
require a collaborative collective rewriting of historically situated textual materials.
Id. at 162.
137. See FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 133, at 227 (“Every educational system is a
political means of maintaining or . . . modifying the appropriate of discourse . . . .  What is an
educational system . . . if not the ritualisation of the word . . . .”); see also COVER, supra note 8, at
96-97.
The very phrase ‘special treatment’ when used to describe pregnancy or maternity
leave, posits men as the norm and women as different or deviant from that norm.  The
problem was not women, or pregnancy, but the effort to fit women’s experiences and
needs into categories forged with men in mind . . . .  The assumption of able-
bodiedness as the norm is manifested in architecture that is inaccessible to people who
use wheelchairs, canes or crutches to get around.  Implicit norms often work subtly,
through categories manifested in language.  Reasoning processes tend to treat
categories as clear, bounded, and sharp edged.
Id.; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336 (1987) (stating that cognitive psychology theorizes that
culture transmits beliefs and preferences through experiences.  These beliefs and preferences
become part of the individual’s perceptions of the world and like other perceptions, they are
not articulated or experienced at a conscious level); BENDER & BRAVEMAN, supra note 96, at 77
51
Harzenski: Redefining Violence: Some Thoughts about Justice, Power, Peace, R
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001
HARZENSKI.FINAL.ASC02 9/19/01  5:34 PM
356 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 9:2
When these people operate with love, respect, regard, inclusivity
and kindness we experience power as caring, nurturing, and
supportive.  When these people operate dictatorially, when they
disdain or disregard those within their influence, we experience
power as uncaring, cold, and harsh. Power, experienced as uncaring
and harsh, is experienced intrusively, invasively, oppressively and is
experienced as an injury and as violence.138
From another perspective, consider what it means to be the
standard bearer.  As the standard bearer, you are establishing
meaning, you are the reference which sets the measure against which
contrast, judgment, and evaluation takes place.  By establishing these
factors, you are the example of meaning.  Therefore, if you want to
establish non-violence as a basis for communication, you must behave
without violence.  You must avoid intrusivity, overbearingness, and
invasiveness.  As someone who establishes meaning, you are an
example of what is meaningful.  This becomes a vicious circle or a
magnificent opportunity, or, as I experience it, a bit of both.
e
Remember that managed communication is very different from
open communication.  For many, managed or manipulated, highly
regimented, formalized, stylized, communication is what passes for
communication.  We are trained to send and receive according to
preset forms or formulas.139  There is no shame in this.  Without
structure, information and data come in as noise.140  There is no way
to have a free-for-all, do your own thing communication system.
Some limits in the form of structure are obligatory.141 Someone must
                                                          
(discussing Cultural Imperialism as universalization of the dominant group’s values and goals.
The dominant group, having access to the means of communication, projects “their own
experiences as representative of humanity.”).
138. See BENDER & BRAVEMAN, supra note 96, at 68 (“[O]ppression is the inhibition of a
group through the vast network of everyday practices, attitudes, assumptions, behaviors, and
institutional rules . . .”).  “Marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression.  A
whole category of people expelled from useful participation in social life . . . .”  Id. at 72.
“Exploitation, marginality and powerlessness all refer to relations of power and
oppression . . . .”  Id. at 76.
139. See SAUSSURE, supra note 133, at 68 (stating that “polite formulas . . . though often
imbued with a certain natural expressiveness . . . are nonetheless fixed by rule; it is this rule and
not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one to use them”); see also DECONSTRUCTION
AND JUSTICE, supra note 96, at 258 (describing how we respond to receiving a court summons).
140. See SIU, supra note 10, at 129 (arguing that “one of the weakest links in dealing with
human beings is the translation of raw data into useable information.  Until your data can be
converted into action, they remain just so much noise.”).
141. See SAUSSURE, supra note 133, at 111-13 (arguing that the expression of thoughts
through language allows for substantive meaning to be brought to otherwise shapeless and
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follow the rules more or less.  Indeed, all of us must cooperate to
some degree.  In that sense, it is similar to the law.  It isn’t polite to
criticize the foundations that support you although it is appropriate
to examine them critically.
The problem is that preformulated communications cannot always
carry depth of heart or flavor of spirit.  Constructed dialogue is
inhibiting; it limits, controls.142  It rests on repetitive formulas.  It
tends toward deadness rather than spontaneity.  It can be
deadening.143  Some things cannot be said, can almost not be
thought, cannot be expressed.144  In that sense, some things are
prohibited, made difficult if not impossible.
What does not fit the means, models and ways of coordinated
communication can be experienced as disempowered.  There are
ways and means to prevent falling victim to that trap.  Others before
                                                          
vague thoughts, ideas, and sounds).
142. See SIU, supra note 10, at 129 (pointing out that the high technological advances of
modern day data collection have created a need to limit and summarize information that, on
one hand, is much more succinct and efficient, and on the other hand, exposes information to
the possible biases of those handling it).
143. See COVER, supra note 8, at 139 (comparing and contrasting jurisgenerative principles).
The state, particularly through adjudication, creates law, norms, standards, and meaning with
jurispathic principles.  The state kills off, destroys, and through the force of its empowerment,
violently denies the legal ideas, values, and norms, offered by unsuccessful contestants.  Id.  “By
exercising its superior brute force . . . the agency of state law shuts down the creative
hermeneutic of principle that is spread throughout our communities.”  Id. at 144.  Cover
comments that judges “are people of violence.  Because of the violence they command, judges
characteristically do not create law, but kill it.  Theirs is a jurispathic office.  Confronting the
luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try
to destroy the rest.”  Id. at 155.  See also FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 1
(“Now my hypothesis is not so much that the court is the natural expression of popular justice,
but rather that its historical function is to ensnare it, to control it and to strangle it . . . .”).
144. BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 1098-99.  Hooks, speaking about the narrow,
confining construction of blackness that continues to define, restrict and inhibit a more fully
developed understanding of the ways in which “black identity has been specifically constituted
in the experience of exile and struggle,” says: “Considering that it is a subject one comes to
voice . . . .  Should we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the ‘subject’ when they
surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice
for the first time?”  Id.  See also Robin West, Symposium, Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and
Criticism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 62 (stating that “if feminist legal theorists want to
understand, much less challenge, patriarchal power, we need to come to grips with its utterly
non-discursive and silencing violence”).  West also states that “so long as silence rather than
discourse remains the primary product of modern patriarchy, then . . . [w]e ought . . . to study
the production of silence.”  Id. at 66.  But, West warns that
[I]f we want to understand how we should begin to remake and reclaim the world in a
way that is more loving . . . we should be extremely wary of the postmodern,
poststructuralist and social-theoretic claim that this non-discursive, woman-bonded,
creative, erotic and quietly rebellious self within is but another product of a political,
patriarchal, liberal and societal discourse.  We should instead seek to protect and
nurture and give voice to that most tentative, unschooled, and . . . undisciplined
female self that lies within.  For it is that self who will show us . . . new ways to judge,
new ways to legislate, and new ways to order.
Id. at 96.
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you found escape routes.  You too can find ways of sharing what you
want to share.  There is no need to give up.  On the other hand, you
cannot expect those who maintain order to reach out with
understanding and acceptance.  Changes to the forms, styles and
regulations of communications are rightfully treated as revolutionary.
Those who benefit from the changes may very well see your offering
as a threat to their power.  And, you know, threatened people often
fight.
Foucault teaches us that fighting is one of the many forms of
communication.145  It, too, expresses and asserts.
I would have preferred to end this section on communication with
some upspirited statement about the wonders of poetry.  In actual
fact, I wanted to write you a poem.  Instead, I find myself moved to
end with the acknowledgment that power is insistently expressive in
all available forms.  I never intended to say that.  Maybe it will help.
V
Power plays come in many forms.
Some games are fast like basketball, others slow like baseball.
Sometimes we play team sports, other times we engage in
individual competitions.
Power plays are not always as clearly delineated as sporting
events.
Sometimes they’re not sporting at all.
People often think of others as fuel, fodder, willing or
unwilling victims,
characters in a screenplay, or just plain “theirs” to do with as
they wish.
As a result people suffer.
It is hard to imagine adequate justification for this.
Surprising,
                                                          
145. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 90-91 (discussing the author’s
thesis, which replaces a liberal contract-oppression schema for analyzing power with a
domination-repression or war-repression schema built, at least in part, on Clausewitz’s assertion
that war is politics continued by another means).  War, fighting, force, and violence, comes
again, through Clausewitz, a relation to, an expression of, and a communication of, power.  Id.
Moreover, Foucault’s perspective allows him to substitute problems of domination and
subjugation for those of sovereignty and obedience.  Id. at 96.  Then, instead of asking why
certain people might wish to dominate others, he turns toward how things operate at the levels
of subjugation.  Id.  There, focused on “those continuous and uninterrupted processes which
subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors,” he begins to explore “how it is
that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted.”  Id.  He offers,
“[S]ubjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects.”  Id. at 98.  In this mode
power is characterized as circulating, as functioning in the form of a chain, individuals are not
its targets, but elements of its articulation, not points of application, but vehicles, transporters,
expressers, communicators.  Our every action - speaking, working, fighting - expresses and
communicates the web of power that defines our existence and our relation to all that is part of
our social reality.  Id.
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our casual rationalizations.
People can be compelled, pushed, pulled, coerced, bribed,
intimidated, tricked, persuaded or seduced.
Methodological choice, a mask for ethical or moral
considerations.
To think of the choice between violent and non-violent
obscures
everyday violence.146
a
On a personal level, I know that rationalization is a process
associated with getting what I want, justifying my wants or desires.
Wanting something, the wanting aligns my thinking, generates ideas,
brings about an ordering of objects, people and events.  The created
ordering supports my ambition.  It becomes obvious to me that I
should get what I want, that what I want is justified.  Objectivity,
described to me in legal studies hardly sounds like this personal
process.
My first year law professors would not validate images of a greedy
judge who, preferring a specific outcome, allowed her mind to
generate rationalizations.  In fact, when asked about this possibility,
my professors denied the applicability or utility of this model.
“No,” the professors told the class, “objectivity is not about the
subjective desires of the judge or decision maker.  It is about an
objective or impersonal perspective.”
In this frame the term  “objective” came to be associated with
impartiality, impersonality, and neutrality.  The rationalizing
opinions studied to teach the method of legal reasoning were
described as grounded in principle, in the rule of law, in a tradition
of logic.  As a result, as I understand it, legal education trains us to
align personal objectives, our objectives as lawyers, with the
established objectives that govern the rationalization process of the
cases.147
                                                          
146. Sharon S. Harzenski, unpublished poem (revised Mar. 2000) (on file with author).
147. POLANYI, supra note 42, at 162.
  Consider a judge . . . deciding a difficult case . . . pondering his decision, he refers
consciously to dozens of precedent and unconsciously to many more.  Before him
numberless other judges have sat and decided according to statute, precedent, equity
and convenience . . . his mind, while he analyses the various aspects of the case, is in
constant contact with theirs . . . .  [T]he decision . . . represents an interpretation
of . . . existing Law, reinforcing or modifying its system in some respect.  It makes it
appear . . . in a somewhat new light.  Public opinion has received a new response and a
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This methodology substitutes a set of “communal” objectives for
personal taste.  Accepting, as limitations, the rightful dominance of
these communal values, is what we refer to as gaining objectivity.
b
A process which moves us to generate a desired response to a
particular set of circumstances is a power process.148  We are trained
in law school to participate as functionaries in a huge dominating
power process.  Does power require us to learn to substitute one set
of objectives for another?
So, where is the opportunity for integrity in that?  Is the minimum
cost of power the loss of personal integrity?149  Examine that issue.
Consider how the imposition of will, the manipulated
accomplishment of personal preferences involve us in conflicts which
often, or perhaps inevitably, involve us in degrading others and
compromising ourselves.  We were reminded power corrupts.150
Surrounded by power in all places, forms, and experiences, we
acknowledge the inescapablity of the net.  In a situation where our
social status is created by power, our education is shaped by power,
our personal relations are sculpted by power,  our economic well
being is determined by power, our own deepest thoughts, what we
might like to think of as privacy or subjectivity, are the result of the
interplay of powerful people and institutions, we acknowledge that
net.   We bring almost nothing to the table that hasn’t already been
                                                          
new stimulus.  Every new decision . . . gives guidance to all future judges for their
decisions of cases yet unthought of.  The operation of the Common law thus
constitutes a sequence of adjustments between succeeding judges, guided by a parallel
interaction between the judges and the general public . . . .  Such coherence and
fitness as this system possesses at any time is the direct embodiment of the wisdom with
which each consecutive judicial decision is adjusted to all those made before and to
any justified changes in public opinion.  Accordingly, the operations of a judicial
system of case law is an instance of spontaneous order in society.
Id.; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986) (discussing his chain novel theory
that echoes this theme of judicial interpretation and opinion writing).  But see, e.g., Rosenfeld,
supra note 133, at 152, 155-56 (noting that Dworkin’s theory of a chain novel type of judicial
interpretation has not gone unchallenged).
148. See SIU, supra note 10, at 31 (stating that “power is the intentional influence over the
beliefs, emotions, and behaviors of people . . . .  One person exerts power over another to the
degree that he is able to exact compliance as desired.  No power is exhibited without an
empowering response.”).
149. See id. at 76 (providing that the “minimum fee you should be willing to pay for entry
into any major tournament of power . . . is personal integrity.  It is easy . . . to justify the
compromises as being a sacrifice for the general good.  But be that as it may, pay with inner
honor you must if you are to get to the very top”).
150. See id. at 119 (discussing the relation between power, wealth, and corruption).
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marked by the ways in which power plays itself out in and around
us.151  What, then, can we mean by integrity?
c
Power is responsibility.  If you want power you must accept the
responsibility.152  That is a new homily.  Some quippy words, a cliche
we are to learn from and about.
I find the fact of extensive and extreme irresponsibility to be one of
the saddest facts about the culture that nourished me.  If it were not
so obviously true, it would be inconceivable to me that leaders,
politicians, judges, administrators, political and economic theorists
                                                          
151. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 189.
Every relation of force implies at each moment a relation of power . . . (its momentary
expression) and every power relation makes reference, as its effect but also as its
condition of possibility, to a political field . . . .  To say that ‘everything is political’, is to
affirm this ubiquity of relations of force and their immanence in a political field.”
Further, “[I]n reality power means relations, a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-
ordinated cluster of relations.
Id. at 198.  “One impoverishes the question of power if one poses it solely in terms of legislation
and constitution, in terms solely of the state . . . .  Power is quite different from and more
complicated, dense and pervasive than a set of laws or state apparatus.”  Id. at 158.
What makes power . . . good, what makes it accepted, is . . . the fact that it doesn’t only
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.  It needs to be considered as a
productive network which runs through the whole social body . . . .
Id. at 119.
152. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, WRITINGS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS: FREUD AND LACAN 133 (1996)
(“[W]hen one does politics . . . it is never without consequences.”); see also TSUNETOMO, supra
note 50, at 33-34 (discussing how the degredation of the samurai custom has left the society
with men who are proud of their material wealth but lacking in duty and self respect); LAO TZU,
supra note 76, at 66.
If the sage would guide the people, he must serve with humility./ If he would lead
them, he must follow behind./ In this way when the sage rules, the people will not feel
oppressed;/ When he stands before them, they will not be harmed./ The whole world
will support him and will not tire of him./ Because he does not compete,/ He does
not meet competition.
Id. at 72.  “When men lack a sense of awe, there will be disaster.”  Id. at 78.  “He who takes upon
himself the humiliation of the people is fit to rule them./ He who takes upon himself the
country’s disasters deserves to be king of the universe.”  Id. at 72.
[W]e must be careful to maintain the right attitude.  Everything proceeds as if of its
own accord, and this can all too easily tempt us to relax and let things take their course
without troubling over details.  Such indifference is the root of all evil.  Symptoms of
decay are bound to be the result . . . .  He who understands . . . is in [a] position to
avoid . . . [these] effects by dint of unremitting perseverance and caution.  And, In a
time of flowering culture, an occasional convulsion is bound to occur, uncovering a
hidden evil within society and at first causing great sensation . . . .  Then everything is
forgotten and peace apparently reigns complacently once more.  However, to the
thoughtful man such occurrences are grave omens that he does not neglect.  This is
the only way of averting evil consequences.
WILHELM, supra note 39, at 245.
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across the entire history of the USA have been able to slough off on
others the responsibility for their choices and actions.
I think there is some relationship between my frustrated inability to
comprehend the general acceptance of careless conduct and my
intolerance for Social Darwinistic theories.153  Perhaps I refuse to
accept that the fittest among us are those who can externalize the
greatest responsibilities.  That seems mad to me, perverse and
counterintuitive.  Do you see what I mean?  It must be retrograde to
empower the grabby greedy self indulgent while disabling honest,
respectful behavior.  That is not evolutionary.  That is not
developmental.  That empowers lower mental functions instead of
higher mental functions.  Something is just not right about that as a
biological fact.
My sister says that our culture got itself twisted into this perversity
because lions, not chimpanzees, were the animal kingdom analog for
human behavior.  Our cultural ancestors did not know we share
ninety-nine percent of our DNA with chimps.154  They identified more
with the lion family, seeing in them a model for thinking about
society.
Considering widespread personal and social irresponsibility and its
relationship to power and leadership brings us to certain specifics.
Was there any excuse for early European settlers to continue to pour
into the Americas when they discovered that their diseases were
killing off indigenous populations? Is ignorance, poor cause and
effect knowledge, the only excuse available?  Is it available?  If
                                                          
153. SABINE, supra note 19, at 721 (discussing the fact that Herbert Spencer was not
influenced by Darwin because Spencer’s work was published nine years before CHARLES
DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1909)).
Spencer undertook the amazing task of ‘deducing’ organic evolution from the
conservation of energy.  And from this beginning the system proceeded successively to
the principles of biology, of psychology, of sociology, and of ethics.  Allowing for
temporary eddies of ‘dissolution,’ nature advances upon a straight line from energy to
life, from life to mind, from mind to society, from society to civilization and to more
highly differentiated and integrated civilizations.
Id. at 722.  According to Sabine, Spencer’s hope was that the growth of society would provide
clear indicia of its lower and higher stages allowing observers to distinguish the obsolete from
the suitable, the fit from the unfit.  Id. at 723.
[M]oral improvement was made to seem merely an extension of the biological
concept of adaptation, and social well-being appeared to be equated with the survival
of the fittest . . . socially valuable behavior, once established, by moral prescription as
habits, is translated into anatomical changes that are transmitted by inheritance.
Id.
154. See Thaddeus Herrick, Chimp Seems Unique, But Not a Missing Link, HOUSTON CHRON.
(1997), at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/metropolitan/97/01/12/oliver.2-0.html
(quoting Gordon Gallup of the University of New York at Albany, who stated “[h]umans and
chimps are 99% identical in terms of basic biological chemistry.”).
58
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/3
HARZENSKI.FINAL.ASC02 9/19/01  5:34 PM
2001] REDEFINING VIOLENCE 363
ignorance doesn’t excuse them, we wouldn’t want to opt into
allowing them to plead self-centeredness, would we?  They, of course,
did plead self-centeredness—at the time and for centuries
afterward—this justification rang clear, true and sufficient.  But, what
does it sound like to you?  Would you find the careless invasion of
your body by an HIV infected individual excusable because the
person had a strong desire for sexual gratification?
We do need to learn to think this way because we have for too long
been indoctrinated into excuse modalities.  If we want to behave
responsibly with the power we inherit, grasp, earn, develop, we need
to rethink the examples provided by prior generations.  People who
exercise careless power are everywhere.  They are being raised for the
experience by careless parents who were raised by careless parents.  It
is a bit like families where domestic abuse is passed on generation to
generation.  And, like physically abusive households, families who
teach their children about using power without assuming
responsibility, teach the natural inevitability of the behavioral
patterns along with the patterns themselves.
Do you want your children to inherit this violence?  If you don’t,
what are you willing to do?
d
First, the exercise of power involves others.  When others are
involved, they must be attended to.  What this means, what this
requires, varies from situation to situation.
A despot, for instance, won’t cater to the needs of others.  He will
simply override those needs or concerns, favoring his own
preferences as far as possible.155  We can learn from history,156 from
                                                          
155. SIU, supra note 10, at 185.
The master of power instantly transformed a mass of conflicting events and risks into a
sure course of action . . . .  This trait was impressively manifested by young Temujin
during the successful escape for his life.  Temujin was a prisoner of his murderous
brother, Targoutai.  He was awaiting his execution with a huge wooden yoke resting
on his shoulders to which his hands were tied.  As soon as darkness fell, Temujin
slipped away with the guards in pursuit.  He jumped into a river with his eyes barely
above water watching.  As the soldiers roamed the banks, one of them saw him but said
nothing.  Temujin noticed it and then and there he knew exactly what to do.  He
followed the horsemen back into his brother’s camp.  Then he crept into the tent of
the stranger who had not given him away.  At great danger to himself, the soldier
removed the yoke, burnt the evidence, and carted him away under a pile of loose wool.
Temujin galloped off to freedom on a fresh horse.  There is no stopping such a man
in a struggle for power.  He became Genghis Khan.
Id.
156. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 95 (discussing “[t]he war upon hypocrisy that
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personal experience,157 from books and movies, that despots and
tyrants of many descriptions, whether political or personal, are
unceasingly creative in the ways, means and excuses they develop for
overriding others.158
Cleverer or more cunning individuals may not be as overt in
displaying their disregard for the needs of others.  On some
occasions it is best to understand these individuals as autocrats of
stealth.  Stealthful autocrats, no less willing than their brothers to
oppress, repress, suppress others in order to attain their purposes,
should be approached with extreme caution.  Not all clever people
are stealthful despots.  Some cunning people prefer to exercise
power by trickery than give effect to overt expressions of authority
and control.  Think of their way of socializing as deceitful.  Do you
know people like that?  Sometimes it comes with a sense of humor, or
maybe more accurately stated, sometimes deception-based
predilections are revealed in attempts at humor as well as attempts at
manipulation.  Or, put another way, cunning people often
manipulate in a variety of settings.  Some are stimulated to
manipulate to “get a laugh” or to humiliate in circumstances where
other power gains are obscure or even absent.
Of course, most power players are neither consistently tyrannical
nor consistently foxy.  They may use overt domination or cunning
manipulation from time to time, however, they also have and use a
collection of other techniques.  Quite often it is the variety of
                                                          
transformed Robespierre’s dictatorship into the Reign of Terror.”).
[There was a] fateful mood of suspicion so glaringly omnipresent throughout the
French Revolution . . . [which] arose directly out of . . . [a] misplaced emphasis on the
heart as the source of political virtue.  The heart . . . keeps its resources alive through a
constant struggle that goes on in its darkness and because of its darkness . . . .  The
consequence of this hiddenness is that our entire psychological life, the process of
moods in our souls, is cursed with a suspicion we constantly feel we must raise against
ourselves, against our innermost motives.  Robespierre’s insane lack of trust of others,
even in his closest friends, sprang ultimately from his not so insane but quite normal
suspicion of himself.  Since his very credo forced him to play the ‘incorruptible’ in
public every day . . . how could he be sure that he was not the one thing he probably
feared most in his life, a hypocrite?
Id. at 92.  This eighteenth century terror, Arendt tells us, “was still enacted in good faith,
and . . . became boundless . . . only because the hunt for hypocrites is boundless by nature.”  Id.
at 95.
157. Doesn’t everyone know someone who they believe has consciously or, more likely,
unconsciously, selected physical illness or incapacity as a means of exercising personal control
over intimate others?  Isn’t everyone familiar with people who employ emotional instability or
immaturity as a manipulative method? Haven’t you ever pouted to get your own way?  Perhaps
you have deliberately bullied or intimidated a friend or family member to ensure the success of
your plans; perhaps not.  Perhaps instead, you have been bullied, harassed or nagged into
producing a desired course of conduct.
158. See ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 95-96 (discussing the use of terror as an
“institutional device,” which helped to guide many historical revolutions to victory).
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techniques and the individual’s capacity to select appropriate
techniques that make for frequent success.
Hence, the advice to appreciate the general need of power players
for cooperation.  Cooperation smoothes the way.  Cooperation may
be temporarily generated through trickery.  Some forms of apparent
cooperation can be developed through intimidation or fear.  Fear or
fraud-grounded cooperation is seeded with discontent and therefore
with resistance and rebellion.  Knowing this, serious long-term power
players do not rely over much on these methods.  Knowledgeable
people might be able to teach you formulas for optimum mixes of
fear, fraud, coercion, kindness, mutuality, and reciprocity.
e
The lessons about power as relationship come directly from
Foucault.  Accordingly, you are instructed to direct your research
about power away from the juridical edifice of sovereignty and away
from the apparatus of the state and its accompanying ideologies.159
Look instead towards domination by material operators of power.
Look towards forms of subjection, towards the inflections and
utilizations of domination and subjection in localized systems,
towards the deployment and employment of strategic methodologies
to establish patterns of dominating, subjugating relations among
various people.160
The state, according to Foucault, is superstructural in relation to a
                                                          
159. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 60 (“Power isn’t localized in the
State . . . and . . . nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function
outside, below and along side the State . . . , on a much more minute and everyday level, are not
also changed.”).  Foucault further asserts that
[P] ower would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked only
through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression . . . exercising
itself only in a negative way . . . .  [P]ower is strong . . . it produces effects at the level of
desire — and also at the level of knowledge . . . .  [P]ower is . . . deeply rooted and the
difficulty of eluding its embrace are effects of . . . these connections.
Id. at 59.
160. Id. at 96-97.
[S]ubstitute the problem of domination and subjugation for that of sovereignty and
obedience . . . .  [T]he analysis . . . should not concern itself with the regulated and
legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with the general mechanisms
through which they operate . . . .  [I]t should be concerned with power at its
extremities, in its ultimate destinations . . . .   Its paramount concern . . . should be
with the point where power surmounts the rules of right which organise and delimit it
and extends itself . . . , invest itself in institutions, . . . equips itself with instruments and
eventually even violent means of intervention . . . .  [O]ne should try to locate power at
the extreme points of its exercise, where it is . . . less legal in character.
Id.
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whole series of power networks (or relationships).   The state is a
meta-power that takes hold and secures itself only when rooted in a
series of multiple and indefinite power relationships that supply it a
necessary basis or supportive foundation.161  In Foucault’s view, your
study of power is impoverished if you concentrate exclusively on
legislation, enforcement, constitutional and juridicial mechanisms.162
Power is more complicated, denser and more pervasive than laws and
the formal institutions associated with the State.163
Human practices, he says, are possible only within relations and
subject to conditions that are finitely modifiable at particular points
and times.164  Power is exercised in accordance with dynamics
established by the relations and conditions that function, from a
power perspective, as the material and as the terrain of operation.
The conditions of possibility define the field of action.  For Foucault
power is omnipresent in the social body because power is
coterminous with the conditions of social relations.165
                                                          
161. Id. at 122 (stating that “the State is far from being able to occupy the whole field of
actual power relations” and that “the State can only operate on the basis of other, already
existing power relations.  The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power
networks.”).  “[E]very power relation makes a reference, as its effect but also as its condition of
possibility, to a political field of which it forms a part.”  Id. at 189.
162. Id. at 158 (“One impoverishes the question of power if one poses it solely in terms of
legislation and constitution, in terms solely of the state and state apparatus.  Power is quite
different from and more complicated, dense and pervasive than a set of laws or state
apparatus.”).
[W]e should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the juridical
edifice . . . the State . . . and the ideologies which accompany them, but towards
domination . . . the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection . . . the
inflections and utilisations of . . . localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses.
Id. at 102.  “The idea that the State must . . . be invoked to account for all the apparatuses in
which power is organised does not seem to me very fruitful for history, or one might rather say
that its fruitfulness has been exhausted.”  Id. at 188.
163. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 158 (stating that “[o]ne cannot
confine oneself to analysing the State apparatus alone if one wants to grasp the mechanisms of
power in their detail and complexity.”).
164. Id. at 245.
[A]ll human practices are possible only within relations and subject to conditions
which are only finitely modifiable at a given point and time . . . .  [T]he exercise of
power can be conceived as the general aspect of practice within which these relations
and conditions function as a material and a terrain of operation.
Id.
165. Id. at 142.
I would suggest [sic] hypotheses which . . . need exploring: (i) [P]ower is co-extensive
with the social body; there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of the
network; (ii)[R]elations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations . . . for
which they play . . . a conditioning and a conditioned role; (iii) [T]hese relations
don’t take the sole form of prohibition and punishment . . . ; (iv) [T]heir
interconnections delineate general conditions of domination.  And that this
domination is organised into a more-or-less coherent and unitary strategic form . . . ;
(v) [P]ower relations do . . . ‘serve’ . . . because they are capable of being utilised in
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What does this mean for us?
I am learning to pay attention to the networks or clusters of
relationships which influence my personal life, my professional life,
and my intellectual life.
Intellectually I existed in a universe that was collapsing behind me;
underneath me is probably a better metaphor to describe the loci of
collapse.  The weakness was not experienced as the impossibility of
looking back—into history or prior scholarship—for guidance; it was
the impossibility of resting comfortably within the given knowledge
supplied, presumed and required by dominant authority that fueled
my insecurity.  The way the world was viewed by those who provided
me with guidance was not the way the world appeared to me.  As a
result I have spent lots of scholarship time adrift at sea, searching for
the source of the flaws in inherited knowledge or in my own
understanding of the world.  Searching for flaws is not entirely
fruitless.  But, the ability to identify defects is not the equivalent of
establishing solutions.  Flaw identification, critical analysis, only goes
so far.
For years I wandered around considering myself alone in this
venture.  To some degree this alienated wandering resulted from
personal defects and can be passed by without much public
comment.  However, isolated, alienated, searching is a common
experience for intellectuals in my generation.  Out of this lonely
perusal we emerge, one after the other, with related observations of
our condition.  Reading one another we recognize the efficacy of the
other’s endeavor, we recognize the accuracy of the other’s
contribution, we recognize the authenticity of the other’s search.  As
Michel Foucault might characterize it, we are clustering around a
theme, a nodule is forming, a bubble rises up in the foaming surf.166
A possible version of knowledge comes into being.  For the purposes
of this work, thinking in terms of power, thinking in terms of the
violence or invasiveness of power, what is happening is that across
culture, experience and focus, concepts like nation-state, sovereignty,
                                                          
strategies; (vi) [T]here are no relations of power without resistances . . . .
Id.  Colin Gordon also asserts: “Hence for Foucault power is omnipresent in a social body
because it is coterminous with the conditions of social relations in general.”  Id. at 246.
166. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 71.  My imagary suggests more
fluidity than does Foucault’s.  In speaking about power, he employs the following terms: “[A]n
implicit model of power emerges: the dissemination of micro-powers, a dispersed network . . . .”
Id. at 71.  “Power is employed and exercised through a net-like ogranisation.”  Id. at 98.  “[Power]
presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions . . . .”  Id. at 104 (emphasis added).  “[The]
fight was located in the fine meshes of the web of power.”  Id. at 116 (emphasis added).  “There is a
network or circuit of bio-power . . . .”  Id. at 186 (emphasis added).  “[P]ower means . . . a . . . co-
ordinated cluster of relations.”  Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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and rule of law are opening up to provide opportunities for serious
scholars to concentrate on the smaller scaled but equally vital roles of
accumulated power in the daily conditioned life of the people.  For
example, Catharine MacKinnon speaks about the pervasive influence
of sex-based domination.167  Robert Cover asks us to examine how law
as violence insidiously infects our experience of life.168
f
The following lengthy quote from Siu captures some of the flavor
of his book, The Craft Of Power, while communicating a disturbing
vision of human relationships.
In the harnessing of people, you should understand as much of their
behavior as the engineer knows of the tensile strength, ductility, expansion
coefficient, and other properties of his structural materials before designing
and building a bridge.  Human beings should be appreciated in each of
four distinct roles, namely, as resources, target, opposition and milieu.
                                                          
167. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence] (stating
“[m]ale and female are created through the erotization of dominance and submission.  The
man/women difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other.”).
MacKinnon states:
the male point of view forces itself upon the world as its way of apprehending it.
[M]ale dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in
history . . . .  Its point of view is standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the
meaning of universality.  Its force is exercised as consent, it authority as participation,
its supremacy as the paradigm of order, its control as the definition of legitimacy.
Id. at 640 (continuing “[f]eminism distinctly as such comprehends that what counts as truth is
produced in the interests of those with power to shape reality, and that this process is as
pervasive as it is necessary as it is changeable . . . .”).
[T]he state is male in that objectivity is its norm.  Objectivity is legal liberalism’s
conception of itself.  It legitimizes itself by reflecting its view of existing society, a
society it made and makes by so seeing it, and calling that view, and that relation,
practical rationality . . . .  The rule form, which unites scientific knowledge with state
control in its conception of what law is, institutionalizes the objective stance as
jurisprudence.
Id. at 644-45.
168. See COVER, supra note 8, at 1605, 1609-10.
A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place bodies
on the line . . . .  [T]he interpretive commitments of officials are realized . . . in the
flesh.  As long as this is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which resists
official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its own
adherents.  The judges deal pain and death.  That is not all they do.  Perhaps that is
not what they usually do.  But they do deal death and pain.  From John Winthrop
through Warren Burger they have sat atop a pyramid of violence, dealing . . . .  It will
not do to insist on the violence of strong poetry, and strong poets.  Even the violence
of weak judges is utterly real -- a naïve but immediate reality, in need of no
interpretation, no critic to reveal it.  Every prisoner displays its mark.
Id.
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They behave radically differently in their hotch-potch of inconsistencies in
each of these roles and under varying circumstances in each case.
Just as an engineer does not count on his suspension cables to stretch
beyond their elasticlimits without breaking, so should you not expect people
to act in ways other than their nature allows.  This kind of knowledge is
technological rather than humanitarian.  It is important that the two not be
confused.  The former is knowing how to use people as tools; the latter is
knowing how to care for them as human beings.169
It is possible to work very hard trying to understand people so you
can use them better and make better use of them.  Humans are tools.
Know your tools, know the conditions under which they operate
effectively, understand the circumstances that generate threats of
overheating, slippage, deteriorating coordination, breakdown.  In the
social sciences humans-as-tools analysis used to be called “social
engineering.”  When I was young, many people associated social
engineering with social reform and with law reform.  More recently
the engineering aspect of the process has received a bad name.170  I
am far from certain the recent disassociation represents a move away
from technological management of people.  That attitude seems to
have survived.
A lot of political reasoning,171 a lot of formal legal reasoning,172 a lot
of professional reasoning,173 and a lot of interpersonal reasoning174
                                                          
169. SIU, supra note 10, at 115.
170. BATESON, supra note 1, at 161-62.
Dr. Mead . . . point[ed] out . . . a discrepancy . . . between “social engineering,”
manipulating people in order to achieve a planned blue-print society, and the ideals of
democracy . . . .  [T]he conflict is now a . . . struggle over the role which social sciences
shall play in the ordering of human relationships . . . .  [T]his war is ideological . . . .
Are we to reserve the techniques and the right to manipulate people as the privilege of
a few planning, goal-oriented, and power hungry individuals . . . ?  Now that we have
the techniques, are we, in cold blood, going to treat people as things?
Id.
171. BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 997.
172. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1987).  In
Chambers, the Omaha Girl’s Club fired a single, pregnant female employee in accordance with
their “role model rule.”  Id. at 699.  The resulting Title VII suit considered whether the “role
model rule” was a business necessity or a bona fide occupational qualification.  Id.  The
appellate court relied on the lower court, which found that the Girls Club established that it
honestly believed that to permit single pregnant staff members to work with the girls would
convey the impression that the Girls Club condoned pregnancy for the girls in the age group it
serves.  The Eighth Circuit is satisfied that a manifest relationship exists between the Girls
Club’s fundamental purpose and its single pregnancy policy.  Id. at 702-03.  The Court of
Appeals upheld the firing.  Id. at 703.
173. HAYAKAWA, supra note 133, at 284 (“Thoughtful purchasing is the last thing many
merchandisers want.  Once the customer is hooked on a brand name, all sorts of tricks can be
played . . . .  A . . . widespread practice . . . [was] to reduce the contents of a package without
reducing its size or price . . . .”).
174. I know a family that sets its clocks ten minutes fast in order to encourage themselves to
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rest on a technological view of people.  Power-based justifications are
almost inevitably the explanation for this treatment.175  Consider how
the dynamic works.  When I explain my conduct as necessitated by
power, how have I “justified” that conduct?  Or, having offered a
power- based explanation for my behavior, how did I come to believe
it would be accepted as an explanation, as a justification?
There are consequences to every act.  When I was young and would
act out in some way against my little sister I would say to my mom,
“She made me do it.”  My mom invariably replied, “No one can make
you do anything.  You choose to do it.”  I never understood my mom.  I
believed deeply and for most of my life that my sister had goaded me
into misconduct.  I remember President George H.W. Bush telling
the nation that Iraqi policy required a warring response.  “He asked
for it” is  frequently offered as an explanation for an assault.  “If you
don’t eat your meat how can you expect to get any pudding” is a
famous line from a Pink Floyd song.176  No one I knew bought the ‘we
bombed the village to save it’ assertion, but in Doris Lessing’s
autobiography177 she details her youthful association with
Communism by saying that many relied on the “You can’t make an
omelet if you don’t break any eggs” to talk about the horrors of
Stalin’s regime.178  What exactly are we saying?  Why does anyone
listen?
It is possible to work very hard to understand people so that you
can care for them adequately and appropriately as human beings.179
Too often when care is mentioned in the context of human-to-human
conduct, we are inclined to think in terms of nurturing, which
                                                          
leave the house early enough to reach their appointments on time.  This example, though,
reveals how this family exercises discipline rather than how they use others to their own ends.  It
isn’t ‘that kind’ of family.  I know another family where the distribution of trust fund monies
may be conditioned on the recipient getting and keeping a job which meets the approval of the
fund’s administrator, not because the trust provides for this judgment but because in the family-
member-administrator’s judgment the recipient ought to work.
175. BATESON, supra note 1, at 160 (“We have learnt, in our cultural setting, to classify
behavior into ‘means’ and ‘ends’ and . . . we go on defining ends as separate from means and
apply the social sciences as crudely instrumental means, using the recipes of science to
manipulate people.”).
176. PINK FLOYD, THE WALL (Capitol, Apr. 25, 2000).
177. DORIS LESSING, WALKING IN THE SHADE: VOLUME TWO OF MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY 1962,
191-93 (1968) (discussing Lessing’s experiences in the forner Soviet Union).
178. Id. at 191.
179. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 160-61 (agreeing with Dr. Mead’s suggestion that we
replace the ends/means goal-oriented habits of mind associated with western civilization with a
habit of thought that looks for the direction and values implicit in the means).  “We have to
find the value of a planned act implicit in and simultaneous with the act itself, not separate
from it in the sense that the act would derive its value from reference to a future end or goal.”
Id. at 161.
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inclines us to think in terms of coddling, soothing, making the way as
easy as possible for another.  How this confusion arose or what holds
it in place is a mystery to me.  I hope we aren’t haunted by caring-for
images appropriately associated with nursery environments because
that is basically the only referent we share for communicating a sense
of caring.  You see what I mean?  Have we been so brainwashed to
think of humans in technological terms, in terms of their utility to us
and our plans, that we cannot easily imagine a series of
complimentary settings to hold or to signify care based relationships
with each other?  Lacking other experiences are we obliged to build
our care constructions out of infancy and romantic attachments?  If
raising a baby or finding new love is pretty much the only model we
have to help us develop caring behaviors, we are bound to make
serious mistakes.   The best we could hope for, if that is our
condition, is to retain enough open-mindedness to learn from our
errors.
g
Eldridge Cleaver said that “Power comes out of the end of a gun.”180
Where I went to school the unmitigated power of armed force was
called “naked” power.  Eldrige Cleaver, a well-known Black Panther,
conceptualized facing the cops as confronting naked power.  Power,
as pure force, absent any pretense of authority, reasonability, or right
order, is undressed, exposed, naked, and obviously violent.  Power
becomes visible as directed violence.  In a naked-power situation
there is only the unmasked reliance on the compulsiveness of deadly
force.
                                                          
180. ELDRIGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 128 (1968).
The police department and the armed forces are two arms of the power structure, the
muscles of control and enforcement.  They have deadly weapons . . . .  They use force,
to make you do what the deciders have decided you must do.
Every country . . . has these agencies of force . . . .  They punish.  They have cells and
prisons to lock you up in . . . .
The techniques of the enforcers are many: firing squads, gas chambers, electric chairs,
torture chambers, the garrote, the guillotine, the tightening rope around your
throat . . . .
Which laws get enforced depends on who is in power . . . .
The police do on a domestic level what the armed forces do on an international level:
protect the way of life of those in power.
Id.; see also REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting Mao Zedong that “[p]olitical
power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”).  But see id. at 79 (stating that FRIEDRICH WIHELM
NIETZSCHE, ON GENEOLOGY OF MORALS (Walter Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans. & Walter
Kaufman ed., Vintage Books ed., 1989) takes a contrasting perspective promoting a view of law
as a technique employed by the weak to limit the powers of the strong).
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Oddly enough even in naked-power situations a symbol is used.
The gun is the symbol.  The gun symbolizes the forcefulness, the
reliance upon force, which is the basis for the assertion of power.
The gun symbolizes the direct immediacy, the inescapability, of the
violence of power, the power of violence.
As naked power relies on force and violence, other forms of power
rely on symbols suited to their nature or message.  Monetary rewards
constitute a powerful inducement for some people.  Others, less
responsive to money, can be moved by a sense of achievement,
making accolades and awards, conferring ‘job well done’ recognition.
Still others are influenced by fame, publicity, institutional or
community status.  What moves us takes on a symbolic role.  That is,
the moving influence, the carrot, the stick, the push, the pull, the
avoidance, and the attraction, are all substitutes for money in a
“medium of exchange” construction.  A certain kind of “distancing”
occurs here.  The offeror, i.e., the one seeking an empowering
response, the one desiring a particular action, is separated from his
willfulness by the intermediary of the symbol offering.  Domination is
depersonalized.  (I am not telling you what to do.  I am making an
offer in which you might be interested.) The actor, the one delivering
the desired response, is separated from her willingness through the
intermediary of the symbolic acceptance.  Submission is
depersonalized.  (I did not give in to you.  I responded to an offer
that appealed to me.)
The personality is less able to distinguish than the intellect.  And,
the intellect makes the distinctions at a high and hidden cost.  What
happens is, the process of separation suggests the value of what was
offered/accepted.  This valuation is recorded.  Having registered the
transaction and its value, a person will be a bit more inclined next
time to use a similar formula for a similar transaction.  Repetition of
this formula embeds it deeper and deeper into memory.  It becomes
habitualized.181 It is something that just gets done.  In effect, it
                                                          
181. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 287 (“[T]he phenomenon of habituation . . . [is the]
change from responding to each occurrence of a repeated event to not overtly responding.”).
Insofar as we think of adaptability as achieved by stochastic process, we let in the
notion of an economics of adaptability . . . .
We may, in the first instance, solve a given problem by trial and error; but when similar
problems recur later, we tend to deal with them out of a range of stochastic operation
and hand over the solution to a deeper and less flexible mechanism which we call
“habit.”
Id. at 257.  In contradiction to my suggestion that these habits develop from repetition, Bateson
remonstrates,
When we equated “learning to learn” with acquired apperceptive habits, this did not
exclude the possibility that such habits might be acquired in other ways.  To suggest
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disappears from view, from consciousness.  It becomes part of “the
way things are.”  It becomes background, context, presumed, instead
of considered.  It spreads out.  That is, in the intellect’s effort to
organize data, to “make sense” of the multifaceted universe of
options, the influence from a particular habit invades other choices.
Someone might reason: “If it was important to me to achieve in
situations X, Y & Z, maybe I find achievement pleasurable.  Maybe I
like achievement.”  Such a person might seek out, or at least be
willing to respond agreeably, to other achievement-based situations.
Ego defensiveness being what it is, that person may find themselves
coming to believe that achievement-based responsiveness, a
willingness to construct their behavior to accomplish available tasks,
was valuable, good, desirable conduct.
An ethical or moral framework could be built in this way.  And, if
that were to happen, if one’s ethical framework was constructed in
this response to symbol system manipulation—even if
unconsciousness prevailed on everyone’s part—the resulting morality
rests on power relationships.  It is a power-grounded, power-based,
and power-instituted morality.
Symbols are powerful for thinking beings.
h
Foucault says there are two primary schemes for the analysis of
power.182  There is the contract-oppression scheme, according to
which people claim power as a right but are compelled, conjoled,
bargained with, tricked or persuaded to share or part with it.183  It is
the theory that lies at the root of liberal ideologies.184  Employing this
theory, shared power becomes troublesome, i.e., oppressive, when it
                                                          
that the only way of acquiring one of these habits is through repeated experience [is
wrong] . . . .  [I]n human education such habits are acquired in various ways.  We
are . . . concerned with . . . real individuals who have complex emotional patterns of
relationship with other individuals.  In such a real world, the individual will be led to
acquire or reject apperceptive habits by the very complex phenomena of personal
example, tone of voice, hostility, love, etc.
Id. at 169-70.
182. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 92 (“[W]e have two schemes for
the analysis of power.  The contract-oppression schema, which is the juridical one, and the
domination-repression or war-repression schema for which the pertinent opposition is not
between the legitimate and the illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and
submission.”).
183. See id. at 88 (discussing power as a commodity that can be treated as such).
184. See id. (“I would call this common point an economism in the theory of power . . . .
Power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession
enables political power or sovereignty to be established.”).
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is overextended because it goes beyond the overt or covert terms of
“the contract.”185  The contract-oppression construct fits nicely into
economic analysis.  So too does the Marxian power model, which ties
political power and economic power into an inseparable knot.186
Foucault’s alternative, the domination-repression or war-repression
scheme, presents power as a relationship of force.187  The way I think
of this is that instead of attempting to build a relationship with my
dad, or my lover, to please him and to please me, what if I set about
building that relationship to keep him appeased, to keep me safe?
However we might characterize the mutual pleasure relationship, the
latter appeasement-based relationship would be based on force.  It
would clearly be a power-focused relationship.  Dropping the
exchange imagery wherein power could be given, transferred,
alienated, Foucault’s domination-repression or war-repression model
visualizes power as existing only in action.  And, the basic or
definitional action of power—how you “know it when you see it”— is
repression.  Foucault uses Clausewitz’s view that “war is an extension
of politics” and Nietzsche’s view to get from a repressive focus to an
aggressive focus within this same framework.188
When the exchange-based constructions of liberalism are replaced
by domination-based constructions, power is everywhere marred by
violence.  While not all power is expressed “at the end of a gun” as in
                                                          
185. See id. at 94-95 (explaining this balance of power in terms of royal power).
186. See id. at 88-89 (“[T]he Marxist conception . . . the historical raison d’etre of political
power is to be found in the economy.”).
187. See id. at 89.  Foucault initiates a discussion of a non-economic analysis of power thusly:
We have in the first place the assertion that power is neither given, nor exchanged,
nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action . . . .  [W]e have at
our disposal another assertion to the effect that power is not primarily the
maintenance and reproduction of economic relations, but is above all a relation of
force.
Id.
188. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 90-91.
[N]one of the political struggles, the conflicts waged over power, with power, for
power, the alterations in the relation of forces, the favouring of certain tendencies . . .
that come about within . . . ‘civil peace’—that none of these phenomena in a political
system should be interpreted except as the continuation of war . . . .  Even when one
writes the history of peace and its institutions, it is always the history of . . . war that
one is writing . . . .  [T]he end result . . . is . . . a contest of strength to be decided in
the last analysis by recourse to arms . . . .  [P]ower as continual war . . . .
So, no sooner do we attempt to liberate ourselves from economistic analyses of power,
than two solid hypotheses offer themselves: the one argues that the mechanisms of
power are those of repression.  For convenience sake, I shall term this Reich’s
hypothesis.  The other argues that the basis of the relationship of power lies in the
hotile engagement of forces.  Again for convenience, I shall call this Nietzsche’s
hypothesis.
Id.
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Cleaver’s or Mao’s naked power metaphor, in the domination/war-
repression scheme of analysis, comparative force is the quintessential
source of action and response.  Hence, trespass,189 infringement,190
intrusiveness,191 compulsion,192 duress,193 injuriousness,194
discordancy,195 and violation,196 are terms which characterize the
forcefulness of power based activity.
For some of you, dialogue after dialogue hidden by fogs of
confusion are lifting.  Foucault’s work might help you put Cover,
MacKinnon and other more modern authors into place alongside
Locke, and the Founding Fathers.197  The competing theories of
power should, for some of you, help clarify ideas, evaluations,
assertions, about institutions and attitudes previously obscured by
lack of information.  For some, power is always, or almost always,
invasive.
The seeking of an empowering response, when carried by
something other than simple request, is almost always experienced as
disrespectful and repressive.  The power-seeker wants what he wants
regardless of what the responder wishes.  The power-seeker wants his
desired response in place of what the responder might wish; any
action that seeker takes to maximize his preferred outcome will
intrude on the responder.
Of course, this is an exaggerated, oversimplified model of action.
Nevertheless, this model does not lack a certain accuracy.  We have
                                                          
189. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1674 (4th ed. 1951) (defining trespass as “[a]n unlawful
act committed with violence, actual or implied, causing injury to the person, property or
relative rights of another.”).
190. See id. at 920 (defining infringement as “[a] breaking into; a trespass or encroachment
upon.”).
191. Id. at 958-59 (comparing intruder, “[o]ne who enters upon land without either right of
possession or color of title,” with invasion, “[a]n encroachment upon the rights of another; the
incursion of an army for conquest or plunder.”).
192. See id. at 359 (defining compulsion as “[c]onstraint; objective necessity; duress.
Forcible inducement to the commission of an act.  It is likened to coercion.”).
193. See id. at 595 (defining duress as “[u]nlawful constraint exercised upon a man whereby
he is forced to do some act that he otherwise would not have done.”).
194. See id. at 925 (defining injurious as “associated with ‘injurious words’”).  In Louisiana
this was another way of describing slander or libel.  The more general term is injury, for which
there is a full page of definitions.  Injury is defined as “an act which damages, harms, or hurts.”
Id.
195. See 4 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 748 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining discordant as “not in accord, not harmonious, at variance, disagreeing.”).
196. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 189, at 1741 (defining violation as “[i]njury;
infringement; breach of right, duty or law; ravishment; seduction.”).
197. See ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 293 (explicating revolutionaries including
those who, as philosophers or as political leaders, are known to us in terms of the American
Revolution).
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all been there, haven’t we, backing down from some small conflict
because the issue wasn’t worth the battle for cooperation.  We select
to appease rather than to confront.  We “go along to get along.”  Not
that this is necessarily bad behavior.  Neither the seeker nor the
responder are essentially or irrevocably compromised in character or
integrity by a single episode, or several episodes.  However, repeated
episodes generate patterns.  Patterns generate expectations.
Expectations generate credible assertions of authority (right).  Rights
contribute additional support.  What began as a simple decision to
appease can end up an established ordering with built in normative
judgments.
VI
In ever moving, coming, going, rising, falling, gaining,
losing life, conflict is inevitable.
Conflicts change shape, form, participants.
They appear, disappear, erupt, retreat, morph.
They flower, seed, mutate.
The question is: Do they ever end?
The more of the world you crave to dominate, the more
impersonal your relations with others.
Craving  less,
enriches human relationships.
Touched and touching, we contact all living beings.
Nothing is without effect, without affect.
What counts as “goodness” in your world of action?
The answer establishes your moral center.
Relationships of power, justice, law and morality
Hang in the balance for you
And for those whose life you touch.198 
a
                                                          
198. Sharon S. Harzenski, untitiled poem (Mar. 2000) (on file with author).
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Why do people go on fighting?199  Have you ever asked yourself that
question?  Is it worth asking why we go on fighting, or should we
instead focus on finding out why we fight at all?  Don’t we often
presume the naturalness of fighting?  Fighting, or so it seems, is an
ordinary, anticipated outcome of conflict, while conflict is treated as
an ordinary outcome of power.200  Some people move quickly from
                                                          
199. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 749.
[M]en are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most defend
themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose
instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness . . . .
[T]heir neighbor is . . . someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on
him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually
without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to
torture and to kill him.  Homo homini lupus [Man is wolf to man] . . . .  As a rule this
cruel aggressiveness waits for some provocation or puts itself at the service of some
purpose, whose goal might have been reached by milder measures.
Id.
200. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 91 (discussing how political
systems should “be understood as episodes, factions, and displacements in . . . war”); see also
ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 10-11 (offering a similar theory).
[T]he hypothesis of a state of nature implies the existence of a beginning that is
separated from everything following it as though by an unbridgeable chasm.  The
relevance of the problem of beginning to the phenomenon of revolution is obvious.
That such a beginning must be intimately connected with violence seems vouched for
by the legendary beginnings of our history as both biblical and classical antiquity
report it: Cain slew Abel, and Romulus slew Remus; violence was the beginning and, by
the same token, no beginning could be made without using violence, without violating
. . . .  The tale[s] spoke clearly: whatever brotherhood human beings may be capable
of has grown out of fracticide, whatever political organization men may have achieved
has its origin in crime.  The conviction, In [sic] the beginning was crime . . . has
carried through the centuries . . . .
Id.; see also FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 500.  To appreciate Freud’s thinking, one first must
establish the trauma of the totem.  Freud, relying on Darwin’s theory of the primal horde—a
violent and jealous father who keeps the females for himself and drives away his young adult
sons—hypothesizes the brothers unifying, turning on their father, slaughtering and then
devouring him.
Psycho-analysis has revealed that the totem animal is in reality a substitute for the
father; and this tallies with the contradictory fact that, though the killing of the animal
is as a rule forbidden, yet its killing is a festive occasion—with the fact that it is killed
and yet not mourned.  The ambivalent emotional attitude, which to this day
characterizes the father-complex in our children and which persists into adult life,
seems to extend to the totem animal in its capacity to substitute for the father.
Totemic religion not only compromised expressions of remorse and attempts at
atonement, it also served as a remembrance of the triumph over the father . . . .  Thus
it became a duty to repeat the crime of parricide again and again in the sacrifice of the
totem animal . . . .  For a long time afterward, the social fraternal feelings . . .
continued to exercise profound influence on the development of society . . . .  In thus
guaranteeing one another’s lives, the brothers were declaring that no one of them
must be treated by another as their father was treated by them jointly [murdered] . . . .
To the religiously-based prohibition against killing the totem was now added the
socially-based prohibition against fratricide . . . .  Society was now based on complicity
in the common crime; religion was based on the sense of guilt and the remorse
attached to it; while morality was based partly on the exigencies of this society and
partly on the penance demanded by the sense of guilt.
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disagreement to embattlement; for them, no settlement opportunity
occurs until after violence sets in.  Others move more slowly,
stretching out stages of escalating intensity.  With some of these,
intervention might bring resolution before what we call “fighting”
begins.  With others, entering the process locks the parties into a
dynamic that can only end with hostilities.201
Studying the progression of disagreements from inception to
settlement, we can begin to develop maps, abstracting patterns from
the particulars of disputes.  What we are looking for are ways to
characterize the movements from power play to armed resistance,
from assertiveness to aggression to fighting, from a simple “no, I’d
rather not” to a weapon drawn in self-defense.  Look for examples in
your personal life, in professional settings, on the news.  The fuller
our catalogue of examples, the more beneficial.
Second, we can begin to explore, in available literature and
through the practical application of the principles described in this
literature, techniques for redirecting escalating conflicts.202 This
                                                          
Id. at 500-03.
201. BATESON, supra note 1, at 68.  Bateson uses the term schismogenesis to describe a
dynamic of progressive differentiation.  Id.  In a chapter dedicated to a discussion of cultural
contact, various dynamic interfaces are investigated.  Bateson begins with three broad models:
complete fusion of interfaced groups; absolute elimination of one group; and persistence of
both groups in dynamic equilibrium.  Id.  Schismogenesis-progressive differentiation-is an
option associated with dynamic equilibrium.  Id.  Bateson offers us the following example of
symmetrical differentiation.
[T]here is a likelihood, if boasting is the reply to boasting, that each group will drive
the other into excessive emphasis of the pattern, a process which if not restrained can
only lead to more and more extreme rivalry and ultimately to hostility and to the
breakdown of the whole system.
Id. at 68.  Bateson also offers the following example of complementary differentiation.  If one
group habitually expressive assertiveness to which members of the other group routinely
respond by exhibiting submissiveness.
It is likely that the submissiveness will promote further assertiveness which in turn will
promote submissiveness.  This schismogenesis, unless it is restrained, leads to a
progressive unilateral distortion of the personalities of the members of both groups,
which results in mutual hostility between them and must end in the breakdown of the
system.
Id.
202. Id. at 70-72.  For example, given his observations Bateson makes a series of tentative
suggestions:
(a) [I]t is possible that a very small admixture of complementary behavior in a
symmetrical relationship, or a very small admixture of symmetrical behavior in a
complementary relationship, may go a long way toward stabilizing the position.
The squire is in a predominately complementary . . . relationship with his
villagers, but if he participates in village cricket (a symmetrical rivalry) but once a
year, this may have a curiously disproportionate effect upon his relationship with
them.
(b) [If] group A sell sago to B while the latter sell fish to A, complementary patterns
may . . . promot[e] a mutual dependence . . . .
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literature is being produced fast and furiously.  We are in a period of
rapid growth.  Attention has been directed toward the study of
violence, toward identifying and developing ways to avoid the
intensification of conflicts.203
b
Life in general is teaching me to be extremely careful with or about
offensive/defensive perspectives.  Offensiveness and defensiveness
correspond to a “life as battle” metaphor.  Like the adversarial system,
like competitiveness, like debating, and maybe even dialectics, the
embattled view of life suggests the essentiality of conflict.  The
suggestion goes deep.  It is repeated frequently.  We are educated to
the point of habituation.  We are programmed.  We are trained.
Over and over we are directed to look for, to observe, to recognize, to
respect, and to anticipate repetitions of conflict.  As a result, we add,
by our own conduct, further reinforcement to preexisting tendencies
or trends.
We are not entirely free.  We are “victimized’ by our expectations.
If you learn from this section how to avoid being victimized by your
expectations, you will have learned enough to make the work worth
while.
What strategies and tactics are available to free you from the snares,
the entanglements, of expecting embattlement?  Awareness is a first
step.
c
The subject is the inevitable suffering of some as an element of the
exercise of power.204  The fact works this way: If power is the ability of
                                                          
(c) [T]he presence of a number of truly reciprocal elements in the relationship may
tend to stabilize it . . . .
(d) [E]ither type of schismogenesis . . . can be checked by factors which tend to unite
the two groups in loyalty or opposition to some outside element . . . .
(e) [C]ontrol by diversion of attention to outside circumstances . . . [whereby] . . .
those responsible . . . cooperate in an attempt to solve the difficulties.
Id.
203. See generally BARRY RUBACK & NEIL ALAN WEINER, INTERPERSONAL VIOLENT BEHAVIORS
1-2 (1995) (noting that violence has been studied by a number of academics and many have
examined theories on how to rectify violence in a culture).
204. See SIU, supra note 10, at 6 (“Of course, thousands of people will be fired . . . .  Of
course, millions will be bombed to fleshy scraps . . .   The remorse can be washed away with the
universal absolution: ‘Too bad, just can’t be helped.’. . .  Let not the wailing and groaning of
the innocent weaken your will to win and keep.”)(ellipses in original).  “One man’s gain so
often rests on another man’s pain.”  Id. at 62.  And, quoting a poem of Robert Southey written
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a person to get another person to accede to the power player’s wishes
or desires, then in every power play there is a dominant, willful
individual and a submissive individual.205  If one thinks of it in the
most benign setting—parent and child—the image is clear without
setting up a strong antagonistic emotional reaction.206  That, of
course, presupposes that you had decent parents to guide you.  If
your parents where less than completely honorable, even in the
parent-child set-up you could find yourself victimized by negative
judgment.207
That fact alone may be enough to warn some of you about the
complexity of studying suffering in the context of human power.  In a
universe where the people who exercise power, the people who ask,
conjole, demand, that others do their will, do things their way,
suffering is added to the world.  Selfish actions result in suffering.208
                                                          
about a long ago battle, “[t]hey say it was a shocking sight/ After the field was won;/For many
thousand bodies here/Lay rotting in the sun;/ But things like that, you know, must be/ After a
famous victory.”  Id. at 62.
The misfortunes of humans may be divided into two classes: First, those inflicted by
the nonhuman environment, and, second, those inflicted by other people.  As
mankind have progressed in knowledge and technique, the second class has become a
continually increasing percentage of the total . . . .  [I]t is now man that is man’s worst
enemy . . . .  [M]uch the most important evils that mankind have to consider are those
which they inflict upon each other through stupidity or malevolence or both.
RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 146-47.
205. MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 167, at 636.  “[T]he male point of view
forces itself upon the world as its way of apprehending it . . . .  [M]ale dominance is perhaps the
most pervasive and tenacious system of power in history.”  Id. at 638.
Power is the intentional influence over the beliefs, emotions, and behaviors of
people . . . .  One person exerts power over another to the degree that he is able to
exact compliance as desired.  No power is exhibited without an empowering response.
The techniques of eliciting empowering responses of the kind and at the time desired
from targeted individuals constitute the craft of power.
SIU, supra note 10, at 31.
206. See FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 744.
The love which founded the family continues to operate in civilization both in its
original form, in which it does not renounce direct sexual satisfaction, and in its
modified form as aim-inhibited affection.  In each, it continues to carry on its function
of binding together considerable numbers of people, and it does so in a more
intensive fashion than can be effected through the interest of work in common.
Id.
207. See BATESON, supra note 1, at 243 (“I believe . . . that the schizophrenic family is an
organization with a great ongoing stability whose dynamic and inner workings are such that
each member is continually undergoing the experience of negation of self.”).
208. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 163 (“Selfishness beyond a point, whether individual or
national, is not wise.”); see also FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 741.
A good part of the struggles of mankind centre round the single task of finding an
expedient accommodation—one, . . . that will bring happiness—between this claim of
the individual and the cultural claims of the group; and one of the problems that
touches the fate of humanity is whether such an accommodation can be reached by
means of some particular from of civilization or whether this conflict is irreconcilable.
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d
I was thinking about the warnings, “Never let them see you sweat”
and, “Whatever you do, don’t let them see you cry.”  If sweating reveals
too much of the reality of effort involved in an endeavor and if tears
reveal too much of the underlying emotionality, cruelty, actual overt
cruelty, reveals too much of its underbelly.  Cruelty strips away the
masks of agreed-upon pretense, the acquiescence to ritualized or
regularized relations, the economy of facial compliance.  It lays bare
and opens the risks of casual compliance and shallow cooperative
arrangements.  The harshness of too much cruelty burns into the
complex nets of our social or political associations.  It awakens dread,
resistance, independent analysis and action.
I want to say that few ceremonies are distracting enough, powerful
enough, to incorporate cruelty; but that just isn’t accurate.  Masters at
cruelty seduce people into ceremonializing the infliction of pain and
suffering.209  History provides too many examples to tolerate denial.210
                                                          
Id.
The development of the individual seems to . . . be a product of the interaction
between two urges, the urge toward happiness, which we usually call ‘egoistic’, and the
urge toward union with others . . . which we call “altruistic” . . . .  [T]he two urges . . .
must struggle with each other in every individual . . . .  But this struggle . . . does admit
of an eventual accommodation.
Id. at 768-69; see also NOSS, supra note 112, at 197.
209. See ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 119, at 472-73.
The preparation of victims and executioners which totalitarianism requires . . . is not
ideology itself . . . but its inherent logicality.  The most pervasive argument . . . of
which Hitler like Stalin was very fond is: You can’t say A without saying B and C and so
on . . . .  [T]he coercive force of logicality . . . springs from our fear of contradicting
ourselves.  To the extent the Bolshevik purge succeeds in making victims confess to
crimes they never committed, it relies chiefly on this basic fear and argues as follows:
We are all agreed on the premise that history is a struggle of classes and on the role of
the Party in its conduct.  You know therefore that, historically speaking, the Party is
always right . . . .  At this historical moment . . . certain crimes are due to be committed
which the Party, knowing the law of history, must punish.  For these crimes, the Party
needs criminals; it may be that the Party, though knowing the crimes, does not quite
know the criminals; more important than to be sure about the criminals is to punish
the crimes, because without such punishment, History will not be advanced . . . .  You,
therefore, either have committed the crimes or have been called upon by the Party to
play the role of criminal—in either case, you have objectively become an enemy of the
Party.  If you don’t confess, you cease to help History through the Party, and have
become a real enemy.  The coercive force of the argument is: if you refuse, you
contradict yourself and through this contradiction, render your whole life
meaningless . . . .
Id.
210. See RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 109.
When the Romans won victories in the Punic wars, the Carthaginians became
persuaded that their misfortunes were due to a certain laxity which had crept into the
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What should not be possible seems almost easy when viewed through
historic lenses.  Exactly the cruelty that ought to alert a population,
instead becomes the very thing uniting them.  The resulting
corruption spreads and lasts.  Whether in public squares, splashed
across the media or in our homes, the ceremonialization of cruelty is
not easily overcome.211  I do not want to assist anyone toward the
                                                          
worship of Moloch.  Moloch liked having children sacrificed to him, and preferred
them aristocratic; but the noble families of Carthage had adopted the practice of
surreptitiously substituting plebian children for their own offspring.  This, it was
thought, had displeased the god, and . . . even the most aristocratic children were duly
consumed in the fire.
Id.; see also ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 100-02 (presenting the Reign of Terror as
the complex result of a profoundly human experience).  I’ve cut and pasted together her
rendition hoping to convey its depth and clarity.  She begins by weaving together two strands of
an already integrated fabric.  Id.  Everyone involved is French and everyone was deeply touched
by the extreme corruption of the French Court.  Id.  The hypocrisy issue eating away at the
secret center of Robespierre’s heart reflected the ill-fated cabals and intrigues of Louis XVI’s
Court with its broken oaths, unkept promises, willfully corrupt manners.  Id.  Arendt reports:
War upon hypocrisy was war declared upon society as the eighteenth century knew it,
and this meant first of all war upon the Court at Versailles as the center of French
society.  Looked at from without, from the viewpoint of misery and wretchedness, it
was characterized by heartlessness; but seen from within . . . it was the scene of
corruption and hypocrisy.  That the wretched life of the poor was confronted by the
rotten life of the rich is crucial for an understanding of what Rousseau and
Robespierre meant when they asserted that men are good ‘by nature’ and become
rotten by means of society . . . .  [T]he Revolution offered the opportunity of tearing
the mask of hypocrisy off the face of French society . . . of tearing the façade of
corruption down and of exposing behind it the unspoiled, honest face of the people.
Id. at 101-02.
[T]he men of the French revolution had no . . . respect for the legal personality which
is given and guaranteed by the body politic . . . .  They believed that they had
emancipated nature herself . . . liberated the natural man in all men, and given him
the Rights of Man to which each was entitled, not by virtue of the body politic . . . but
by virtue of being born . . . .  For the people who now appeared were not ‘artificially’
hidden behind any mask, since they stood just as much outside the body politic as they
stood outside society.  No hypocrisy distorted their faces and no legal personality
protected them . . . .  From then on, the ‘real wants’ determined the course of the
Revolution . . . .  For the masses, once they . . . discovered that a constitution was not a
panacea for poverty, turned against the Constituent Assembly as they had turned
against the Court . . . .  When this force was let loose, when everybody . . . [became]
convinced that only naked need and interest were without hypocrisy, the malheureux
changed into enragés, for rage is . . . the only form in which misfortune can become
active.  Thus, after hypocrisy had been unmasked and suffering been exposed, it was
rage and not virtue that appeared . . . .  It was the unequal contest of these rages, the
rage of naked misfortune pitted against the rage of unmasked corruption, that
produced the ‘continuous reaction’ of ‘progressive violence’ of which Robespierre
spoke . . . .  For rage . . . is the mode in which impotence becomes active in its last
stage of final despair.  The enragés . . . were those who refused to bear or endure their
suffering any longer, without, however, being able to rid themselves of it or even to
alleviate it . . . .  [S]uffering, once . . . transformed into rage, can release overwhelming
forces.
Id. at 104-07. 
211. ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 83 (stating that “from this deed of violence the
same chain of wrongdoing will follow, only that now mankind will not even have the
consolation that the violence it must call crime is indeed characteristic of evil men only?”).
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accomplishment of such a goal.  I would rather point to the
establishment of disciplines that help us develop effective techniques
suitable to other characters and inclinations.
Is it possible to promote power while censuring some of its
expressions?  The endeavor is common enough.  Use your own
judgment to determine the degree, extent and conditions of success.
e
No one offering you ideology or domination as a path toward the
right ordering of the community is contributing directly toward non-
violence.
Many people cannot separate theory from ideology.212  They cling
                                                          
212. See 17 THE COMPLETE EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 902 (2d ed. 1989)
(offering at least seven different definitions of the word ‘theory’).  For our purposes the
relevant definitions include:
a systemic statement of rules or principles to be followed; a system of idea held as an
explanation of a group of facts or phenomena; a hypothesis that has been established
by observation or experiment and is propounded as accounting for known facts;
systemic conception or statement of the principles of something.
Id.  The dictionary also reminds us that ‘theory’ is used to identify abstraction as distinguished
from or in contrast to “practice.”  See id.  The dictionary revealed that the root of the word is
Greek.  See id.  In the original language the word was used to refer to viewing or contemplating
and probably came into he English language when Aristotle’s works were translated.  See id.
The dictionary taught me that ‘ideology’ was originally associated with the science of ideas, that
branch of philosophy or psychology that deals with the nature and origin of ideas.  While it
suggests that it might have been associated with Condillac and the belief that all ideas are
derived from sensations, it also offers the extension of application into the realm of idealistic,
non-literal, speculative, visionary; warning that in this context the term is understood in a
depreciatory sense.  See id.  Frankly, I do not know - except by familiar usage - how I got my
sense of ideology, a sense which employs the term to refer to the assertions or beliefs
constituting a political, social, economic or even psychological program or paradigm.  And,
since the section which contains this footnote rests on a capacity to distinguish between theory
and ideology by using the second term in extreme contrast to the way it is defined in my
dictionary, I set out in search of an explanation.  The emergent pattern pleases me insofar as it
supports my assertions and displeases me insofar as it lends a peculiar and, I fear, ideological
cast to a great deal of the material I rely upon in my footnotes, as well as to some of my own
views.  Living and learning is what my dear friend and now dean of Temple Law School told me
early on was the purpose of legal scholarship.  Being somewhat humiliated in the here-and-now,
I can only add that I wish more of my learning were not quite so publicly exposed.  But, then,
I’ve known all along that what I write is an exposure of my ignorance.  The emergent pattern,
according to my sources, follows a pattern generated by Marxist influence.  See also SABINE, supra
note 19, at 772-77 (asserting that Marx used the word ‘ideology’ in a peculiar way).  “The [or
‘this’] notion of ideology was at once one of Marx’s most pregnant ideas and also one of the
vaguest and most subject to abuse.”  Id. at 773. The notion which Sabine found novel, pregnant,
vague and potentially dangerous is that: “The individual counts mainly through his membership
in the class, because his ideas—his moral convictions, his esthetic preferences, even the kind of
reasoning that seems to him convincing—are in the main a reflection of the ideas generated by
the class.”  Id. at 772.  The idea that “[i]deas reflect and more or less misrepresent an
underlying economic reality . . .,” id. at 773, when generalized to “[i]t is not the consciousness
of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines
their consciousness . . . ,” id. at 775, is laced throughout this paper; articulated by a number of
sources as a statement of incontrovertible fact.  It is far too late in the game for this paper for
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to theories, form allegiances to theories.  They allow theories to
replace experiential learning.  When this happens the theory is
transformed into an ideology.213  Ideologies organize evidence,
structure thoughts, manage material.  With an ideology, analysis
proceeds along preset, established, patterns.
This analysis may make for efficiency, but it does not provide for
                                                          
me to invert the construction and treat this idea as ‘ideological’ in its own (source) terms; I
cannot now examine the degree to which my social existence determined for me the appeal of
this construction.  I can, however, project a future research project in which I undertake this
inquiry.  Id.
213. See also RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 23-24 (telling us that philosophy seeks a theoretical
understanding of the structure of the world while seeking to inculcate the best way of living in
the world; in effect philosophy seeks “a theory of the universe upon which to base a practical
ethic.”).  He admits that because of its theoretical aspect “philosophy consists . . . in the framing
of large general hypotheses which science is not yet in a position to test.”  Id. at 25.  He adds:
“Those who have a passion for quick returns and for an exact balance sheet of effort and reward
may feel impatient of a study which cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, arrive at
certainties . . . .” But, he warns: “The demand for certainty is one which is natural . . . but is
nevertheless an intellectual vice.”  Id. at 26.  “So long as men are not trained to withhold
judgment in the absence of evidence, they will be led astray . . . .”  Id. at 27.  “[I]t is not enough
to recognize that all our knowledge is . . . uncertain and vague; it is necessary . . . to learn to act
upon the best hypothesis without dogmatically believing it.”  Id. at 28; see also ARENDT,
TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 119, at 466 (employing the term ‘ideology’ in a way closely
aligned with my propositions).
What totalitarian rule needs to guide the behavior of its subjects is a preparation to fit
each of them equally well for the role of executioner and the role of victim.  This two-
sided preparation, the substitute for a principle of action, is [the] ideology . . .
ideologies—isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything
and every occurrence . . . are a very recent phenomenon . . . .   Ideologies are known
for their scientific character: they combine the scientific approach with results of
philosophical relevance and pretend to be scientific philosophy.  The word ‘ideology’
seems to imply that an idea can become the subject matter of science, just as animals
are the subject matter of zoology, and that the suffix-logy in ideology, as in zoology,
indicates nothing but the logoi, the scientific statements made on it . . . .  An ideology is
quite literally what its name indicates . . . the logic of an idea.   Its subject matter is
history . . . .  The ideology treats the course of events as though it followed the same
‘law’ as the logical exposition of its ‘idea.’ ideologies pretend to know the mysteries . . .
the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future.
Id. at 468-69.  “Ideologies . . . assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything . . . and
that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent
process of logical deduction.”  Id. at 470.
[T]here appear three . . . totalitarian elements . . . peculiar to . . . ideological thinking.
First, in their claim to total explanation, ideologies . . . explain not what is, but what
becomes, what is born and passes away . . . .   Secondly, . . . ideological thinking
becomes independent of all experience . . . .  Thirdly, since ideologies have no power
to transform reality, they achieve . . . emancipation of thought from experience
through certain methods of demonstration.  Ideological thinking orders facts into an
absolutely logical procedure . . . it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in
the realm of reality . . . .  Once it has established its premise, its point of departure,
experiences no longer interfere with ideological thinking, nor can it be taught by
reality . . . .  The device . . . totalitarian rulers used to transform . . . ideologies into
weapons . . . was deceptively simple and inconspicuous: they took them dead
seriously . . . .  [S]tringent logicality as a guide to action permeates the whole structure
of totalitarian movements and governments.
Id. at 470-72.
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personal understanding, integration or responsibility.  People who
substitute ideology for understanding end up making up slogans
when the situation calls for reasoning.214  A person dependent upon
slogans for guidance is incapable of proceeding to justice.215
The practice of justice is not the practice of domination.216  Finding
ways to get people to agree with you, to go along with your program,
may lead to situations organized to your taste and to your benefit.
That path, however, inclines you to move “against” people, which is
contrary to the requirements of justice.  Within the contours of the
practice of justice no one is the ‘enemy”, no one can be treated for
long as an antagonist.217  When we find ourselves opposed to others
                                                          
214. See ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 32 (noting that the words “rebellion” and
“revolt” never indicated liberation and even less did they point to the establishment of a new
freedom).
215. See LEVINAS, TOTALITY & INFINITY, supra note 52, at 246.
Justice would not be possible without the singularity, the unicity of subjectivity.  In this
justice subjectivity does not figure as a formal reason, but as individuality . . . .  The
deepening of the inner life can no longer be guided by evidences of history.  It is given
over to risk and to the moral certainty of the I—to horizons more vast than history, in
which history itself is judged . . . .  To place oneself . . . under the . . . judgment of God-
but equally failing to recognize the subjectivity.
Id.
[J]ustice summons me to go beyond the straight line of justice, and henceforth
nothing can mark the end of this march; behind the straight line of the law the land of
goodness extends infinite and unexplored, necessitating all the resources of a singular
presence.  I am therefore necessary for justice, as responsible beyond every limit fixed
by law.
 Id. at 245.
216. CORNELL, IMAGINARY DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 4-5.
There are three conditions that insure a minimum degree of individuation which I
defend as necessary for the equivalent chance to transform ourselves into individuated
beings who can participate in public and political life as equal citizens . . . .  For a
person to be able to shine through, she must first be able to imagine herself as whole .
. . .  [T]he freedom to struggle to become a person is a chance or opportunity which
depends on a prior set of conditions that I refer to as minimum conditions of
individuation . . . .  Given my understanding of the person as involving an endless
process of working through, each of us must have the chance to take on this struggle
in his or her own unique way.
Id.
217. LEVINAS, PHILOSOPHICALWRITINGS, supra note 35, at 146 (“The religious discourse that
precedes all religious discourse is not dialogue.  It is the ‘here I am’ said to a neighbor to whom
I am given over, by which I announce peace, that is, my responsibility for the other.”).  “The
fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third in relation to another, likewise a neighbor, is the
birth of thought, of consciousness, of justice, and of philosophy.”  Id. at 95.  “Responsibility goes
beyond being.  In sincerity, in frankness, in the veracity of this saying, in the uncoveredness of
suffering, being is altered.”  Id. at 121.  “My responsibility for the other . . . testifies to Infinity.”
Id. at 103; see also Derrida, supra note 110, at 21.  Derrida is not entirely at home with Levinas’
characterizations of justice.  See id.  Nor can I attribute to Derrida direct support for the
statement.  However, in part his framework is shareable. Describing the aporia, the
deconstructive tension, the seemingly paradoxical and meaning giving relation, the privileged
instability between law and justice.  See id.  Derrida states that “I shall . . . propose . . . a difficult
and unstable distinction between justice and droit, between justice (infinite, incalculable,
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we can be sure that domination, not justice, is at work as the shaping
force in the situation.
f
Force is associated with tension, anxiety, disturbance, and stress.
Harmony is associated with easier ways of achieving cooperative
behavior.  Sharing may be an attribute of safety and security.218
Hoarding and other selfish, self-centered behaviors are associated
with experiences of deprivation, need, and desperation.219  Getting
things right through domination, direction, control may appeal at a
superficial level toward the construction of ordered liberty.  In the
justice context, though, superficial orderings are not the goal.  We
yearn for a level of mutual ease that is inconsistent with
compulsion.220  What we need is to learn how to be sensitive to our
                                                          
rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic) and the exercise
of justice as law or right, legitimacy or legality, stabilizable and statutory, calculable, a system of
regulated and coded prescriptions.”  Id. at 22.  Derrida is tempted to compare the concept of
justice he is working out to Levinas’ construction because both arise out of infinitude, both
emphasize a heteronomic relation to others— “to the faces of otherness that govern me, whose
infinity I cannot thematize and whose hostage I remain.”  Id.  “Levinas’s notion of justice,”
Derrida tells us, “might sooner be compared to the Hebrew equivalent of . . . ‘sanctity’.”  Id. at
22.  Nevertheless, Derrida tells us that borrowing these conceptualizations from Levinas would
create an undue risk of confusion, as he thrusts us back into the unstable and vitalizing relation,
the aporia, between justice and droit (right/law).  See id.
218. SIU, supra note 10, at 206.
The degree of human warmth and naturalness with which persons relate to others is a
reflection of their self-confidence, which, in turn, is a function of their native
capability, relative to the increment of change being pursued. Should the latter lie
fully within their own capacity to accomplish, they can deal with the world . . . on a . . .
more personal basis . . . .  [C]ontented with minimum levels of material goods and
power, while going around sprinkling sunshine into people’s lives . . . it is conceivable
that practically all their dealings with the world . . . can be human and personal.
Id.
219. Id. at 156 (stating that in Brazil in the 1950s, Francisco Juliao was organizing
revolutionary peasant leagues.)  Padre Antonio Costa, a  parish priest in Cabo, a village located
in the path of the revolutionary organizer, was asked about Juliao’s appeal.  “They do not
believe in Juliao,” he responded, “they do not believe in the Church; they do not believe in
anything,” answered the Padre.  “They are too hungry to believe.”  Id.
220. LAO TZU, supra note 76, at 30.
Whenever you advise a ruler on the way of the Tao,/ Counsel him not to use force to
conquer the universe./For this would only cause resistance./ Thorn bushes spring up
wherever the army has passed./Lean years follow the wake of a great war./Just do what
needs to be done./Never take advantage of power.
He who stands on tiptoe is not steady./He who strides cannot maintain the pace. /He
who makes a show is not enlightened./He who is self-righteous is not respected./ He
who boasts achieves nothing./ He who brags will not endure./ According to followers
of the Tao,/ ‘These are extra food and unnecessary luggage.’/ They do not bring
happiness./Therefore followers of the Tao avoid them.
Id. at 24.
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own relative ease or comfort as well as how and when others
experience safety.  Somewhere formulas for options distinguishable
from emotional blackmail or mutual irritation passed off as tolerance
can emerge from committed practice.221
g
The strong force of expectations pushes, pulls, limits, inhibits and
often drives us.  Unless and until you learn to make constant
adjustments to your expectation maps, you may find yourself
victimized by your own judgments.
First, your expectations may become universalized for you.222  By
projecting your personal expectations outside the contexts of their
relevancy, you judge yourself and others: as just; as unjust; using tests
and standards inappropriate to the circumstances.
Second, if you have a tendency to dominate, a taste for control, you
may start manipulating situations to correspond with your
expectations.223  Anyone who controls a situation in order to satisfy
her expectations, and thereby, satisfy her sense of justice runs a
serious risk of finding herself criticized when she expected respect.
Disappointment follows.
The secret is to learn to separate your personal expectations from
those of other participants in a situation. Learn to integrate all
relevant perspectives to generate a comprehensive understanding of
the expectations of all participants.224  This will allow you to move with
                                                          
221. Id. at 13.
Accept disgrace willingly./Accept misfortune as the human condition./What do you
mean by ‘Accept disgrace willingly?’/Accept being unimportant,/do not be concerned
about gain and loss./That is called ‘accepting disgrace willingly.’/What do you mean
by “Accepting misfortune as the human condition?’/ Misfortune comes from having a
body./Without a body, how could there be misfortune?/Surrender yourself humbly;
then you can be trusted to care for all things./Love the world as your own self; then
you can truly care for all things.
Id.; see also WILHELM, supra note 39, at 152.
When one encounters an obstruction, the important thing is to reflect on how best to
deal with it.  When threatened with danger, one should not strive blindly to go ahead,
for this only leads to complications.  The correct thing is . . . to retreat for the time
being . . . to await the right moment for action.
Id.
222. See BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 1007 (explaining that “[t]he authors warn of
false universalisms, in which overgeneralizations or unstated reference points implicitly
attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant subset of that group.”).
223. See ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 31, at 250 (describing the way the Bolsheviks
interpreted as mandatory revolutionary conduct patterns of suspiciousness established during
the French revolution).
224. See BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 1102-05 (citing Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,
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grace to achieve a balanced result instead of compelling or
dominating by violence those with less power to accede to the wishes
of those with more power.
h
Putting down the ways of violence, the ways of force, power,
compulsion is easier when we remember that beyond the bare
necessities none of the things society offers can satisfy human need or
desire.225  There is nothing any of us can do about this formulation
except to demean others or ourselves in our attempts to deny this
simple fact of life.  The world has little of value to humans beyond
the necessities of secure existence, except insofar as life offers us an
opportunity to share in the experience of life.
                                                          
103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-85 (1990)).  According to Bartlett, Positionality is a stance or
perspective, which utilizes a concept of experientially determined knowledge.  Id.
Experience interacts with an individual’s current perceptions to reveal new
understandings . . . .  [P]ositionality rejects the perfectibility, externality, or objectivity
of truth . . . .  Truth is situated in that it emerges from particular involvements and
relationships . . . .  No individual can understand except from some limited
perspective . . . .  [T]he key to increasing knowledge lies in the effort to extend one’s
limited perspective . . . .  [P]erspective [can be improved] by stretching .  .  .
imagination to Identify and understand the perspective of others.
Id.; see also REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 577-78 (citing Lasswell & McDougal, Theory
About Law, supra note 1, at 374-94) (defining ‘participant observer’ as the term Lasswell taught
me to employ to identify what, in their literature, is referred to as the ‘observational
standpoint’).  In this article, Lasswell and McDougal take pains to note that a participant must
be able to distinguish the observational standpoint of a scholar and decision-maker.  Id.  A
scholar, they warn must not permit “the perspectives and communication signs of the
participants in legal and social process, which are a part of the data he is observing, to dominate
his own perspectives and instruments of inquiry and communication . . .” lest confusion and
distortion cloud scholarly perception.  Id. at 577.  To serve an enlightening function, Lasswell
and McDougal recommend that scholars develop acute consciousness of their own community
identifications
seek[ing] to make appropriate discount for the biases of [personal] cultural
background, class and group memberships, personality formation and previous
experience - to assume a vantage point different from that of the active community
participants who make claims before processes of authoritative decision or of the
authoritative decision-makers who respond to such claims, and from this vantage point
to clarify and Identify for the different participants in community process the common
interests which they . . . may not have been able to perceive.
Id. at 578.
225. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 45.  See also LAO TZU, supra note 76, at 53.
When the court is arrayed in splendor,/The fields are full of weeds,/ And the
granaries are bare. / Some wear gorgeous clothes,/Carry sharp swords,/And indulge
themselves with food and drink;/ They have more possessions than they can use./
They are robber barons./ This is certainly not the way of Tao.
Id.; SANTIDEVA, supra note 36, at 99 (considering “wealth as an unending misfortune because of
the troubles of acquiring, protecting, and losing it.  Those whose minds are attached to wealth
on account of their distracted state have no opportunity for liberation.”).
84
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/3
HARZENSKI.FINAL.ASC02 9/19/01  5:34 PM
2001] REDEFINING VIOLENCE 389
The best thing you can do for yourself and for others is to go
through life with yourself and with others in as kind and gracious a
way as possible.226  Seen from the perspective of someone trying to
“make it” in life, this statement strikes a discordant note.  It suggests
foolishness.  But it is not foolish.  It is wise.227  Conveniently—and, I
suggest, not at all coincidentally - justice, the practice of justice, the
art of justice, is a direct way to work toward and to achieve a mature,
caring regard for the value of life.228
                                                          
226. See POLANYI, supra note 42, at 45 (speaking admiringly about the fact that
“[e]verywhere in the world there are people who are trusted . . . to tell the truth or to be fair;
there are consciences touched by compassion, struggling against ties of comfort or the
callousness born of harsh custom.”); see also RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 165 (“The world . . .
stands in need of . . . certain moral qualities . . . .  The qualities most needed are charity and
tolerance . . . .”); FREUD READER, supra note 3, at 744.
A small minority . . . find happiness . . . along the path of love . . . .  [F]ar-reaching
mental changes in the function of love are necessary before this can happen.  These
people make themselves independent of their object’s acquiescence by displacing what
they mainly value from being loved on to loving; they protect themselves against the
loss of the object by directing their love . . . to all . . . alike; they avoId the uncertainties
and disappointments of genital love by turning away from sexual aims and
transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim.  What they bring to
themselves in this way is a state of evenly suspended, steadfast, affectionate feeling . . . .
Perhaps St. Francis of Assisi went furthest in thus exploiting love for the benefit of an
inner feeling of happiness.
Id.; see also SABINE, supra note 19, at 928.
[T]he moral problem of human beings oblige[s them] to meet and conduct their
transactions in situations such that simple coercion is beyond the reach of either party
. . . .  [I]t is the problem of finding . . . a reserve of good will and good faith . . . .  [I]t is
not a new problem . . . .  The solution . . . can[not] be reduced to a ‘system’ or
formula, for it is in substance a moral attitude or temper of mind . . . .  Aristotle
suggested . . . these capacities underlie the human ability to form communities . . . .
[I]n them men can meet as . . . equals . . . .  [D]ifferences of rank and authority can be
matters of mutual acceptance and . . . mutual respect . . . rather than matters of
coercion and deception . . . .
Id.
227. SABINE, supra note 19, at 929 (“[H]owever it may have been formulated, the idea of
natural law expressed the conviction that men can meet in a spirit of fairness, of mutual good-
will and good faith . . . .  The belief that some such attitude is humanly possible . . . was
ingrained in the long tradition of Western humanism . . . .”  And, these ideas, Sabine says, “are
the best that the wisdom of the democratic tradition has created . . . .”); see also POLANYI, supra
note 42, at 47.
The general foundations of coherence and freedom in society may be regarded as
secure to the extent to which men uphold their belief in the reality of truth, justice,
charity and tolerance, and accept dedication to the service of these realities; while
society may be expected to disintegrate and fall into servitude when men deny, explain
away, or simply disregard these realities and . . . obligations.
Id.
228. POLANYI, supra note 42, at 29-30.
The ideal of a free society is . . . to be a good society; a body of men who respect truth,
desire justice, and love their fellows.  It is only because these aspirations coincide with
the claims of . . . conscience, that the institutions which secure their pursuit are
recognized by us as the safeguards of our freedom.  It is misleading to describe a
society thus constituted, which is an instrument of our consciences, as established for
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i
One final story to end this piece.  This story is about another friend
of mine, not the friend whose father killed her mother, but a friend
whose brother murdered her sister-in-law, a woman who was also her
best friend and co-worker. Sadly and horribly, in a fit of jealous rage,
my friend’s brother slaughtered his wife.229
This occurred over six years ago.  The brother is in prison for life.
The children of that tragic marriage live with their mother’s sister,
isolated from everyone in their father’s family for fear of
contamination.  You see, the sister, who is now the caretaker, is
convinced that the family that produced the murderous husband is
sickening and threatens to spread its violent disease to whoever
comes and stays in close proximity.  My friend continues to work in
the same factory with pretty much the same people where she and
her sister-in-law had been employed.
My friend recently has been allowed to visit with her niece and
nephew.  She has begun to examine the role she played in events
leading up to the murder.  Deep within herself she believes she might
have some guilt concerning her brother’s actions, since she told her
mother who told her brother that his wife was talking flirtatiously at a
bar with some other guy.  My friend told her mother for “something
to talk about:” probably not thinking at all; or thinking only that her
sister-in-law was flirting with danger in one way or another; thinking
to get some “quality” time with her mother by relating this tasty
morsel of gossip; or maybe thinking her mother could talk to her
                                                          
the sake of our individual selves; for it protects our conscience from our own greed,
ambition . . . .  Morally, men live by what they sacrifice to their conscience; therefore,
the citizen of a free society . . . depends on society for his moral existence.  His social
responsibilities give him occasion to a moral life . . . .
Id.
229. See FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 19, at 193.
I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions.  I do not mean to say,
however, that truth is therefore absent.  It seems to me that the possibility exists for
fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for
bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or “manufactures” something that
does not as yet exist, that is, “fictions” it.
Id.; see also ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 119, at 474 (contributing a troublesome
rejoinder).  “The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced
Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of
experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no
longer exist.”  Id.  The facts underlying this section occurred about two years ago.  As with the
first story, I cannot provide enough information to allow others to identify the people I write
about.  Their privacy, already shockingly invaded by my use of these individuals as subjects,
entitles them to as much confidentiality as possible under the circumstances.
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daughter-in-law about her conduct; or thinking her own conduct was
equally troublesome so throwing some guilt around was a way of
handling internal pressures of conscience.
My friend loved her sister-in-law.  Her bloody body in her bloody
trailer sits in my friend’s mind, on her mind; you might say it haunts
her.  She wants freedom from her guilt.  She wants to identify the
points and degree of her responsibility so she can find a way to
amend the situation.  She wants to bring peace to her disquieted
conscience.  She has been to counseling.  The process is long and
hard and she does what she can.  Every day she confronts people at
work who, she imagines, talk behind her back about her role in this
awful deed.  Someday, she reassures herself, she will be able to talk
this over with them.  They will be able to come to some acceptance
with each other.
Like the protagonist in Qui Ju, my friend seeks justice.
This week at work an event occurred that threw her into turmoil.
As part of the company’s participation in United Way, speakers from
funded community groups are invited in to give brief informative
talks to the assembled work force.  This week’s speaker was from a
support group for victims of violent crime and for the families of the
victims of violent crime.  The speaker--we can only imagine
unknowingly--decided to focus her remarks on a six year old area
murder.  My friend found herself front-row- center for the retelling of
her family horror story.  Too shaken to move, she remained in her
seat, sobbing and tearful, as the awful facts of this murder and of the
effects of this murder on the parents, sisters, brothers children,
neighbors of her sister-in-law were addressed.
There are two things I want to say about the event.  First, even
though it was an immediately disturbing event for my friend, in the
long run I believe this episode will lead her toward her goal.  The
refreshed publication of the murder in a working community
intimately involved with it resulted in trauma.  The trauma elicited
counseling.  As a result, everyone was provided with professional
assistance.  This may enable them to expiate long held disturbances.
My friend is more able to talk with her co-workers about the situation
now.  That is a positive development.  Second, it is an odd fact, a
positive but concerning coincidence, that the speaker brought in to
talk about the suffering of people affected by violent crime inhabited
a world so circumscribed that she identified the victims in a one-sided
way.  Maybe we are not used to thinking about how violence damages
those who commit it as well as those who are the selected victims of
the perpetrators.  It affects those close to the victims.  It affects those
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close to the perpetrators.  Eventually, it affects the people close to the
people immediately involved.  Then, it effects the neighborhoods,
the schools, the streets, the places we meet and work, the way we
relate to one another, how we behave, what we do and what we think,
how we teach our children, how we treat each other.  It affects the
laws we write, the laws we enforce, our attitudes, and our values.
In the face of violence, there is no hard barrier of impenetrability
that stops the osmosis of damage.  Pebble-in-the-pond ripples spread
out in all directions.  Who would doubt the devastation my friend
suffers because of this crime?  Who would doubt the damage to her
children, to her mother?  Who would doubt the damage to the other
co-workers at this company, or to that unidentified man in the bar
who spoke with the deceased?
In the face of pervasive, invasive, hostile, antagonistic negative
judgment carried along by willfully and/or carelessly disregarding the
dignity of each person, how are we to conduct ourselves?  When we
have been infected ourselves, when we carry into action the
resenting, alienated, self-absorbed personality characteristics of
sufferers,230 how are we to avoid inflicting like suffering on others?
                                                          
230. See ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 119, at 476-78.
Solitude can become loneliness; this happens when all by myself I am deserted by my
own self . . . .  What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self which
can be realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and
trustworthy company of my equals . . . .  What prepares men for totalitarian
domination in the non-totalitarian world is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline
experience usually suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has
become an everyday experience . . . .”
Id.; see also ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 88-90 (considering the human experience “world
alienation” buffeted by “frightening arbitrariness,” “melancholy haphazardness”).  These
processes, according to Arendt, devour objectivity, render meaningless traditions counted on to
create common memory, i.e., history, subject the boundaries of nature to human manipulation,
leaving behind “a society . . . without a common world.”  People “live in desperate lonely
separation or are pressed together into a mass.”  Id. at 89-90; see also FREUD READER, supra note
3, at 296.  “[T]he devil is . . . nothing else than the personification of the repressed unconscious
instinctual life.” And, “[P]ermanent character-traits are either unchanged prolongations of
original instincts, or sublimations of those instincts, or reaction-formations against them.”  Id. at
297.  In terms of specifics, Freud mentions: “[T]he intense ‘burning’ ambition of people who
earlier suffered from enuresis.”  Id.  “The connections between the complexes of interest in
money and of defaecation.”  Id. at 296.  “[T]hese character-traits of orderliness, parsimony and
obstinacy, which are so often prominent in people who were formerly anal erotics . . . .”  Id. at
295. In another section of the book Freud states that “[w]hen an instinctual trend undergoes
repression, its libidinal elements are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into
a sense of guilt.”  Id. at 767.  Further, “[T]he price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss
of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt.”  Id. at 763.  “[C]ivilization,” Freud
tells us, “is built upon a renunciation of instinct . . . .  This ‘cultural frustration’ dominates
the . . . field of social relations . . . .  [I]t is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations
have to struggle.”  Id. at 742.  Finally, a Freudian insight inconsistent with the general emphasis
of this article, but one we need to ponder, the founder of psycho-analysis posits: “It is not easy
to understand how it can be possible to deprive an instinct of satisfaction.  Nor is doing so
without danger.  If the loss is not compensated for economically, one can be certain that serious
disorders will ensue.”  Id. at 742.
88
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/3
HARZENSKI.FINAL.ASC02 9/19/01  5:34 PM
2001] REDEFINING VIOLENCE 393
When we redefine violence, let’s do it in ways that include us.231
Like my friends, most of us need help.I certainly do not mean we
should limit or inhibit extending assistance to obvious sufferers.
Instead, I mean we should not imagine those who inflict violence as
alien monsters while casting ourselves in the role of objective
observers.  We are sometimes victims, sometimes victimizers.  We are
perpetrators and sufferers.  Let’s study how it works so we can take
responsibility for our actions.
                                                          
231. See ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 119, at 474-75.
Isolation and impotence, that is the fundamental inability to act . . . have always been
characteristic of tyrannies . . . .  What we call isolation in the political sphere, is called
loneliness in the sphere of social intercourse . . . .  [W]hen the most elementary form
of human creativity, . . . the capacity to add something of one’s own to the common
world, is destroyed, isolation becomes unbearable . . . .  [T]otalitarianism . . . bases
itself on loneliness, on the experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is
among the most radical and desperate experiences . . . .
Id.; see also ARENDT, PAST, supra note 28, at 111 (“[V]iolence is inevitably inherent in all activities
of making, fabricating, and producing, that is, in all activities by which men confront nature
directly . . . .  The building of . . . human artifice always involves some violence . . . .”).
The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying moment that
institutes law implies a performative force, . . . power or violence.  Justice . . . [i]ts very
moment of foundation . . . the operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating,
justifying law (droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative . . .
violence . . . that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment
could guarantee or contradict or invalidate.
DERRIDA, supra note 110, at 13.  And, more simply “[T]he violence of an injustice has begun
when all the members of a community do not share the same idiom throughout.”  Id. at 18.
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